# HG changeset patch # User Antoine Pitrou # Date 1368892602 -7200 # Node ID c627638753e2d25a98950585b259104a025937a9 # Parent 9682241dc8fcb4b1aef083bd30860efa070c3d6d Issue #17980: Fix possible abuse of ssl.match_hostname() for denial of service using certificates with many wildcards (CVE-2013-2099). diff --git a/Lib/ssl.py b/Lib/ssl.py --- a/Lib/ssl.py +++ b/Lib/ssl.py @@ -129,9 +129,16 @@ class CertificateError(ValueError): pass -def _dnsname_to_pat(dn): +def _dnsname_to_pat(dn, max_wildcards=1): pats = [] for frag in dn.split(r'.'): + if frag.count('*') > max_wildcards: + # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more + # than one wildcard per fragment. A survery of established + # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a + # reasonable choice. + raise CertificateError( + "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn)) if frag == '*': # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless # fragment. diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ssl.py b/Lib/test/test_ssl.py --- a/Lib/test/test_ssl.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_ssl.py @@ -349,6 +349,17 @@ class BasicSocketTests(unittest.TestCase self.assertRaises(ValueError, ssl.match_hostname, None, 'example.com') self.assertRaises(ValueError, ssl.match_hostname, {}, 'example.com') + # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more than one + # wildcard per fragment. + cert = {'subject': ((('commonName', 'a*b.com'),),)} + ok(cert, 'axxb.com') + cert = {'subject': ((('commonName', 'a*b.co*'),),)} + ok(cert, 'axxb.com') + cert = {'subject': ((('commonName', 'a*b*.com'),),)} + with self.assertRaises(ssl.CertificateError) as cm: + ssl.match_hostname(cert, 'axxbxxc.com') + self.assertIn("too many wildcards", str(cm.exception)) + def test_server_side(self): # server_hostname doesn't work for server sockets ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23)