From 47cc240f66e73157c2f4dc357ce107857e61da67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Hrozek Date: Sep 11 2013 09:19:52 +0000 Subject: New upstream release 1.11.0 - Remove upstreamed patches --- diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index c68b12a..52e673d 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -47,3 +47,4 @@ sssd-1.2.91.tar.gz /sssd-1.10.0.tar.gz /sssd-1.10.1.tar.gz /sssd-1.11.0beta2.tar.gz +/sssd-1.11.0.tar.gz diff --git a/0001-proxy-Alocate-auth-tokens-in-struct-authtok_conv.patch b/0001-proxy-Alocate-auth-tokens-in-struct-authtok_conv.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e82eeca..0000000 --- a/0001-proxy-Alocate-auth-tokens-in-struct-authtok_conv.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -From 545f49b72cdf8453fb0b85c9d87e7d4711da57da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Lukas Slebodnik -Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 13:21:31 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] proxy: Alocate auth tokens in struct authtok_conv - -Struct sss_auth_token became opaque in commit -9acfb09f7969a69f58bd45c856b01700541853ca. -All ocasions of "struct sss_auth_token" was replaced with pointer to this -struct, but proper initialization of auth_tokens was missing -in struct authtok_conv. - -Resolves: -https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2046 - -diff --git a/src/providers/proxy/proxy_child.c b/src/providers/proxy/proxy_child.c -index efdf9120a8ec529283aa3f2c6cacd98d659a6ef7..6f95ede6af78f0286933fc4259dd258ef69f2d37 100644 ---- a/src/providers/proxy/proxy_child.c -+++ b/src/providers/proxy/proxy_child.c -@@ -201,6 +201,23 @@ static errno_t call_pam_stack(const char *pam_target, struct pam_data *pd) - conv.conv=proxy_internal_conv; - } - auth_data = talloc_zero(pd, struct authtok_conv); -+ if (auth_data == NULL) { -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, ("talloc_zero failed.\n")); -+ return ENOMEM; -+ } -+ auth_data->authtok = sss_authtok_new(auth_data); -+ if (auth_data->authtok == NULL) { -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, ("sss_authtok_new failed.\n")); -+ ret = ENOMEM; -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ auth_data->newauthtok = sss_authtok_new(auth_data); -+ if (auth_data->newauthtok == NULL) { -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, ("sss_authtok_new failed.\n")); -+ ret = ENOMEM; -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ - conv.appdata_ptr=auth_data; - - ret = pam_start(pam_target, pd->user, &conv, &pamh); -@@ -279,6 +296,9 @@ static errno_t call_pam_stack(const char *pam_target, struct pam_data *pd) - pd->pam_status = pam_status; - - return EOK; -+fail: -+ talloc_free(auth_data); -+ return ret; - } - - static int pc_pam_handler(DBusMessage *message, struct sbus_connection *conn) --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/0002-mmap_cache-Check-if-slot-and-name_ptr-are-not-invali.patch b/0002-mmap_cache-Check-if-slot-and-name_ptr-are-not-invali.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 493cf0f..0000000 --- a/0002-mmap_cache-Check-if-slot-and-name_ptr-are-not-invali.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,196 +0,0 @@ -From 9028706a00da1bc48547e74aa872c825ac15adb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Michal Zidek -Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2013 20:59:33 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mmap_cache: Check if slot and name_ptr are not invalid. - -This patch prevents jumping outside of allocated memory in -case of corrupted slot or name_ptr values. It is not proper -solution, just hotfix until we find out what is the root cause -of ticket https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2018 ---- - src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- - src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h | 2 ++ - src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c | 8 ++++++ - src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c | 8 ++++++ - src/util/mmap_cache.h | 3 ++ - 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -index 49878fcfb91c195fb864c83e1da0163a23dbe5a7..cd5a6436e005b4c7f5622eaff2f259de3bbe5d29 100644 ---- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -+++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -@@ -373,8 +373,23 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, -+ ("Corrupted fastcache. Slot number too big.\n")); -+ sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ - rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); - name_ptr = *((rel_ptr_t *)rec->data); -+ /* FIXME: This check relies on fact that offset of member strs -+ * is the same in structures sss_mc_pwd_data and sss_mc_group_data. */ -+ if (name_ptr != offsetof(struct sss_mc_pwd_data, strs)) { -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, -+ ("Corrupted fastcache. name_ptr value is %u.\n", name_ptr)); -+ sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); -+ return NULL; -+ } - - t_key = (char *)rec->data + name_ptr; - if (strcmp(key->str, t_key) == 0) { -@@ -608,6 +623,13 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_pw_invalidate_uid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, uid_t uid) - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Corrupted fastcache.\n")); -+ sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); -+ ret = ENOENT; -+ goto done; -+ } -+ - rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); - data = (struct sss_mc_pwd_data *)(&rec->data); - -@@ -739,6 +761,13 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_gr_invalidate_gid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, gid_t gid) - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Corrupted fastcache.\n")); -+ sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); -+ ret = ENOENT; -+ goto done; -+ } -+ - rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); - data = (struct sss_mc_grp_data *)(&rec->data); - -@@ -889,8 +918,9 @@ static void sss_mc_header_update(struct sss_mc_ctx *mc_ctx, int status) - /* update header using barriers */ - h = (struct sss_mc_header *)mc_ctx->mmap_base; - MC_RAISE_BARRIER(h); -- if (status != SSS_MC_HEADER_RECYCLED) { -- /* no reason to update anything else if the file is recycled */ -+ if (status == SSS_MC_HEADER_ALIVE) { -+ /* no reason to update anything else if the file is recycled or -+ * right before reset */ - h->hash_table = MC_PTR_DIFF(mc_ctx->hash_table, mc_ctx->mmap_base); - h->free_table = MC_PTR_DIFF(mc_ctx->free_table, mc_ctx->mmap_base); - h->data_table = MC_PTR_DIFF(mc_ctx->data_table, mc_ctx->mmap_base); -@@ -1113,3 +1143,23 @@ done: - talloc_free(tmp_ctx); - return ret; - } -+ -+/* Erase all contents of the mmap cache. This will bring the cache -+ * to the same state as if it was just initialized. */ -+void sss_mmap_cache_reset(struct sss_mc_ctx *mc_ctx) -+{ -+ if (mc_ctx == NULL) { -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, -+ ("Fastcache not initialized. Nothing to do.\n")); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ sss_mc_header_update(mc_ctx, SSS_MC_HEADER_UNINIT); -+ -+ /* Reset the mmaped area */ -+ memset(mc_ctx->data_table, 0xff, mc_ctx->dt_size); -+ memset(mc_ctx->free_table, 0x00, mc_ctx->ft_size); -+ memset(mc_ctx->hash_table, 0xff, mc_ctx->ht_size); -+ -+ sss_mc_header_update(mc_ctx, SSS_MC_HEADER_ALIVE); -+} -diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h -index 25cec40cc26d6732c1465c014ab5aab4a59ec906..fdeaa09126858b04958f4e3eee17b8a92cf61350 100644 ---- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h -+++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h -@@ -63,4 +63,6 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_gr_invalidate_gid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, gid_t gid); - errno_t sss_mmap_cache_reinit(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, size_t n_elem, - time_t timeout, struct sss_mc_ctx **mc_ctx); - -+void sss_mmap_cache_reset(struct sss_mc_ctx *mc_ctx); -+ - #endif /* _NSSSRV_MMAP_CACHE_H_ */ -diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -index b3e9a8a0bd6b0a90783d60c8809bb1f542b31f54..2d69be93b76587a7e474c1db55430930ca850321 100644 ---- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted. */ -+ return ENOENT; -+ } - - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { -@@ -180,6 +184,10 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted. */ -+ return ENOENT; -+ } - - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { -diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -index 4acc6425e2609c140d71a1013ca203d7db074e02..fa21bd2896a1de868735cd6d22d09159fd3d8ed2 100644 ---- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -@@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted */ -+ return ENOENT; -+ } - - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { -@@ -181,6 +185,10 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted */ -+ return ENOENT; -+ } - - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { -diff --git a/src/util/mmap_cache.h b/src/util/mmap_cache.h -index 55383c056b36460676958754baada9c294331b5e..6c223df6c79b5ac10786903eecd1cb8c8a3999a5 100644 ---- a/src/util/mmap_cache.h -+++ b/src/util/mmap_cache.h -@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ typedef uint32_t rel_ptr_t; - #define SSS_MC_MAJOR_VNO 0 - #define SSS_MC_MINOR_VNO 4 - -+#define SSS_MC_HEADER_UNINIT 0 /* after ftruncate or before reset */ - #define SSS_MC_HEADER_ALIVE 1 /* current and in use */ - #define SSS_MC_HEADER_RECYCLED 2 /* file was recycled, reopen asap */ - -@@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ struct sss_mc_rec { - char data[0]; - }; - -+/* FIXME: Function sss_mc_find_record currently relies on fact that -+ * offset of strs is the same in both sss_mc_pwd_data and sss_mc_grp_data. */ - struct sss_mc_pwd_data { - rel_ptr_t name; /* ptr to name string, rel. to struct base addr */ - uint32_t uid; --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/0003-mmap_cache-Check-data-name-value-in-client-code.patch b/0003-mmap_cache-Check-data-name-value-in-client-code.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 089fb09..0000000 --- a/0003-mmap_cache-Check-data-name-value-in-client-code.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,119 +0,0 @@ -From 8a5931bcc8e9034e4beb92fc9addf3f7fcf83fd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Michal Zidek -Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 19:29:56 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/4] mmap_cache: Check data->name value in client code - -data->name value must be checked to prevent segfaults in -case of corrupted memory cache. - -resolves: -https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2018 ---- - src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ - src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -index 2d69be93b76587a7e474c1db55430930ca850321..da5da0411e556c30c4a3db6faf80139d65ae817c 100644 ---- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - #include - #include - #include "nss_mc.h" -@@ -102,12 +103,17 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - uint32_t hash; - uint32_t slot; - int ret; -+ size_t strs_offset; -+ uint8_t *max_addr; - - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_ctx("group", &gr_mc_ctx); - if (ret) { - return ret; - } - -+ /* Get max address of data table. */ -+ max_addr = gr_mc_ctx.data_table + gr_mc_ctx.dt_size; -+ - /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ - hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&gr_mc_ctx, name, name_len + 1); - slot = gr_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; -@@ -133,7 +139,19 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - continue; - } - -+ strs_offset = offsetof(struct sss_mc_grp_data, strs); - data = (struct sss_mc_grp_data *)rec->data; -+ /* Integrity check -+ * - name_len cannot be longer than all strings -+ * - data->name cannot point outside strings -+ * - all strings must be within data_table */ -+ if (name_len > data->strs_len -+ || (data->name + name_len) > (strs_offset + data->strs_len) -+ || (uint8_t *)data->strs + data->strs_len > max_addr) { -+ ret = ENOENT; -+ goto done; -+ } -+ - rec_name = (char *)data + data->name; - if (strcmp(name, rec_name) == 0) { - break; -diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -index fa21bd2896a1de868735cd6d22d09159fd3d8ed2..4b08766857d5013e6f13c3dbe574c5a88fa915b0 100644 ---- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - #include - #include - #include "nss_mc.h" -@@ -103,12 +104,17 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - uint32_t hash; - uint32_t slot; - int ret; -+ size_t strs_offset; -+ uint8_t *max_addr; - - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_ctx("passwd", &pw_mc_ctx); - if (ret) { - return ret; - } - -+ /* Get max address of data table. */ -+ max_addr = pw_mc_ctx.data_table + pw_mc_ctx.dt_size; -+ - /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ - hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&pw_mc_ctx, name, name_len + 1); - slot = pw_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; -@@ -134,7 +140,20 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - continue; - } - -+ strs_offset = offsetof(struct sss_mc_pwd_data, strs); -+ - data = (struct sss_mc_pwd_data *)rec->data; -+ /* Integrity check -+ * - name_len cannot be longer than all strings -+ * - data->name cannot point outside strings -+ * - all strings must be within data_table */ -+ if (name_len > data->strs_len -+ || (data->name + name_len) > (strs_offset + data->strs_len) -+ || (uint8_t *)data->strs + data->strs_len > max_addr) { -+ ret = ENOENT; -+ goto done; -+ } -+ - rec_name = (char *)data + data->name; - if (strcmp(name, rec_name) == 0) { - break; --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/0004-mmap_cache-Remove-triple-checks-in-client-code.patch b/0004-mmap_cache-Remove-triple-checks-in-client-code.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 64422d1..0000000 --- a/0004-mmap_cache-Remove-triple-checks-in-client-code.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -From e61044d99ce1e68057fda236f04a731f1f3f299a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Michal Zidek -Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 18:01:30 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 2/4] mmap_cache: Remove triple checks in client code. - -We had pattern in client code with 3 conditions -that can be replaced with one. ---- - src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c | 30 ++++++++++-------------------- - src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c | 30 ++++++++++-------------------- - 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -index da5da0411e556c30c4a3db6faf80139d65ae817c..9fe72a60e58e0c94f0c38f243276060b70f28aa9 100644 ---- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -@@ -117,16 +117,11 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ - hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&gr_mc_ctx, name, name_len + 1); - slot = gr_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -- return ENOENT; -- } -- -- while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -- /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted. */ -- return ENOENT; -- } - -+ /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and -+ * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is -+ * probbably corrupted. */ -+ while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { - goto done; -@@ -160,7 +155,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - slot = rec->next; - } - -- if (slot == MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } -@@ -197,16 +192,11 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, - /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ - hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&gr_mc_ctx, gidstr, len+1); - slot = gr_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -- return ENOENT; -- } -- -- while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -- /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted. */ -- return ENOENT; -- } - -+ /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and -+ * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is -+ * probbably corrupted. */ -+ while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { - goto done; -@@ -227,7 +217,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, - slot = rec->next; - } - -- if (slot == MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } -diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -index 4b08766857d5013e6f13c3dbe574c5a88fa915b0..7aca4a04b6b19b50b883960229083b688639ee4f 100644 ---- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -@@ -118,16 +118,11 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ - hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&pw_mc_ctx, name, name_len + 1); - slot = pw_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -- return ENOENT; -- } -- -- while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -- /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted */ -- return ENOENT; -- } - -+ /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and -+ * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is -+ * probbably corrupted. */ -+ while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { - goto done; -@@ -162,7 +157,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - slot = rec->next; - } - -- if (slot == MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } -@@ -199,16 +194,11 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, - /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ - hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&pw_mc_ctx, uidstr, len+1); - slot = pw_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -- return ENOENT; -- } -- -- while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -- /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted */ -- return ENOENT; -- } - -+ /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and -+ * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is -+ * probbably corrupted. */ -+ while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { - goto done; -@@ -229,7 +219,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, - slot = rec->next; - } - -- if (slot == MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/0005-mmap_cache-Off-by-one-error.patch b/0005-mmap_cache-Off-by-one-error.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a6a9837..0000000 --- a/0005-mmap_cache-Off-by-one-error.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,162 +0,0 @@ -From 13df7b9e400211c717284fb841c849ba034ed348 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Michal Zidek -Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 18:22:06 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 3/4] mmap_cache: Off by one error. - -Removes off by one error when using macro MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS -and adds new macro MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS. ---- - src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 12 ++++++------ - src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c | 8 ++++---- - src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c | 8 ++++---- - src/util/mmap_cache.h | 3 +++ - 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -index cd5a6436e005b4c7f5622eaff2f259de3bbe5d29..a1bab0c8d877a354451ad5c31ec5e86b294837e9 100644 ---- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -+++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -@@ -368,12 +368,12 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - hash = sss_mc_hash(mcc, key->str, key->len); - - slot = mcc->hash_table[hash]; -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { - return NULL; - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { - DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, - ("Corrupted fastcache. Slot number too big.\n")); - sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); -@@ -617,13 +617,13 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_pw_invalidate_uid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, uid_t uid) - hash = sss_mc_hash(mcc, uidstr, strlen(uidstr) + 1); - - slot = mcc->hash_table[hash]; -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { - DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Corrupted fastcache.\n")); - sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); - ret = ENOENT; -@@ -755,13 +755,13 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_gr_invalidate_gid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, gid_t gid) - hash = sss_mc_hash(mcc, gidstr, strlen(gidstr) + 1); - - slot = mcc->hash_table[hash]; -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } - - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { - DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Corrupted fastcache.\n")); - sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); - ret = ENOENT; -diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -index 9fe72a60e58e0c94f0c38f243276060b70f28aa9..4e3d9fb0dfffc2194a6d1e2035ed5782af528fce 100644 ---- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c -@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and - * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is - * probbably corrupted. */ -- while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ while (MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { - goto done; -@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - slot = rec->next; - } - -- if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } -@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, - /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and - * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is - * probbably corrupted. */ -- while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ while (MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { - goto done; -@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, - slot = rec->next; - } - -- if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } -diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -index 7aca4a04b6b19b50b883960229083b688639ee4f..a0a8d87f7475d8fea1bc32409a2d5c6af8f7896f 100644 ---- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c -@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and - * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is - * probbably corrupted. */ -- while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ while (MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { - goto done; -@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, - slot = rec->next; - } - -- if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } -@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, - /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and - * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is - * probbably corrupted. */ -- while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ while (MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); - if (ret) { - goto done; -@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, - slot = rec->next; - } - -- if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { -+ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { - ret = ENOENT; - goto done; - } -diff --git a/src/util/mmap_cache.h b/src/util/mmap_cache.h -index 6c223df6c79b5ac10786903eecd1cb8c8a3999a5..abf8cac49dda1c53cf7aa2a428eefa49c42c4d8e 100644 ---- a/src/util/mmap_cache.h -+++ b/src/util/mmap_cache.h -@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ typedef uint32_t rel_ptr_t; - #define MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(base, slot, type) \ - (type *)((base) + ((slot) * MC_SLOT_SIZE)) - -+#define MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, dt_size) \ -+ ((slot) < ((dt_size) / MC_SLOT_SIZE)) -+ - #define MC_VALID_BARRIER(val) (((val) & 0xff000000) == 0xf0000000) - - #define MC_CHECK_RECORD_LENGTH(mc_ctx, rec) \ --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/0006-mmap_cache-Use-better-checks-for-corrupted-mc-in-res.patch b/0006-mmap_cache-Use-better-checks-for-corrupted-mc-in-res.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4d88e25..0000000 --- a/0006-mmap_cache-Use-better-checks-for-corrupted-mc-in-res.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,118 +0,0 @@ -From 441e6050f4b67134d15862e401b4c4e8546d7387 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Michal Zidek -Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 16:08:17 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 4/4] mmap_cache: Use better checks for corrupted mc in - responder - -We introduced new way to check integrity of memcache in the -client code. We should use similiar checks in the responder. ---- - src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- - src/util/mmap_cache.h | 2 -- - 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -index a1bab0c8d877a354451ad5c31ec5e86b294837e9..95a7fe9dc7dd527cab6261f68d1dd0ab2f738d2a 100644 ---- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -+++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -@@ -356,6 +356,39 @@ static errno_t sss_mc_find_free_slots(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - return EOK; - } - -+static errno_t sss_mc_get_strs_offset(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, -+ size_t *_offset) -+{ -+ switch (mcc->type) { -+ case SSS_MC_PASSWD: -+ *_offset = offsetof(struct sss_mc_pwd_data, strs); -+ return EOK; -+ case SSS_MC_GROUP: -+ *_offset = offsetof(struct sss_mc_grp_data, strs); -+ return EOK; -+ default: -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Unknown memory cache type.\n")); -+ return EINVAL; -+ } -+} -+ -+static errno_t sss_mc_get_strs_len(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, -+ struct sss_mc_rec *rec, -+ size_t *_len) -+{ -+ switch (mcc->type) { -+ case SSS_MC_PASSWD: -+ *_len = ((struct sss_mc_pwd_data *)&rec->data)->strs_len; -+ return EOK; -+ case SSS_MC_GROUP: -+ *_len = ((struct sss_mc_grp_data *)&rec->data)->strs_len; -+ return EOK; -+ default: -+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Unknown memory cache type.\n")); -+ return EINVAL; -+ } -+} -+ - static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - struct sized_string *key) - { -@@ -364,6 +397,10 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - uint32_t slot; - rel_ptr_t name_ptr; - char *t_key; -+ size_t strs_offset; -+ size_t strs_len; -+ uint8_t *max_addr; -+ errno_t ret; - - hash = sss_mc_hash(mcc, key->str, key->len); - -@@ -372,6 +409,14 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - return NULL; - } - -+ /* Get max address of data table. */ -+ max_addr = mcc->data_table + mcc->dt_size; -+ -+ ret = sss_mc_get_strs_offset(mcc, &strs_offset); -+ if (ret != EOK) { -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { - if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { - DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, -@@ -381,10 +426,15 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - } - - rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); -+ ret = sss_mc_get_strs_len(mcc, rec, &strs_len); -+ if (ret != EOK) { -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ - name_ptr = *((rel_ptr_t *)rec->data); -- /* FIXME: This check relies on fact that offset of member strs -- * is the same in structures sss_mc_pwd_data and sss_mc_group_data. */ -- if (name_ptr != offsetof(struct sss_mc_pwd_data, strs)) { -+ if (key->len > strs_len -+ || (name_ptr + key->len) > (strs_offset + strs_len) -+ || (uint8_t *)rec->data + strs_offset + strs_len > max_addr) { - DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, - ("Corrupted fastcache. name_ptr value is %u.\n", name_ptr)); - sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); -diff --git a/src/util/mmap_cache.h b/src/util/mmap_cache.h -index abf8cac49dda1c53cf7aa2a428eefa49c42c4d8e..7c6693ac8151ac488fc5f4d2384749784eb98c7d 100644 ---- a/src/util/mmap_cache.h -+++ b/src/util/mmap_cache.h -@@ -113,8 +113,6 @@ struct sss_mc_rec { - char data[0]; - }; - --/* FIXME: Function sss_mc_find_record currently relies on fact that -- * offset of strs is the same in both sss_mc_pwd_data and sss_mc_grp_data. */ - struct sss_mc_pwd_data { - rel_ptr_t name; /* ptr to name string, rel. to struct base addr */ - uint32_t uid; --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/0007-mmap_cache-Skip-records-which-doesn-t-have-same-hash.patch b/0007-mmap_cache-Skip-records-which-doesn-t-have-same-hash.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6904d18..0000000 --- a/0007-mmap_cache-Skip-records-which-doesn-t-have-same-hash.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@ -From 6e95ece6809a8a6c6b4fcddb6e076514dd835857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Lukas Slebodnik -Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 05:39:28 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/2] mmap_cache: Skip records which doesn't have same hash - -The code uses 2 hashes for each record, but only one hash table to -index them both, furthermore each record has only one single 'next' -pointer. - -This means that in certain conditions a record main end up being on a -hash chain even though its hashes do not match the hash chain. This can -happen when another record 'drags' it in from another hash chain where -they both belong. - -If the record without matching hashes happens to be the second of the -chain and the first record is removed, then the non matching record is -left on the wrong chain. On removal of the non-matching record the hash -chain will not be updated and the hash chain will end up pointing to an -invalid slot. -This slot may be later reused for another record and may not be the -first slot of this new record. In this case the hash chain will point to -arbitrary data and may cause issues if the slot is interpreted as the -head of a record. - -By skipping any block that has no matching hashes upon removing the -first record in a chain we insure that dangling references cannot be -left in the hash table - -Resolves: -https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2049 ---- - src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -index fced018ebafb4224b3ea216ec99461538ea878da..522e6fa57640261ff4cc17bf554776d7d905bf7a 100644 ---- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -+++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -@@ -196,6 +196,27 @@ static void sss_mc_add_rec_to_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - cur->next = MC_PTR_TO_SLOT(mcc->data_table, rec); - } - -+static inline uint32_t -+sss_mc_get_next_slot_with_hash(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, -+ struct sss_mc_rec *start_rec, -+ uint32_t hash) -+{ -+ struct sss_mc_rec *rec; -+ uint32_t slot; -+ -+ slot = start_rec->next; -+ while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -+ rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); -+ if (rec->hash1 == hash || rec->hash2 == hash) { -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ slot = rec->next; -+ } -+ -+ return slot; -+} -+ - static void sss_mc_rm_rec_from_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - struct sss_mc_rec *rec, - uint32_t hash) -@@ -213,7 +234,11 @@ static void sss_mc_rm_rec_from_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - slot = mcc->hash_table[hash]; - cur = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); - if (cur == rec) { -- mcc->hash_table[hash] = rec->next; -+ /* rec->next can refer to record without matching hashes. -+ * We need to skip this(those) records, because -+ * mcc->hash_table[hash] have to refer to valid start of the chain. -+ */ -+ mcc->hash_table[hash] = sss_mc_get_next_slot_with_hash(mcc, rec, hash); - } else { - slot = cur->next; - while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { -@@ -221,7 +246,14 @@ static void sss_mc_rm_rec_from_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - cur = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); - if (cur == rec) { - /* changing a single uint32_t is atomic, so there is no -- * need to use barriers in this case */ -+ * need to use barriers in this case. -+ * -+ * This situation is different to the removing record from -+ * the beggining of the chain. The record have to only be -+ * removed from chain, because this chain can be -+ * subset or supperset of another chain and we don't want -+ * to break another chains. -+ */ - prev->next = cur->next; - slot = MC_INVALID_VAL; - } else { --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/0008-mmap_cache-Use-stricter-check-for-hash-keys.patch b/0008-mmap_cache-Use-stricter-check-for-hash-keys.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5aa5f96..0000000 --- a/0008-mmap_cache-Use-stricter-check-for-hash-keys.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -From 6a6f9c3a48fbfd7c61cd0c6d0aa9b4bf7bdb5fd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Lukas Slebodnik -Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 07:24:46 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 2/2] mmap_cache: Use stricter check for hash keys. - -ht_size is size of hash_table in bytes, but hash keys have type uint32_t ---- - src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 10 ++++++---- - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -index 522e6fa57640261ff4cc17bf554776d7d905bf7a..c34997b8034d05796687ff7d380b367d5c7bba06 100644 ---- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -+++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c -@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void sss_mc_add_rec_to_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - struct sss_mc_rec *cur; - uint32_t slot; - -- if (hash > mcc->ht_size) { -+ if (hash > MC_HT_ELEMS(mcc->ht_size)) { - /* Invalid hash. This should never happen, but better - * return than trying to access out of bounds memory */ - return; -@@ -225,9 +225,11 @@ static void sss_mc_rm_rec_from_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, - struct sss_mc_rec *cur = NULL; - uint32_t slot; - -- if (hash > mcc->ht_size) { -- /* Invalid hash. This should never happen, but better -- * return than trying to access out of bounds memory */ -+ if (hash > MC_HT_ELEMS(mcc->ht_size)) { -+ /* It can happen if rec->hash1 and rec->has2 was the same. -+ * or it is invalid hash. It is better to return -+ * than trying to access out of bounds memory -+ */ - return; - } - --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/0501-FEDORA-Switch-the-default-ccache-location.patch b/0501-FEDORA-Switch-the-default-ccache-location.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0da1bf0..0000000 --- a/0501-FEDORA-Switch-the-default-ccache-location.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -diff -up sssd-1.8.96/src/man/sssd-krb5.5.xml.ccache sssd-1.8.96/src/man/sssd-krb5.5.xml ---- sssd-1.8.96/src/man/sssd-krb5.5.xml.ccache 2012-08-24 17:08:01.619610422 +0200 -+++ sssd-1.8.96/src/man/sssd-krb5.5.xml 2012-08-24 17:09:15.447826123 +0200 -@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ - for details) is created. - - -- Default: /tmp -+ Default: /run/user/%U - - - -@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ - used to create a unique filename in a safe way. - - -- Default: FILE:%d/krb5cc_%U_XXXXXX -+ Default: DIR:%d/krb5cc - - - diff --git a/sources b/sources index 028c122..58ac26a 100644 --- a/sources +++ b/sources @@ -1 +1 @@ -cbdb06a79021f96ef2bfba3d9603ec44 sssd-1.11.0beta2.tar.gz +6d2133b8bab79edb7c48c4dbc5d461ba sssd-1.11.0.tar.gz diff --git a/sssd.spec b/sssd.spec index f51cbd4..8c98bc9 100644 --- a/sssd.spec +++ b/sssd.spec @@ -8,25 +8,15 @@ Name: sssd Version: 1.11.0 -Release: 0.2.beta2%{?dist} +Release: 1%{?dist} Group: Applications/System Summary: System Security Services Daemon License: GPLv3+ URL: http://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ -Source0: https://fedorahosted.org/released/sssd/%{name}-%{version}beta2.tar.gz +Source0: https://fedorahosted.org/released/sssd/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz BuildRoot: %(mktemp -ud %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-XXXXXX) ### Patches ### -Patch0001: 0001-proxy-Alocate-auth-tokens-in-struct-authtok_conv.patch -Patch0002: 0002-mmap_cache-Check-if-slot-and-name_ptr-are-not-invali.patch -Patch0003: 0003-mmap_cache-Check-data-name-value-in-client-code.patch -Patch0004: 0004-mmap_cache-Remove-triple-checks-in-client-code.patch -Patch0005: 0005-mmap_cache-Off-by-one-error.patch -Patch0006: 0006-mmap_cache-Use-better-checks-for-corrupted-mc-in-res.patch -Patch0007: 0007-mmap_cache-Skip-records-which-doesn-t-have-same-hash.patch -Patch0008: 0008-mmap_cache-Use-stricter-check-for-hash-keys.patch - -Patch0501: 0501-FEDORA-Switch-the-default-ccache-location.patch ### Dependencies ### Requires: sssd-common = %{version}-%{release} @@ -332,7 +322,7 @@ UpdateTimestamps() { done } -%setup -q -n %{name}-1.10.92 +%setup -q for p in %patches ; do %__patch -p1 -i $p @@ -686,6 +676,10 @@ fi %postun -n libsss_idmap -p /sbin/ldconfig %changelog +* Wed Aug 28 2013 Jakub Hrozek - 1.11.0-1 +- New upstream release 1.11.0 +- https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/wiki/Releases/Notes-1.11.0 + * Fri Aug 23 2013 Jakub Hrozek - 1.11.0-0.2.beta2 - Resolves: #967012 - [abrt] sssd-1.9.5-1.fc18: sss_mmap_cache_gr_invalidate_gid: Process /usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_nss was killed by