diff --git a/0001-proxy-Alocate-auth-tokens-in-struct-authtok_conv.patch b/0001-proxy-Alocate-auth-tokens-in-struct-authtok_conv.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e82eeca --- /dev/null +++ b/0001-proxy-Alocate-auth-tokens-in-struct-authtok_conv.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 545f49b72cdf8453fb0b85c9d87e7d4711da57da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lukas Slebodnik +Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 13:21:31 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] proxy: Alocate auth tokens in struct authtok_conv + +Struct sss_auth_token became opaque in commit +9acfb09f7969a69f58bd45c856b01700541853ca. +All ocasions of "struct sss_auth_token" was replaced with pointer to this +struct, but proper initialization of auth_tokens was missing +in struct authtok_conv. + +Resolves: +https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2046 + +diff --git a/src/providers/proxy/proxy_child.c b/src/providers/proxy/proxy_child.c +index efdf9120a8ec529283aa3f2c6cacd98d659a6ef7..6f95ede6af78f0286933fc4259dd258ef69f2d37 100644 +--- a/src/providers/proxy/proxy_child.c ++++ b/src/providers/proxy/proxy_child.c +@@ -201,6 +201,23 @@ static errno_t call_pam_stack(const char *pam_target, struct pam_data *pd) + conv.conv=proxy_internal_conv; + } + auth_data = talloc_zero(pd, struct authtok_conv); ++ if (auth_data == NULL) { ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, ("talloc_zero failed.\n")); ++ return ENOMEM; ++ } ++ auth_data->authtok = sss_authtok_new(auth_data); ++ if (auth_data->authtok == NULL) { ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, ("sss_authtok_new failed.\n")); ++ ret = ENOMEM; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ auth_data->newauthtok = sss_authtok_new(auth_data); ++ if (auth_data->newauthtok == NULL) { ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, ("sss_authtok_new failed.\n")); ++ ret = ENOMEM; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + conv.appdata_ptr=auth_data; + + ret = pam_start(pam_target, pd->user, &conv, &pamh); +@@ -279,6 +296,9 @@ static errno_t call_pam_stack(const char *pam_target, struct pam_data *pd) + pd->pam_status = pam_status; + + return EOK; ++fail: ++ talloc_free(auth_data); ++ return ret; + } + + static int pc_pam_handler(DBusMessage *message, struct sbus_connection *conn) +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/0002-mmap_cache-Check-if-slot-and-name_ptr-are-not-invali.patch b/0002-mmap_cache-Check-if-slot-and-name_ptr-are-not-invali.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..493cf0f --- /dev/null +++ b/0002-mmap_cache-Check-if-slot-and-name_ptr-are-not-invali.patch @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +From 9028706a00da1bc48547e74aa872c825ac15adb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michal Zidek +Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2013 20:59:33 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] mmap_cache: Check if slot and name_ptr are not invalid. + +This patch prevents jumping outside of allocated memory in +case of corrupted slot or name_ptr values. It is not proper +solution, just hotfix until we find out what is the root cause +of ticket https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2018 +--- + src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h | 2 ++ + src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c | 8 ++++++ + src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c | 8 ++++++ + src/util/mmap_cache.h | 3 ++ + 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +index 49878fcfb91c195fb864c83e1da0163a23dbe5a7..cd5a6436e005b4c7f5622eaff2f259de3bbe5d29 100644 +--- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c ++++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +@@ -373,8 +373,23 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ++ ("Corrupted fastcache. Slot number too big.\n")); ++ sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); + name_ptr = *((rel_ptr_t *)rec->data); ++ /* FIXME: This check relies on fact that offset of member strs ++ * is the same in structures sss_mc_pwd_data and sss_mc_group_data. */ ++ if (name_ptr != offsetof(struct sss_mc_pwd_data, strs)) { ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ++ ("Corrupted fastcache. name_ptr value is %u.\n", name_ptr)); ++ sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); ++ return NULL; ++ } + + t_key = (char *)rec->data + name_ptr; + if (strcmp(key->str, t_key) == 0) { +@@ -608,6 +623,13 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_pw_invalidate_uid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, uid_t uid) + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Corrupted fastcache.\n")); ++ sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); ++ ret = ENOENT; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ + rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); + data = (struct sss_mc_pwd_data *)(&rec->data); + +@@ -739,6 +761,13 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_gr_invalidate_gid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, gid_t gid) + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Corrupted fastcache.\n")); ++ sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); ++ ret = ENOENT; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ + rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); + data = (struct sss_mc_grp_data *)(&rec->data); + +@@ -889,8 +918,9 @@ static void sss_mc_header_update(struct sss_mc_ctx *mc_ctx, int status) + /* update header using barriers */ + h = (struct sss_mc_header *)mc_ctx->mmap_base; + MC_RAISE_BARRIER(h); +- if (status != SSS_MC_HEADER_RECYCLED) { +- /* no reason to update anything else if the file is recycled */ ++ if (status == SSS_MC_HEADER_ALIVE) { ++ /* no reason to update anything else if the file is recycled or ++ * right before reset */ + h->hash_table = MC_PTR_DIFF(mc_ctx->hash_table, mc_ctx->mmap_base); + h->free_table = MC_PTR_DIFF(mc_ctx->free_table, mc_ctx->mmap_base); + h->data_table = MC_PTR_DIFF(mc_ctx->data_table, mc_ctx->mmap_base); +@@ -1113,3 +1143,23 @@ done: + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); + return ret; + } ++ ++/* Erase all contents of the mmap cache. This will bring the cache ++ * to the same state as if it was just initialized. */ ++void sss_mmap_cache_reset(struct sss_mc_ctx *mc_ctx) ++{ ++ if (mc_ctx == NULL) { ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, ++ ("Fastcache not initialized. Nothing to do.\n")); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ sss_mc_header_update(mc_ctx, SSS_MC_HEADER_UNINIT); ++ ++ /* Reset the mmaped area */ ++ memset(mc_ctx->data_table, 0xff, mc_ctx->dt_size); ++ memset(mc_ctx->free_table, 0x00, mc_ctx->ft_size); ++ memset(mc_ctx->hash_table, 0xff, mc_ctx->ht_size); ++ ++ sss_mc_header_update(mc_ctx, SSS_MC_HEADER_ALIVE); ++} +diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h +index 25cec40cc26d6732c1465c014ab5aab4a59ec906..fdeaa09126858b04958f4e3eee17b8a92cf61350 100644 +--- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h ++++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.h +@@ -63,4 +63,6 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_gr_invalidate_gid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, gid_t gid); + errno_t sss_mmap_cache_reinit(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, size_t n_elem, + time_t timeout, struct sss_mc_ctx **mc_ctx); + ++void sss_mmap_cache_reset(struct sss_mc_ctx *mc_ctx); ++ + #endif /* _NSSSRV_MMAP_CACHE_H_ */ +diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c +index b3e9a8a0bd6b0a90783d60c8809bb1f542b31f54..2d69be93b76587a7e474c1db55430930ca850321 100644 +--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c ++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c +@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted. */ ++ return ENOENT; ++ } + + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { +@@ -180,6 +184,10 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted. */ ++ return ENOENT; ++ } + + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { +diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c +index 4acc6425e2609c140d71a1013ca203d7db074e02..fa21bd2896a1de868735cd6d22d09159fd3d8ed2 100644 +--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c ++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c +@@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted */ ++ return ENOENT; ++ } + + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { +@@ -181,6 +185,10 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted */ ++ return ENOENT; ++ } + + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { +diff --git a/src/util/mmap_cache.h b/src/util/mmap_cache.h +index 55383c056b36460676958754baada9c294331b5e..6c223df6c79b5ac10786903eecd1cb8c8a3999a5 100644 +--- a/src/util/mmap_cache.h ++++ b/src/util/mmap_cache.h +@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ typedef uint32_t rel_ptr_t; + #define SSS_MC_MAJOR_VNO 0 + #define SSS_MC_MINOR_VNO 4 + ++#define SSS_MC_HEADER_UNINIT 0 /* after ftruncate or before reset */ + #define SSS_MC_HEADER_ALIVE 1 /* current and in use */ + #define SSS_MC_HEADER_RECYCLED 2 /* file was recycled, reopen asap */ + +@@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ struct sss_mc_rec { + char data[0]; + }; + ++/* FIXME: Function sss_mc_find_record currently relies on fact that ++ * offset of strs is the same in both sss_mc_pwd_data and sss_mc_grp_data. */ + struct sss_mc_pwd_data { + rel_ptr_t name; /* ptr to name string, rel. to struct base addr */ + uint32_t uid; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/0003-mmap_cache-Check-data-name-value-in-client-code.patch b/0003-mmap_cache-Check-data-name-value-in-client-code.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..089fb09 --- /dev/null +++ b/0003-mmap_cache-Check-data-name-value-in-client-code.patch @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +From 8a5931bcc8e9034e4beb92fc9addf3f7fcf83fd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michal Zidek +Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 19:29:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] mmap_cache: Check data->name value in client code + +data->name value must be checked to prevent segfaults in +case of corrupted memory cache. + +resolves: +https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2018 +--- + src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c +index 2d69be93b76587a7e474c1db55430930ca850321..da5da0411e556c30c4a3db6faf80139d65ae817c 100644 +--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c ++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include "nss_mc.h" +@@ -102,12 +103,17 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + uint32_t hash; + uint32_t slot; + int ret; ++ size_t strs_offset; ++ uint8_t *max_addr; + + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_ctx("group", &gr_mc_ctx); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + ++ /* Get max address of data table. */ ++ max_addr = gr_mc_ctx.data_table + gr_mc_ctx.dt_size; ++ + /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ + hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&gr_mc_ctx, name, name_len + 1); + slot = gr_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; +@@ -133,7 +139,19 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + continue; + } + ++ strs_offset = offsetof(struct sss_mc_grp_data, strs); + data = (struct sss_mc_grp_data *)rec->data; ++ /* Integrity check ++ * - name_len cannot be longer than all strings ++ * - data->name cannot point outside strings ++ * - all strings must be within data_table */ ++ if (name_len > data->strs_len ++ || (data->name + name_len) > (strs_offset + data->strs_len) ++ || (uint8_t *)data->strs + data->strs_len > max_addr) { ++ ret = ENOENT; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ + rec_name = (char *)data + data->name; + if (strcmp(name, rec_name) == 0) { + break; +diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c +index fa21bd2896a1de868735cd6d22d09159fd3d8ed2..4b08766857d5013e6f13c3dbe574c5a88fa915b0 100644 +--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c ++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include "nss_mc.h" +@@ -103,12 +104,17 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + uint32_t hash; + uint32_t slot; + int ret; ++ size_t strs_offset; ++ uint8_t *max_addr; + + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_ctx("passwd", &pw_mc_ctx); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + ++ /* Get max address of data table. */ ++ max_addr = pw_mc_ctx.data_table + pw_mc_ctx.dt_size; ++ + /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ + hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&pw_mc_ctx, name, name_len + 1); + slot = pw_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; +@@ -134,7 +140,20 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + continue; + } + ++ strs_offset = offsetof(struct sss_mc_pwd_data, strs); ++ + data = (struct sss_mc_pwd_data *)rec->data; ++ /* Integrity check ++ * - name_len cannot be longer than all strings ++ * - data->name cannot point outside strings ++ * - all strings must be within data_table */ ++ if (name_len > data->strs_len ++ || (data->name + name_len) > (strs_offset + data->strs_len) ++ || (uint8_t *)data->strs + data->strs_len > max_addr) { ++ ret = ENOENT; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ + rec_name = (char *)data + data->name; + if (strcmp(name, rec_name) == 0) { + break; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/0004-mmap_cache-Remove-triple-checks-in-client-code.patch b/0004-mmap_cache-Remove-triple-checks-in-client-code.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64422d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/0004-mmap_cache-Remove-triple-checks-in-client-code.patch @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +From e61044d99ce1e68057fda236f04a731f1f3f299a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michal Zidek +Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 18:01:30 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] mmap_cache: Remove triple checks in client code. + +We had pattern in client code with 3 conditions +that can be replaced with one. +--- + src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c | 30 ++++++++++-------------------- + src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c | 30 ++++++++++-------------------- + 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c +index da5da0411e556c30c4a3db6faf80139d65ae817c..9fe72a60e58e0c94f0c38f243276060b70f28aa9 100644 +--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c ++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c +@@ -117,16 +117,11 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ + hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&gr_mc_ctx, name, name_len + 1); + slot = gr_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { +- return ENOENT; +- } +- +- while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { +- /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted. */ +- return ENOENT; +- } + ++ /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and ++ * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is ++ * probbably corrupted. */ ++ while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { + goto done; +@@ -160,7 +155,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + slot = rec->next; + } + +- if (slot == MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } +@@ -197,16 +192,11 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, + /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ + hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&gr_mc_ctx, gidstr, len+1); + slot = gr_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { +- return ENOENT; +- } +- +- while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { +- /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted. */ +- return ENOENT; +- } + ++ /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and ++ * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is ++ * probbably corrupted. */ ++ while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { + goto done; +@@ -227,7 +217,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, + slot = rec->next; + } + +- if (slot == MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } +diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c +index 4b08766857d5013e6f13c3dbe574c5a88fa915b0..7aca4a04b6b19b50b883960229083b688639ee4f 100644 +--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c ++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c +@@ -118,16 +118,11 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ + hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&pw_mc_ctx, name, name_len + 1); + slot = pw_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { +- return ENOENT; +- } +- +- while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { +- /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted */ +- return ENOENT; +- } + ++ /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and ++ * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is ++ * probbably corrupted. */ ++ while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { + goto done; +@@ -162,7 +157,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + slot = rec->next; + } + +- if (slot == MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } +@@ -199,16 +194,11 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, + /* hashes are calculated including the NULL terminator */ + hash = sss_nss_mc_hash(&pw_mc_ctx, uidstr, len+1); + slot = pw_mc_ctx.hash_table[hash]; +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { +- return ENOENT; +- } +- +- while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { +- /* This probably means that the memory cache was corrupted */ +- return ENOENT; +- } + ++ /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and ++ * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is ++ * probbably corrupted. */ ++ while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { + goto done; +@@ -229,7 +219,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, + slot = rec->next; + } + +- if (slot == MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/0005-mmap_cache-Off-by-one-error.patch b/0005-mmap_cache-Off-by-one-error.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6a9837 --- /dev/null +++ b/0005-mmap_cache-Off-by-one-error.patch @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +From 13df7b9e400211c717284fb841c849ba034ed348 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michal Zidek +Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 18:22:06 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] mmap_cache: Off by one error. + +Removes off by one error when using macro MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS +and adds new macro MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS. +--- + src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 12 ++++++------ + src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c | 8 ++++---- + src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c | 8 ++++---- + src/util/mmap_cache.h | 3 +++ + 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +index cd5a6436e005b4c7f5622eaff2f259de3bbe5d29..a1bab0c8d877a354451ad5c31ec5e86b294837e9 100644 +--- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c ++++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +@@ -368,12 +368,12 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + hash = sss_mc_hash(mcc, key->str, key->len); + + slot = mcc->hash_table[hash]; +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { + return NULL; + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { + DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, + ("Corrupted fastcache. Slot number too big.\n")); + sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); +@@ -617,13 +617,13 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_pw_invalidate_uid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, uid_t uid) + hash = sss_mc_hash(mcc, uidstr, strlen(uidstr) + 1); + + slot = mcc->hash_table[hash]; +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { + DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Corrupted fastcache.\n")); + sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); + ret = ENOENT; +@@ -755,13 +755,13 @@ errno_t sss_mmap_cache_gr_invalidate_gid(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, gid_t gid) + hash = sss_mc_hash(mcc, gidstr, strlen(gidstr) + 1); + + slot = mcc->hash_table[hash]; +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } + + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { +- if (slot > MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(mcc->dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { + DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Corrupted fastcache.\n")); + sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); + ret = ENOENT; +diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c +index 9fe72a60e58e0c94f0c38f243276060b70f28aa9..4e3d9fb0dfffc2194a6d1e2035ed5782af528fce 100644 +--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c ++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_group.c +@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and + * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is + * probbably corrupted. */ +- while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ while (MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { + goto done; +@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + slot = rec->next; + } + +- if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } +@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, + /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and + * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is + * probbably corrupted. */ +- while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ while (MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&gr_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { + goto done; +@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getgrgid(gid_t gid, + slot = rec->next; + } + +- if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, gr_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } +diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c +index 7aca4a04b6b19b50b883960229083b688639ee4f..a0a8d87f7475d8fea1bc32409a2d5c6af8f7896f 100644 +--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c ++++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_passwd.c +@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and + * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is + * probbably corrupted. */ +- while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ while (MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { + goto done; +@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwnam(const char *name, size_t name_len, + slot = rec->next; + } + +- if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } +@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, + /* If slot is not within the bounds of mmaped region and + * it's value is not MC_INVALID_VAL, then the cache is + * probbably corrupted. */ +- while (slot < MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ while (MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = sss_nss_mc_get_record(&pw_mc_ctx, slot, &rec); + if (ret) { + goto done; +@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ errno_t sss_nss_mc_getpwuid(uid_t uid, + slot = rec->next; + } + +- if (slot >= MC_SIZE_TO_SLOTS(pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { ++ if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, pw_mc_ctx.dt_size)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto done; + } +diff --git a/src/util/mmap_cache.h b/src/util/mmap_cache.h +index 6c223df6c79b5ac10786903eecd1cb8c8a3999a5..abf8cac49dda1c53cf7aa2a428eefa49c42c4d8e 100644 +--- a/src/util/mmap_cache.h ++++ b/src/util/mmap_cache.h +@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ typedef uint32_t rel_ptr_t; + #define MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(base, slot, type) \ + (type *)((base) + ((slot) * MC_SLOT_SIZE)) + ++#define MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, dt_size) \ ++ ((slot) < ((dt_size) / MC_SLOT_SIZE)) ++ + #define MC_VALID_BARRIER(val) (((val) & 0xff000000) == 0xf0000000) + + #define MC_CHECK_RECORD_LENGTH(mc_ctx, rec) \ +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/0006-mmap_cache-Use-better-checks-for-corrupted-mc-in-res.patch b/0006-mmap_cache-Use-better-checks-for-corrupted-mc-in-res.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d88e25 --- /dev/null +++ b/0006-mmap_cache-Use-better-checks-for-corrupted-mc-in-res.patch @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +From 441e6050f4b67134d15862e401b4c4e8546d7387 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michal Zidek +Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 16:08:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] mmap_cache: Use better checks for corrupted mc in + responder + +We introduced new way to check integrity of memcache in the +client code. We should use similiar checks in the responder. +--- + src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + src/util/mmap_cache.h | 2 -- + 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +index a1bab0c8d877a354451ad5c31ec5e86b294837e9..95a7fe9dc7dd527cab6261f68d1dd0ab2f738d2a 100644 +--- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c ++++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +@@ -356,6 +356,39 @@ static errno_t sss_mc_find_free_slots(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + return EOK; + } + ++static errno_t sss_mc_get_strs_offset(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, ++ size_t *_offset) ++{ ++ switch (mcc->type) { ++ case SSS_MC_PASSWD: ++ *_offset = offsetof(struct sss_mc_pwd_data, strs); ++ return EOK; ++ case SSS_MC_GROUP: ++ *_offset = offsetof(struct sss_mc_grp_data, strs); ++ return EOK; ++ default: ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Unknown memory cache type.\n")); ++ return EINVAL; ++ } ++} ++ ++static errno_t sss_mc_get_strs_len(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, ++ struct sss_mc_rec *rec, ++ size_t *_len) ++{ ++ switch (mcc->type) { ++ case SSS_MC_PASSWD: ++ *_len = ((struct sss_mc_pwd_data *)&rec->data)->strs_len; ++ return EOK; ++ case SSS_MC_GROUP: ++ *_len = ((struct sss_mc_grp_data *)&rec->data)->strs_len; ++ return EOK; ++ default: ++ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, ("Unknown memory cache type.\n")); ++ return EINVAL; ++ } ++} ++ + static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + struct sized_string *key) + { +@@ -364,6 +397,10 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + uint32_t slot; + rel_ptr_t name_ptr; + char *t_key; ++ size_t strs_offset; ++ size_t strs_len; ++ uint8_t *max_addr; ++ errno_t ret; + + hash = sss_mc_hash(mcc, key->str, key->len); + +@@ -372,6 +409,14 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + return NULL; + } + ++ /* Get max address of data table. */ ++ max_addr = mcc->data_table + mcc->dt_size; ++ ++ ret = sss_mc_get_strs_offset(mcc, &strs_offset); ++ if (ret != EOK) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { + if (!MC_SLOT_WITHIN_BOUNDS(slot, mcc->dt_size)) { + DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, +@@ -381,10 +426,15 @@ static struct sss_mc_rec *sss_mc_find_record(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + } + + rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); ++ ret = sss_mc_get_strs_len(mcc, rec, &strs_len); ++ if (ret != EOK) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + name_ptr = *((rel_ptr_t *)rec->data); +- /* FIXME: This check relies on fact that offset of member strs +- * is the same in structures sss_mc_pwd_data and sss_mc_group_data. */ +- if (name_ptr != offsetof(struct sss_mc_pwd_data, strs)) { ++ if (key->len > strs_len ++ || (name_ptr + key->len) > (strs_offset + strs_len) ++ || (uint8_t *)rec->data + strs_offset + strs_len > max_addr) { + DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, + ("Corrupted fastcache. name_ptr value is %u.\n", name_ptr)); + sss_mmap_cache_reset(mcc); +diff --git a/src/util/mmap_cache.h b/src/util/mmap_cache.h +index abf8cac49dda1c53cf7aa2a428eefa49c42c4d8e..7c6693ac8151ac488fc5f4d2384749784eb98c7d 100644 +--- a/src/util/mmap_cache.h ++++ b/src/util/mmap_cache.h +@@ -113,8 +113,6 @@ struct sss_mc_rec { + char data[0]; + }; + +-/* FIXME: Function sss_mc_find_record currently relies on fact that +- * offset of strs is the same in both sss_mc_pwd_data and sss_mc_grp_data. */ + struct sss_mc_pwd_data { + rel_ptr_t name; /* ptr to name string, rel. to struct base addr */ + uint32_t uid; +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/0007-mmap_cache-Skip-records-which-doesn-t-have-same-hash.patch b/0007-mmap_cache-Skip-records-which-doesn-t-have-same-hash.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6904d18 --- /dev/null +++ b/0007-mmap_cache-Skip-records-which-doesn-t-have-same-hash.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 6e95ece6809a8a6c6b4fcddb6e076514dd835857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lukas Slebodnik +Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 05:39:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] mmap_cache: Skip records which doesn't have same hash + +The code uses 2 hashes for each record, but only one hash table to +index them both, furthermore each record has only one single 'next' +pointer. + +This means that in certain conditions a record main end up being on a +hash chain even though its hashes do not match the hash chain. This can +happen when another record 'drags' it in from another hash chain where +they both belong. + +If the record without matching hashes happens to be the second of the +chain and the first record is removed, then the non matching record is +left on the wrong chain. On removal of the non-matching record the hash +chain will not be updated and the hash chain will end up pointing to an +invalid slot. +This slot may be later reused for another record and may not be the +first slot of this new record. In this case the hash chain will point to +arbitrary data and may cause issues if the slot is interpreted as the +head of a record. + +By skipping any block that has no matching hashes upon removing the +first record in a chain we insure that dangling references cannot be +left in the hash table + +Resolves: +https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2049 +--- + src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +index fced018ebafb4224b3ea216ec99461538ea878da..522e6fa57640261ff4cc17bf554776d7d905bf7a 100644 +--- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c ++++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +@@ -196,6 +196,27 @@ static void sss_mc_add_rec_to_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + cur->next = MC_PTR_TO_SLOT(mcc->data_table, rec); + } + ++static inline uint32_t ++sss_mc_get_next_slot_with_hash(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, ++ struct sss_mc_rec *start_rec, ++ uint32_t hash) ++{ ++ struct sss_mc_rec *rec; ++ uint32_t slot; ++ ++ slot = start_rec->next; ++ while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { ++ rec = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); ++ if (rec->hash1 == hash || rec->hash2 == hash) { ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ slot = rec->next; ++ } ++ ++ return slot; ++} ++ + static void sss_mc_rm_rec_from_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + struct sss_mc_rec *rec, + uint32_t hash) +@@ -213,7 +234,11 @@ static void sss_mc_rm_rec_from_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + slot = mcc->hash_table[hash]; + cur = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); + if (cur == rec) { +- mcc->hash_table[hash] = rec->next; ++ /* rec->next can refer to record without matching hashes. ++ * We need to skip this(those) records, because ++ * mcc->hash_table[hash] have to refer to valid start of the chain. ++ */ ++ mcc->hash_table[hash] = sss_mc_get_next_slot_with_hash(mcc, rec, hash); + } else { + slot = cur->next; + while (slot != MC_INVALID_VAL) { +@@ -221,7 +246,14 @@ static void sss_mc_rm_rec_from_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + cur = MC_SLOT_TO_PTR(mcc->data_table, slot, struct sss_mc_rec); + if (cur == rec) { + /* changing a single uint32_t is atomic, so there is no +- * need to use barriers in this case */ ++ * need to use barriers in this case. ++ * ++ * This situation is different to the removing record from ++ * the beggining of the chain. The record have to only be ++ * removed from chain, because this chain can be ++ * subset or supperset of another chain and we don't want ++ * to break another chains. ++ */ + prev->next = cur->next; + slot = MC_INVALID_VAL; + } else { +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/0008-mmap_cache-Use-stricter-check-for-hash-keys.patch b/0008-mmap_cache-Use-stricter-check-for-hash-keys.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5aa5f96 --- /dev/null +++ b/0008-mmap_cache-Use-stricter-check-for-hash-keys.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 6a6f9c3a48fbfd7c61cd0c6d0aa9b4bf7bdb5fd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lukas Slebodnik +Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 07:24:46 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] mmap_cache: Use stricter check for hash keys. + +ht_size is size of hash_table in bytes, but hash keys have type uint32_t +--- + src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c | 10 ++++++---- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +index 522e6fa57640261ff4cc17bf554776d7d905bf7a..c34997b8034d05796687ff7d380b367d5c7bba06 100644 +--- a/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c ++++ b/src/responder/nss/nsssrv_mmap_cache.c +@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void sss_mc_add_rec_to_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + struct sss_mc_rec *cur; + uint32_t slot; + +- if (hash > mcc->ht_size) { ++ if (hash > MC_HT_ELEMS(mcc->ht_size)) { + /* Invalid hash. This should never happen, but better + * return than trying to access out of bounds memory */ + return; +@@ -225,9 +225,11 @@ static void sss_mc_rm_rec_from_chain(struct sss_mc_ctx *mcc, + struct sss_mc_rec *cur = NULL; + uint32_t slot; + +- if (hash > mcc->ht_size) { +- /* Invalid hash. This should never happen, but better +- * return than trying to access out of bounds memory */ ++ if (hash > MC_HT_ELEMS(mcc->ht_size)) { ++ /* It can happen if rec->hash1 and rec->has2 was the same. ++ * or it is invalid hash. It is better to return ++ * than trying to access out of bounds memory ++ */ + return; + } + +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/sssd.spec b/sssd.spec index d9a7f5c..f51cbd4 100644 --- a/sssd.spec +++ b/sssd.spec @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Name: sssd Version: 1.11.0 -Release: 0.1.beta2%{?dist} +Release: 0.2.beta2%{?dist} Group: Applications/System Summary: System Security Services Daemon License: GPLv3+ @@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ Source0: https://fedorahosted.org/released/sssd/%{name}-%{version}beta2.tar.gz BuildRoot: %(mktemp -ud %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-XXXXXX) ### Patches ### +Patch0001: 0001-proxy-Alocate-auth-tokens-in-struct-authtok_conv.patch +Patch0002: 0002-mmap_cache-Check-if-slot-and-name_ptr-are-not-invali.patch +Patch0003: 0003-mmap_cache-Check-data-name-value-in-client-code.patch +Patch0004: 0004-mmap_cache-Remove-triple-checks-in-client-code.patch +Patch0005: 0005-mmap_cache-Off-by-one-error.patch +Patch0006: 0006-mmap_cache-Use-better-checks-for-corrupted-mc-in-res.patch +Patch0007: 0007-mmap_cache-Skip-records-which-doesn-t-have-same-hash.patch +Patch0008: 0008-mmap_cache-Use-stricter-check-for-hash-keys.patch + Patch0501: 0501-FEDORA-Switch-the-default-ccache-location.patch ### Dependencies ### @@ -677,6 +686,12 @@ fi %postun -n libsss_idmap -p /sbin/ldconfig %changelog +* Fri Aug 23 2013 Jakub Hrozek - 1.11.0-0.2.beta2 +- Resolves: #967012 - [abrt] sssd-1.9.5-1.fc18: sss_mmap_cache_gr_invalidate_gid: + Process /usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_nss was killed by + signal 11 (SIGSEGV) +- Resolves: #996214 - sssd proxy_child segfault + * Wed Aug 08 2013 Jakub Hrozek - 1.11.0beta2 - New upstream release 1.11 beta 2 - https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/wiki/Releases/Notes-1.11.0beta2