From 568625900ef5c607a2c2596472fbc9f62ec571fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se>
Date: Oct 24 2021 08:28:51 +0000
Subject: Based on openssh-8.7p1-2.fc35


---

diff --git a/gsi-openssh.spec b/gsi-openssh.spec
index 0d61b1f..5d75771 100644
--- a/gsi-openssh.spec
+++ b/gsi-openssh.spec
@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@
 # Do we want libedit support
 %global libedit 1
 
-%global openssh_ver 8.6p1
-%global openssh_rel 3
+%global openssh_ver 8.7p1
+%global openssh_rel 1
 
 Summary: An implementation of the SSH protocol with GSI authentication
 Name: gsi-openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.2
+Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
 Provides: gsissh = %{version}-%{release}
 Obsoletes: gsissh < 5.8p2-2
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
@@ -146,24 +146,22 @@ Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
 # Do not break X11 without IPv6
 Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213
-Patch969: openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
-# ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518)
 Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
 # sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
 Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
-# ssh incorrectly restores the blocking mode on standard output (#1942901)
-Patch976: openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch
+# CVE-2021-41617
+Patch978: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
 
 # Fix issue with read-only ssh buffer during gssapi key exchange (#1938224)
 # https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/19
 Patch97: openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch
 # This is the patch that adds GSI support
 # Based on hpn_isshd-gsi.7.5p1b.patch from Globus upstream
-Patch98: openssh-8.6p1-gsissh.patch
+Patch98: openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch
 
 # This is the HPN patch
 # Based on https://sourceforge.net/projects/hpnssh/files/Patches/HPN-SSH%2015v2%208.5p1/
-Patch99: openssh-8.6p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
+Patch99: openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
 
 License: BSD
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
@@ -299,10 +297,9 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
 %patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
 %patch965 -p1 -b .visibility
 %patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
-%patch969 -p0 -b .debian
 %patch974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
 %patch975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
-%patch976 -p1 -b .restore-nonblock
+%patch978 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
 
 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
@@ -500,6 +497,9 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen.target
 
 %changelog
+* Sun Oct 24 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.7p1-1
+- Based on openssh-8.7p1-2.fc35
+
 * Tue Sep 14 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 8.6p1-3.2
 - Rebuilt with OpenSSL 3.0.0
 
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
index 6ee2535..cccb3e0 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +	options->enable_k5users = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
 @@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  #endif
  	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sPermitListen:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
 @@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
index 407ff4c..1831f27 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +	options->use_kuserok = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
 @@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
  		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
@@ -193,9 +193,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
 +	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
  	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
@@ -217,16 +217,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 @@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
- 		break;
- 
+		}
+		break;
+
 +	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
 +		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sPermitListen:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
 @@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
index 2814c6f..930de69 100644
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@@ -54,18 +54,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -409,8 +409,10 @@ sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const
- 				errstr = "invalid environment string";
- 				goto fail;
- 			}
--			if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL)
-+			if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
-+				free(opt);
- 				goto alloc_fail;
-+			}
- 			cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */
- 			if (!valid_env_name(cp)) {
- 				free(cp);
 @@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
  		return r;
  	}
@@ -133,13 +121,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
 @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
- 			    &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
- 				error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
- 				freerrset(fingerprints);
+		    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+			error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
+			freerrset(fingerprints);
 +				free(dnskey_digest);
- 				return -1;
- 			}
- 		}
+			return -1;
+		}
+
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
@@ -316,6 +304,36 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/open
  	int i;
  
  	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
+@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
@@ -324,33 +342,29 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
  				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
  				    filename, linenum, arg2);
 +				free(arg2);
- 				return -1;
+ 				goto out;
  			}
  			free(arg2);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:23:35.389741329 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-08-30 16:27:04.854555296 +0200
+@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ killchild(int signo)
  {
  	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
  		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
 -		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
 +		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
  	}
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
  
  	if (signo)
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!*activep) {
--			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
 @@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
  		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
  			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
@@ -363,37 +377,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		}
  		break;
  
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
-@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
- static void
- notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2_f("reading");
- }
- 
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
  		debug_f("invalid tun");
  		goto done;
  	}
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
index f3b1334..4473518 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@@ -807,15 +807,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.681061553 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authentica
- # endif
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
-+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && !partial)
- 		audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method));
- #endif
- }
 @@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
  		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
  		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
@@ -1204,9 +1195,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  
 -	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
 -	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
- 	debug3_f("%s %p signature %s%s%s", auth_method, key,
- 	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
- 	    (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
+	debug3_f("%s %s signature %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key),
+	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
+	    (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
 @@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session
  }
  
@@ -2065,7 +2056,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  close_startup_pipes(void)
  {
 @@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
- 	    ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
+ 	}
  }
  
 -/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
index 387b7a0..c130022 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@@ -504,15 +504,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
 @@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
 +	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
 +	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 @@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
index 519ee29..8560c9f 100644
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
 @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
 +# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
 +# problems.
  #UsePAM no
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
index 145eac0..48f9f10 100644
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
- 	port-linux.o \
+ 	port-prngd.o \
  	port-solaris.o \
  	port-net.o \
 -	port-uw.o
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
index 4baa024..762825e 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-04-19 15:18:32.071920379 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5	2021-04-19 15:21:18.400179265 +0200
-@@ -368,15 +368,13 @@ or
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-08-30 13:29:00.174292872 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2021-08-30 13:31:32.009548808 +0200
+@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@ or
  .Qq *.c.example.com
  domains.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -14,15 +14,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- .Xr ssh 1
- will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
- specified.
-@@ -436,20 +434,25 @@ If the option is set to
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+@@ -445,20 +441,25 @@ If the option is set to
  (the default),
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -52,7 +54,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -465,13 +468,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -474,13 +475,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -826,6 +822,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
+@@ -874,6 +868,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -838,10 +839,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+@@ -886,10 +885,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -90,7 +92,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1169,29 +1168,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+@@ -1219,29 +1216,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -129,7 +131,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1301,37 +1296,33 @@ function, and all code in the
+@@ -1351,37 +1344,33 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -176,7 +178,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1503,37 +1494,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+@@ -1553,37 +1542,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
  The default is
  .Cm no .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -223,10 +225,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-04-19 15:18:32.062920311 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 15:20:42.591908243 +0200
-@@ -373,15 +373,13 @@ If the argument is
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-08-30 13:29:00.157292731 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5	2021-08-30 13:32:16.263918533 +0200
+@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@ If the argument is
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -239,15 +241,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
- public key or host-based authentication.
- .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-@@ -445,20 +443,25 @@ The default is
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -277,7 +281,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -485,13 +488,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -490,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -291,7 +295,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -680,21 +676,22 @@ For this to work
+@@ -685,21 +679,22 @@ For this to work
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
-@@ -794,26 +791,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
+@@ -799,26 +794,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
  .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  environment variable.
  .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
@@ -356,7 +360,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -958,20 +942,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+@@ -965,20 +947,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -386,7 +390,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
  .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -1003,15 +992,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+@@ -1010,15 +997,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
  sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -402,7 +406,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1097,21 +1077,26 @@ function, and all code in the
+@@ -1104,21 +1082,26 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -433,7 +437,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1154,15 +1139,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+@@ -1161,15 +1144,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -449,7 +453,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1541,37 +1517,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+@@ -1548,37 +1522,25 @@ or equivalent.)
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
index 2c29486..e26bebd 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@@ -19,11 +19,10 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
  	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
  	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
  	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
-diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
-index 086b8ebb..687c57b4 100644
---- a/auth.c
-+++ b/auth.c
-@@ -400,7 +400,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
+--- a/auth.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/auth.c	2021-08-27 12:41:51.262788953 +0200
+@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const
  	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
  		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
  		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
@@ -33,18 +32,15 @@ index 086b8ebb..687c57b4 100644
  			return 1;
  		break;
  	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-@@ -724,99 +725,6 @@ fakepw(void)
- 	return (&fake);
+@@ -730,97 +731,6 @@ fakepw(void)
  }
  
--/*
+ /*
 - * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
 - * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
 - * called.
 - * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
-- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
-- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
-- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
 - */
 -
 -static char *
@@ -130,9 +126,10 @@ index 086b8ebb..687c57b4 100644
 -	return xstrdup(name);
 -}
 -
- /*
+-/*
   * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
   * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+  * several times.
 diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
 index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 --- a/auth2-gss.c
@@ -2913,10 +2910,9 @@ index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
+diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
+--- a/readconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/readconf.c	2021-08-27 12:25:42.556421509 +0200
 @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
  #include "uidswap.h"
  #include "myproposal.h"
@@ -2925,7 +2921,7 @@ index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
  
  /* Format of the configuration file:
  
-@@ -160,6 +161,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -161,6 +162,8 @@ typedef enum {
  	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
  	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
  	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
@@ -2934,7 +2930,7 @@ index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
  	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
  	oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
  	oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -204,10 +207,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -206,10 +209,22 @@ static struct {
  	/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
  #if defined(GSSAPI)
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
@@ -2957,7 +2953,7 @@ index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
  #endif
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
  	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-@@ -1029,10 +1044,42 @@ parse_time:
+@@ -1113,10 +1128,42 @@ parse_time:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -2986,7 +2982,7 @@ index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
 +	case oGssKexAlgorithms:
-+		arg = strdelim(&s);
++		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
 +		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 +			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
 +			    filename, linenum);
@@ -3000,9 +2996,9 @@ index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
  	case oBatchMode:
  		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1911,7 +1958,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2306,7 +2353,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
  	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication = -1;
 +	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
@@ -3014,8 +3010,8 @@ index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -2059,8 +2112,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+@@ -2463,8 +2516,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
 +	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
@@ -3033,7 +3029,7 @@ index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -2702,7 +2765,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
+@@ -3246,7 +3309,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
@@ -3048,13 +3044,12 @@ index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
-diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
-index feedb3d2..a8a8870d 100644
---- a/readconf.h
-+++ b/readconf.h
-@@ -41,7 +41,13 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
- 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
+--- a/readconf.h.gsskex	2021-08-27 12:05:29.248142431 +0200
++++ b/readconf.h	2021-08-27 12:22:19.270679852 +0200
+@@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+ 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
 +	int     gss_keyex;		/* Try GSS key exchange */
  	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
@@ -3066,11 +3061,10 @@ index feedb3d2..a8a8870d 100644
  	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/servconf.c	2021-08-27 12:28:15.887735189 +0200
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
  #include "auth.h"
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
@@ -3078,7 +3072,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
  
  static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
      const char *, int);
-@@ -133,8 +134,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
@@ -3089,8 +3083,8 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
 +	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -375,10 +379,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -356,10 +360,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -3109,7 +3103,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -531,6 +543,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -506,6 +518,7 @@ typedef enum {
  	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
@@ -3117,7 +3111,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
  	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -607,12 +620,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -587,12 +600,22 @@ static struct {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -3139,8 +3133,8 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
 +	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1548,6 +1571,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+@@ -1576,6 +1599,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3151,7 +3145,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
  	case sGssCleanupCreds:
  		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1556,6 +1583,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1584,6 +1611,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3160,7 +3154,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
 +	case sGssKexAlgorithms:
-+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
++		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
 +		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 +			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
 +			    filename, linenum);
@@ -3174,7 +3168,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2777,6 +2820,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2892,6 +2935,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
index dc8a7d0..8592607 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-19 14:57:30.307370482 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac	2021-04-19 14:57:30.315370543 +0200
-@@ -1974,12 +1974,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.646699953 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac	2021-08-30 13:07:43.662700088 +0200
+@@ -1985,12 +1985,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
  	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
  ])
  
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
  		fi
  	]
  )
-@@ -2008,6 +2010,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
+@@ -2019,6 +2021,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen])
  AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include <dlfcn.h>])
  
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
  # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
  	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
-@@ -5564,6 +5600,7 @@ echo "                  BSD Auth support
+@@ -5624,6 +5660,7 @@ echo "                  BSD Auth support
  echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
  echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
  echo "                   PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
  echo "                  U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
  
  echo ""
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-19 14:57:30.261370134 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-04-19 15:14:38.916155695 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.571699324 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
 @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
  	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
  	ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
  	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
  	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
  	hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
-@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
+@@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
  	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
  	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
  	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
  	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
-@@ -337,6 +339,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
+@@ -339,6 +341,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
  	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
  	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
  	if test -d pkg ; then \
  		rm -fr pkg ; \
-@@ -511,6 +515,7 @@ regress-prep:
+@@ -513,6 +517,7 @@ regress-prep:
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
  	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
  	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
-@@ -674,6 +679,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT
+@@ -677,6 +682,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT
  	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
  	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
  
@@ -120,17 +120,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
  # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
  SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
  	regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
-@@ -709,6 +724,7 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(RE
+@@ -711,7 +726,8 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(RE
+ 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
  	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
  	regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
- 	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
+-	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
++	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
 +	regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \
  
  tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
  	echo all tests passed
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh	2021-04-19 14:57:30.316370550 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
 @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ else
  	done
  
@@ -140,10 +142,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/
  	r=$?
  	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
  		fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile	2021-04-19 15:15:44.411651410 +0200
-@@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
+@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
  		known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \
  		modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
  		pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
@@ -153,7 +155,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefil
  		rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
  		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
  		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
-@@ -249,8 +250,9 @@ unit:
+@@ -252,8 +253,9 @@ unit:
  		V="" ; \
  		test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
  		    V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
@@ -165,9 +167,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefil
  			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
  		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \
  			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-19 14:57:30.316370550 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh	2021-04-19 14:57:30.316370550 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
 +#
 +#  Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
@@ -518,9 +520,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11
 +	trace "kill agent"
 +	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
 +fi
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile	2021-04-19 14:57:30.316370550 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
 @@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
  
  REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?=	yes
@@ -529,9 +531,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regre
 +SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig pkcs11
  
  .include <bsd.subdir.mk>
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-19 14:57:30.317370558 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c	2021-04-19 14:57:30.317370558 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
@@ -870,9 +872,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +	test_parse_invalid();
 +	test_generate_valid();
 +}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c	2021-04-19 14:57:30.317370558 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
 @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
  #include "digest.h"
  #include "ssh-sk.h"
@@ -952,9 +954,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c
  			ret = 1;
  		goto done;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c	2021-04-19 14:57:30.317370558 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
 @@ -847,10 +847,72 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
  }
  
@@ -1125,10 +1127,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c
  	send_status(e, success);
  }
  #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-19 14:57:30.269370194 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5	2021-04-19 14:57:30.321370588 +0200
-@@ -1063,6 +1063,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.578699383 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
+@@ -1111,6 +1111,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with
  .Cm CertificateFile
  in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
  the identity.
@@ -1150,10 +1152,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm IgnoreUnknown
  Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
  encountered in configuration parsing.
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-19 14:57:30.269370194 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-04-19 15:17:05.804267447 +0200
-@@ -843,6 +843,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.578699383 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
+@@ -826,6 +826,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
  			break;
  		case 'i':
@@ -1168,7 +1170,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  			p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
  			if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
  				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
-@@ -1695,6 +1703,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1681,6 +1689,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
  	(void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
  #endif
@@ -1176,7 +1178,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  
   skip_connect:
  	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
-@@ -2211,6 +2220,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const stru
+@@ -2197,6 +2206,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const stru
  	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
  }
  
@@ -1222,7 +1224,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
  static void
  load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
-@@ -2225,11 +2273,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
+@@ -2211,11 +2259,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
  	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
  	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
  	int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
@@ -1234,7 +1236,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  
  	n_ids = n_certs = 0;
  	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
-@@ -2242,33 +2285,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
+@@ -2228,33 +2271,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
  	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
  
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
@@ -1300,9 +1302,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
  		free(cp);
  		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-04-19 14:57:30.318370565 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
 @@ -860,8 +860,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
  			free(fp);
  		} else {
@@ -1317,9 +1319,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
  		}
  		free(comments[i]);
  		sshkey_free(keys[i]);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2021-04-19 14:57:30.318370565 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
 @@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
  	u_int nkeys, i;
  	struct sshbuf *msg;
@@ -1337,9 +1339,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-c
  		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
  			/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
  			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2021-04-19 14:57:30.320370580 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2021-08-30 13:12:27.709084157 +0200
 @@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
  	int			logged_in;
  };
@@ -1383,8 +1385,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_RV rv;
  	CK_ULONG i;
  
--	debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d",
--	    p, p->refcount, p->valid);
+-	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d",
+-	    p->name, p->refcount, p->valid);
 -	if (!p->valid)
 +	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", m, m->refcount, m->valid);
 +	if (!m->valid)
@@ -1427,9 +1429,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +}
 +
 +/*
-+ * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable.
++ * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
 + * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
-+ * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
++ * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
 + * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
 + */
 +static void
@@ -1446,15 +1448,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -135,13 +178,11 @@ pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_p
- static void
- pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
+@@ -137,11 +180,9 @@ pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_prov
  {
--	debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
-+	debug_f("%p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
+ 	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount);
  	if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
 -		if (p->valid)
--			error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p);
+-			error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name);
  		free(p->name);
 -		free(p->slotlist);
 -		free(p->slotinfo);
@@ -1543,7 +1542,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  }
  
  static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
-@@ -195,6 +283,55 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
+@@ -195,6 +286,55 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
  static int ec_key_idx = 0;
  #endif
  
@@ -1599,7 +1598,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  /* release a wrapped object */
  static void
  pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
-@@ -208,6 +345,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr,
+@@ -208,6 +348,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr,
  	if (k11->provider)
  		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
  	free(k11->keyid);
@@ -1607,7 +1606,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	free(k11);
  }
  
-@@ -222,8 +360,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, C
+@@ -222,8 +363,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, C
  	CK_RV			rv;
  	int			ret = -1;
  
@@ -1618,7 +1617,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
  		return (-1);
-@@ -262,12 +400,12 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
+@@ -262,12 +403,12 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
  	else {
  		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
  		    si->token.label);
@@ -1633,7 +1632,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	    (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
  	if (pin != NULL)
  		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
-@@ -297,13 +435,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
+@@ -297,13 +438,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
  static int
  pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
  {
@@ -1650,7 +1649,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  }
  
  
-@@ -319,13 +458,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs
+@@ -319,13 +461,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs
  
  	*val = 0;
  
@@ -1668,7 +1667,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	attr.type = type;
  	attr.pValue = &flag;
-@@ -356,13 +496,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, C
+@@ -356,13 +499,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, C
  	int			 always_auth = 0;
  	int			 did_login = 0;
  
@@ -1686,7 +1685,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
  		if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
-@@ -439,8 +580,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con
+@@ -439,8 +583,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con
  		return (-1);
  	}
  
@@ -1697,7 +1696,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
  
  	/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
-@@ -484,7 +625,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
+@@ -484,7 +628,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
  /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
  static int
  pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
@@ -1706,7 +1705,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  {
  	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
  
-@@ -502,6 +643,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *
+@@ -502,6 +646,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *
  		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
  	}
  
@@ -1719,7 +1718,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
  	RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
  	return (0);
-@@ -532,8 +679,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst,
+@@ -532,8 +682,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst,
  		return (NULL);
  	}
  
@@ -1730,7 +1729,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
  	sig = xmalloc(siglen);
-@@ -598,7 +745,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
+@@ -598,7 +748,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
  
  static int
  pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
@@ -1739,7 +1738,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  {
  	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
  
-@@ -614,6 +761,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider
+@@ -614,6 +764,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider
  	k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
  	memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
  
@@ -1752,7 +1751,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
  	EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
  
-@@ -650,8 +803,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
+@@ -650,8 +806,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
  	int			login_required, ret;
  
@@ -1763,7 +1762,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
  
-@@ -661,9 +814,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
+@@ -661,9 +817,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
  		error("pin required");
  		return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
  	}
@@ -1775,7 +1774,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		return (-1);
  	}
  	if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
-@@ -699,7 +852,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+@@ -699,7 +855,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
  pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
      CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
  {
@@ -1785,7 +1784,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -713,14 +867,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -713,14 +870,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  
  	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
  	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
@@ -1806,7 +1805,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return (NULL);
-@@ -731,19 +886,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -731,19 +889,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
@@ -1830,7 +1829,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto fail;
-@@ -755,8 +910,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -755,8 +913,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  		goto fail;
  	}
  
@@ -1841,7 +1840,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (group == NULL) {
  		ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
  		goto fail;
-@@ -767,13 +922,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -767,13 +925,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  		goto fail;
  	}
  
@@ -1858,7 +1857,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (octet == NULL) {
  		ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
  		goto fail;
-@@ -790,7 +945,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -790,7 +948,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  		goto fail;
  	}
  
@@ -1867,7 +1866,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		goto fail;
  
  	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -806,7 +961,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -806,7 +964,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  	ec = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
  
  fail:
@@ -1876,7 +1875,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
  	if (ec)
  		EC_KEY_free(ec);
-@@ -823,7 +978,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+@@ -823,7 +981,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
  pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
      CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
  {
@@ -1886,7 +1885,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -834,14 +990,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -834,14 +993,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  
  	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
  	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
@@ -1907,7 +1906,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return (NULL);
-@@ -852,19 +1009,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -852,19 +1012,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
@@ -1931,7 +1930,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto fail;
-@@ -876,8 +1033,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -876,8 +1036,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  		goto fail;
  	}
  
@@ -1942,7 +1941,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
  		error("BN_bin2bn failed");
  		goto fail;
-@@ -886,7 +1043,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -886,7 +1046,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  		fatal_f("set key");
  	rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
  
@@ -1951,7 +1950,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		goto fail;
  
  	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -901,7 +1058,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -901,7 +1061,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  	rsa = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
  
  fail:
@@ -1960,7 +1959,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
  	RSA_free(rsa);
  
-@@ -912,7 +1069,8 @@ static int
+@@ -912,7 +1072,8 @@ static int
  pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
      CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
  {
@@ -1970,7 +1969,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -936,14 +1094,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -936,14 +1097,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  
  	memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
  	cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
@@ -1991,7 +1990,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return -1;
-@@ -955,18 +1114,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -955,18 +1117,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
  	if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
@@ -2014,7 +2013,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto out;
-@@ -980,8 +1140,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -980,8 +1143,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  		subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
  	X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
  
@@ -2025,7 +2024,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		error("d2i_x509 failed");
  		goto out;
  	}
-@@ -1001,7 +1161,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -1001,7 +1164,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  			goto out;
  		}
  
@@ -2034,7 +2033,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  			goto out;
  
  		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -1031,7 +1191,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -1031,7 +1194,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  			goto out;
  		}
  
@@ -2043,7 +2042,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  			goto out;
  
  		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -1051,7 +1211,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -1051,7 +1214,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  		goto out;
  	}
   out:
@@ -2052,7 +2051,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
  	X509_free(x509);
  	RSA_free(rsa);
-@@ -1102,11 +1262,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_U
+@@ -1102,11 +1265,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_U
   */
  static int
  pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
@@ -2067,7 +2066,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -1123,10 +1284,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provide
+@@ -1123,10 +1287,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provide
  	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
  	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
  
@@ -2094,7 +2093,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto fail;
-@@ -1207,11 +1381,12 @@ fail:
+@@ -1207,11 +1384,12 @@ fail:
   */
  static int
  pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
@@ -2109,7 +2108,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -1227,10 +1402,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider
+@@ -1227,10 +1405,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider
  	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
  	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
  
@@ -2127,16 +2126,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
 +		nattr++;
 +	}
-+
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
  
 -	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
++
 +	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto fail;
-@@ -1499,16 +1687,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct
+@@ -1499,16 +1690,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct
  }
  #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
  
@@ -2155,7 +2154,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	int ret = -1;
  	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
  	void *handle = NULL;
-@@ -1517,164 +1699,298 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_
+@@ -1517,164 +1702,298 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
  	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
  	CK_ULONG i;
@@ -2241,17 +2240,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
 -		    provider_id, rv);
 +		    provider_module, rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
--	rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
++		goto fail;
++	}
 +	rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID));
 +	if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL &&
 +	    strcmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID)) {
 +		debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
 +		    m->info.manufacturerID);
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
+-	rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
 +	rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription));
  	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
  	    " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
@@ -2529,7 +2528,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
  	if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
-@@ -1683,7 +1999,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, c
+@@ -1683,7 +2002,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, c
  		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
  	}
  	if (nkeys == 0)
@@ -2568,9 +2567,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	return (nkeys);
  }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2021-04-19 14:57:30.320370580 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
 @@ -22,10 +22,14 @@
  #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED		4
  #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED		5
@@ -2586,9 +2585,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
  #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
  struct sshkey *
  	pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-19 14:57:30.318370565 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c	2021-04-19 14:57:30.318370565 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
@@ -3009,9 +3008,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-19 14:57:30.318370565 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h	2021-04-19 14:57:30.318370565 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dbdf7ed..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,320 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index 32d1f617..0024f751 100644
---- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -333,7 +333,27 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
- #endif
- 
- 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
--	if (nonblock) {
-+	c->restore_block = 0;
-+	if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set
-+		 * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to
-+		 * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
-+		 * with other programs that follow.
-+		 */
-+		if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
-+			set_nonblock(rfd);
-+		}
-+		if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
-+			set_nonblock(wfd);
-+		}
-+		if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
-+			set_nonblock(efd);
-+		}
-+	} else if (nonblock) {
- 		if (rfd != -1)
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
- 		if (wfd != -1)
-@@ -422,17 +442,23 @@ channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc)
- }
- 
- int
--channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp)
-+channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp)
- {
- 	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
--	int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
-+	int ret, fd = *fdp;
- 
--	if (fd != -1) {
--		ret = close(fd);
--		*fdp = -1;
--		if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
--			channel_find_maxfd(sc);
--	}
-+	if (fd == -1)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if ((*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) ||
-+	   (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) ||
-+	   (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0))
-+		(void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, 0);	/* restore blocking */
-+
-+	ret = close(fd);
-+	*fdp = -1;
-+	if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
-+		channel_find_maxfd(sc);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -442,13 +468,13 @@ channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
- {
- 	int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
- 
--	channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+	channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 	if (rfd != sock)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd);
- 	if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd);
- 	if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- }
- 
- static void
-@@ -702,7 +728,7 @@ channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
--				channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+				channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 				channel_free(ssh, c);
- 				break;
- 			}
-@@ -1491,7 +1517,8 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
- 
- Channel *
- channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
--    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out)
-+    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
-+    int in, int out, int nonblock)
- {
- 	Channel *c;
- 
-@@ -1499,7 +1526,7 @@ channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
- 
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
- 	    -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
--	    0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    0, "stdio-forward", nonblock);
- 
- 	c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
- 	c->host_port = port_to_connect;
-@@ -1649,7 +1676,7 @@ channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
- 	if (c->single_connection) {
- 		oerrno = errno;
- 		debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 		chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
- 		errno = oerrno;
- 	}
-@@ -2058,7 +2085,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
- 		return 1;
- 	if (len <= 0) {
- 		debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- 	} else {
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
-@@ -2087,7 +2114,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
- 		return 1;
- 	if (len <= 0) {
- 		debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- 	} else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
- 		debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self);
- 	else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0)
-diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
-index 378d987c..6bf86b00 100644
---- a/channels.h
-+++ b/channels.h
-@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@
- 
- #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC	-1
- 
-+/* nonblocking flags for channel_new */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE	0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET	1 /* set non-blocking state */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO	2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */
-+
-+/* c->restore_block mask flags */
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD	0x01
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD	0x02
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD	0x04
-+
- /* TCP forwarding */
- #define FORWARD_DENY		0
- #define FORWARD_REMOTE		(1)
-@@ -139,6 +149,7 @@ struct Channel {
- 				 * to a matching pre-select handler.
- 				 * this way post-select handlers are not
- 				 * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
-+	int	restore_block;	/* fd mask to restore blocking status */
- 	struct sshbuf *input;	/* data read from socket, to be sent over
- 				 * encrypted connection */
- 	struct sshbuf *output;	/* data received over encrypted connection for
-@@ -266,7 +277,7 @@ void	 channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *,
- void	 channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
- 	    channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
- void	 channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
--int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *);
-+int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *);
- void	 channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
- 
- /* mux proxy support */
-@@ -313,7 +324,7 @@ Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short,
- 	    char *, char *, int *, const char **);
- Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
- Channel	*channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
--	    u_short, int, int);
-+	    u_short, int, int, int);
- Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
- 	    u_short, char *, char *);
- Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index 219f0e90..bdd67686 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -1405,14 +1405,6 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
- 	if (have_pty)
- 		leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- 
--	/* restore blocking io */
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
--
- 	/*
- 	 * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
- 	 * exit status to be returned.  In that case, clear error code if the
-diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
-index faf4ef1e..9454bfed 100644
---- a/mux.c
-+++ b/mux.c
-@@ -452,14 +452,6 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
- 	if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
- 		error_f("tcgetattr: %s", strerror(errno));
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
--
- 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	if (cctx->want_tty) {
-@@ -469,7 +461,7 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
- 
- 	nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
- 	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
--	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 
- 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
- 	c->remote_id = nc->self;	/* link control -> session channel */
-@@ -1025,13 +1017,8 @@ mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
--
--	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
-+	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1],
-+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 	free(chost);
- 
- 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
-diff --git a/nchan.c b/nchan.c
-index 4a4494b8..7ef3a350 100644
---- a/nchan.c
-+++ b/nchan.c
-@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
- 			    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	} else {
--		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) {
-+		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd) < 0) {
- 			logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
- 			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->wfd,
- 			    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
-@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
- 			    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	} else {
--		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) {
-+		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd) < 0) {
- 			logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
- 			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->rfd,
- 			    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
-@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
- 	debug_f("channel %d: (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
- 	    c->self, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
- 	    channel_format_extended_usage(c));
--	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) {
-+	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd) < 0) {
- 		logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
- 		    "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->efd,
- 		    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 696dc3bc..6243db76 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -1876,9 +1876,10 @@ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
- 	    (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
--		fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
-+		fatal_f("dup() in/out failed");
- 	if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
--	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
-+	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out,
-+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed");
- 	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
- 	channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
-@@ -2074,14 +2075,6 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
- 		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(in))
--		set_nonblock(in);
--	if (!isatty(out))
--		set_nonblock(out);
--	if (!isatty(err))
--		set_nonblock(err);
--
- 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	if (tty_flag) {
-@@ -2091,7 +2084,7 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	c = channel_new(ssh,
- 	    "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
- 	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
--	    "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 
- 	debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self);
- 
diff --git a/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch b/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1285979..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
---- compat.h.orig	2020-10-05 10:09:02.953505129 -0700
-+++ compat.h	2020-10-05 10:10:17.587733113 -0700
-@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
- 
- #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
--/* #define unused		0x00000004 */
-+#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
- /* #define unused		0x00000008 */
- #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
- /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
---- compat.c.orig	2020-10-05 10:25:02.088720562 -0700
-+++ compat.c	2020-10-05 10:13:11.637282492 -0700
-@@ -65,11 +65,12 @@
- 		{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_6.6*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|
- 					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
-+		{ "OpenSSH_7.4*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE|
-+		  			SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74},
- 		{ "OpenSSH_7.0*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.1*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.2*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.3*,"
--		  "OpenSSH_7.4*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.5*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.6*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.7*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
---- sshconnect2.c.orig	2020-09-26 07:26:37.618010545 -0700
-+++ sshconnect2.c	2020-10-05 10:47:22.116315148 -0700
-@@ -1305,6 +1305,26 @@
- 			break;
- 	}
- 	free(oallowed);
-+	/*
-+	 * OpenSSH 7.4 supports SHA2 sig types, but fails to indicate its
-+	 * support.  For that release, check the local policy against the
-+	 * SHA2 signature types.
-+	 */
-+	if (alg == NULL &&
-+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
-+		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
-+		while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
-+			if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
-+				continue;
-+			tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512", NULL);
-+			if (tmp != NULL)
-+				alg = xstrdup(cp);
-+			free(tmp);
-+			if (alg != NULL)
-+				break;
-+		}
-+		free(oallowed);
-+	}
- 	return alg;
- }
- 
-
diff --git a/openssh-8.6p1-gsissh.patch b/openssh-8.6p1-gsissh.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 685dcd9..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.6p1-gsissh.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2449 +0,0 @@
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth2.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.443951396 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.601078299 +0200
-@@ -277,7 +277,28 @@
- 	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
--	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	if (user[0] == '\0') {
-+		debug("received empty username for %s", method);
-+		if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) {
-+			char *lname = NULL;
-+			PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname));
-+			if (lname && lname[0] != '\0') {
-+				free(user);
-+				user = lname;
-+				debug("set username to %s from gssapi context", user);
-+			} else {
-+				debug("failed to set username from gssapi context");
-+				ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh,
-+				    "failed to set username from gssapi context");
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
-+	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s",
-+	    user[0] ? user : "<implicit>", service, method);
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-@@ -288,17 +309,42 @@
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
- 
--	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
--		/* setup auth context */
--		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
-+	/* If first time or username changed or empty username,
-+	   setup/reset authentication context. */
-+	if ((authctxt->attempt++ == 0) ||
-+	    (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0) ||
-+	    (strcmp(user, "") == 0)) {
-+		if (authctxt->user) {
-+			free(authctxt->user);
-+			authctxt->user = NULL;
-+		}
-+		authctxt->valid = 0;
- 		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
--		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
-+		if (strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0) {
-+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Unsupported service %s",
-+			    service);
-+		}
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+		/* If we're going to set the username based on the
-+		   GSSAPI context later, then wait until then to
-+		   verify it. Just put in placeholders for now. */
-+		if ((strcmp(user, "") == 0) &&
-+		    ((strcmp(method, "gssapi") == 0) ||
-+		     (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0))) {
-+			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-+		} else {
-+#endif
-+		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
-+		if (authctxt->pw) {
- 			authctxt->valid = 1;
- 			debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user);
- 		} else {
- 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
- 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
- 		}
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+		} /* endif for setting username based on GSSAPI context */
-+#endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 		if (options.use_pam)
- 			PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
-@@ -307,6 +353,7 @@
- 		    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
- 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
-+		if (authctxt->attempt == 1) {
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-@@ -322,9 +369,10 @@
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
- 			    "no authentication methods enabled");
--	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
--	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
--		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service "
-+		}
-+	}
-+	if (strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
-+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of service "
- 		    "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
- 		    authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
- 	}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.6p1/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth2-gss.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.342951168 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-gss.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.602078301 +0200
-@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
- 
-+static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh);
- static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
- static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
- static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
-@@ -63,8 +64,8 @@
- {
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
--	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
--	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *b2 = NULL;
-+	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf, gssbuf2;
- 	u_char *p;
- 	size_t len;
- 
-@@ -75,6 +76,9 @@
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- 
-+	if ((b2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+
- 	mic.value = p;
- 	mic.length = len;
- 
-@@ -85,13 +89,29 @@
- 		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
- 	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
- 
-+	/* client may have used empty username to determine target
-+	   name from GSSAPI context */
-+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b2, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex",
-+	    ssh->kex->session_id);
-+
-+	if ((gssbuf2.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b2)) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
-+	gssbuf2.length = sshbuf_len(b2);
-+
- 	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
--	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
--		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
--		    authctxt->pw, 1));
-+	    &gssbuf, &mic))) ||
-+	    !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+	    &gssbuf2, &mic)))) {
-+		if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
-+			authenticated =
-+			    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+			    authctxt->pw, 1));
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
-+	sshbuf_free(b2);
- 	free(mic.value);
- 
- 	return (authenticated);
-@@ -146,7 +166,9 @@
- 		return (0);
- 	}
- 
--	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
-+	/* authctxt->valid may be 0 if we haven't yet determined
-+	   username from gssapi context. */
-+	if (authctxt->user == NULL) {
- 		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
- 		free(doid);
- 		return (0);
-@@ -184,7 +206,7 @@
- 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- 	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- 	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
--	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags = 0;
- 	u_char *p;
- 	size_t len;
- 	int r;
-@@ -205,6 +227,7 @@
- 	free(p);
- 
- 	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(gssctxt, ssh);
- 		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
- 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
- 			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 ||
-@@ -279,6 +302,34 @@
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+static void
-+gssapi_set_username(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
-+	char *lname = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((authctxt->user == NULL) || (authctxt->user[0] == '\0')) {
-+		PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname));
-+		if (lname && lname[0] != '\0') {
-+			if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user);
-+			authctxt->user = lname;
-+			debug("set username to %s from gssapi context", lname);
-+			authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user));
-+			if (authctxt->pw) {
-+				authctxt->valid = 1;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+				if (options.use_pam)
-+					PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
-+#endif
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			debug("failed to set username from gssapi context");
-+			ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh,
-+			    "failed to set username from gssapi context");
-+		}
-+	}
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
-  * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
-@@ -289,12 +340,14 @@
- input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
--	int r, authenticated;
-+	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	const char *displayname;
- 
- 	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
- 		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
- 
-+	gssapi_set_username(ssh);
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
- 	 * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
-@@ -303,8 +356,11 @@
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
- 
--	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
--	    authctxt->pw, 1));
-+	/* user should be set if valid but we double-check here */
-+	if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 1));
-+	}
- 
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
- 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
-@@ -356,11 +412,17 @@
- 		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
- 	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
- 
--	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
--		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
--		    authctxt->pw, 0));
--	else
-+	gssapi_set_username(ssh);
-+
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) {
-+		if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
-+			authenticated =
-+			    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+			    authctxt->pw, 0));
-+		}
-+	} else {
- 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-+	}
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
-@@ -380,6 +442,26 @@
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh) {
-+	char *errstr;
-+	OM_uint32 maj, min;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	errstr = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min));
-+	if (errstr) {
-+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
-+		    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, maj)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errstr)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
-+			fatal_fr(r, "");
-+		free(errstr);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
- 	"gssapi-keyex",
- 	userauth_gsskeyex,
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth.c openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.445951400 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.603078303 +0200
-@@ -344,7 +344,8 @@
- 	    method,
- 	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
- 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
--	    authctxt->user,
-+	    (authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) ?
-+		authctxt->user : "unknown",
- 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- 	    extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
-@@ -586,13 +587,18 @@
- #endif
- 
- 	pw = getpwnam(user);
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+	if (options.use_pam && options.permit_pam_user_change && pw == NULL)
-+		pw = sshpam_getpw(user);
-+#endif
- 
- #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
- 	aix_restoreauthdb();
- #endif
- 	if (pw == NULL) {
- 		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
--		    user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
-+		    (user && user[0]) ? user : "unknown",
-+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
- #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
- 		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
- 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth.h openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.445951400 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.603078303 +0200
-@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+#endif
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
- 	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-8.6p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth-pam.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.440951389 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-pam.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.604078305 +0200
-@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@
- static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL;
- static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL;
- static char *sshpam_conninfo = NULL;
-+static struct ssh *sshpam_ssh = NULL;
- 
- /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
- #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
-@@ -301,6 +302,56 @@
- # define pam_chauthtok(a,b)	(sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
- #endif
- 
-+struct passwd *
-+sshpam_getpw(const char *user)
-+{
-+	struct passwd *pw;
-+
-+	if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) != NULL)
-+		return(pw);
-+
-+	debug("PAM: faking passwd struct for user '%.100s'", user);
-+	if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
-+		return NULL;
-+	pw->pw_name = xstrdup(user);	/* XXX leak */
-+	pw->pw_shell = "/bin/true";
-+	pw->pw_gecos = "sshd fake PAM user";
-+	return (pw);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+sshpam_check_userchanged(void)
-+{
-+	int sshpam_err;
-+	struct passwd *pw;
-+	const char *user;
-+
-+	debug("sshpam_check_userchanged");
-+	sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
-+				  (sshpam_const void **)&user);
-+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
-+		fatal("PAM: could not get PAM_USER: %s",
-+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-+	debug("sshpam_check_userchanged: user was '%.100s'",
-+	    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	if (strcmp(user, sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name) != 0) {
-+		debug("PAM: user mapped from '%.100s' to '%.100s'",
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name, user);
-+		if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
-+			fatal("PAM: could not get passwd entry for user "
-+			    "'%.100s' provided by PAM_USER", user);
-+		pwfree(sshpam_authctxt->pw);
-+		sshpam_authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pw);
-+		sshpam_authctxt->valid = allowed_user(sshpam_ssh, pw);
-+		free(sshpam_authctxt->user);
-+		sshpam_authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
-+		debug("PAM: user '%.100s' now %svalid", user,
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "in");
-+	}
-+	debug("sshpam_check_userchanged: user is '%.100s'",
-+	    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+}
-+
- static void
- sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
- {
-@@ -332,7 +383,7 @@
- static void
- import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
- {
--	char *env;
-+	char *env, *user;
- 	u_int n, i, num_env;
- 	int r;
- 
-@@ -348,6 +399,19 @@
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 	sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0);
-+	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+		debug("PAM: user is '%.100s'",
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+		debug("PAM: got username '%.100s' from thread", user);
-+		if ((sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, user))
-+		    != PAM_SUCCESS)
-+			fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_USER: %s",
-+			    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-+		pwfree(sshpam_authctxt->pw);
-+		sshpam_authctxt->pw = pwcopy(sshpam_getpw(user));
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Import environment from subprocess */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
-@@ -522,6 +586,13 @@
- 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
- 		goto auth_fail;
- 
-+	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
-+		debug("sshpam_thread: user is '%.100s'",
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+		sshpam_check_userchanged();
-+		debug("sshpam_thread: user is '%.100s'",
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	}
- 	if (!do_pam_account()) {
- 		/* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN.
- 		 * Backward compatibility for other errors. */
-@@ -546,6 +617,13 @@
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
-+		debug("sshpam_thread: user is '%.100s'",
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Export any environment strings set in child */
- 	for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
-@@ -738,6 +816,8 @@
- 		xasprintf(&sshpam_conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d",
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- 		    sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
-+		/* Save so allowed_user can be called later */
-+		sshpam_ssh = ssh;
- 	}
- 	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
- 		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
-@@ -1082,6 +1162,18 @@
- 	debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
- 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- 
-+	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
-+		debug("do_pam_account: user is '%.100s'",
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+		sshpam_check_userchanged();
-+		debug("do_pam_account: user is '%.100s'",
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+		if (getpwnam(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name) == NULL)
-+			fatal("PAM: completed authentication but PAM account invalid");
-+		debug("do_pam_account: user is '%.100s'",
-+		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	}
-+
- 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
- 		sshpam_account_status = 0;
- 		return (sshpam_account_status);
-@@ -1370,6 +1462,9 @@
- 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
- 
- 	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
-+	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
-+		sshpam_check_userchanged();
-+	}
- 	sshpam_password = NULL;
- 	free(fake);
- 	if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth-pam.h openssh-8.6p1/auth-pam.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth-pam.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.303951079 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-pam.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.604078305 +0200
-@@ -43,5 +43,6 @@
- int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void);
- void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int);
- int is_pam_session_open(void);
-+struct passwd *sshpam_getpw(const char *);
- 
- #endif /* USE_PAM */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-8.6p1/canohost.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/canohost.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.343951170 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/canohost.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.605078308 +0200
-@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
- #include <sys/un.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>          /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
- 
- #include <netinet/in.h>
- #include <arpa/inet.h>
-@@ -295,3 +296,33 @@
- {
- 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
- }
-+
-+void
-+resolve_localhost(char **host)
-+{
-+	struct hostent *hostinfo;
-+
-+	hostinfo = gethostbyname(*host);
-+	if (hostinfo == NULL || hostinfo->h_name == NULL) {
-+		debug("gethostbyname(%s) failed", *host);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (hostinfo->h_addrtype == AF_INET) {
-+		struct in_addr addr;
-+		addr = *(struct in_addr *)(hostinfo->h_addr);
-+		if (ntohl(addr.s_addr) == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
-+			char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-+			if (gethostname(buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
-+				debug("gethostname() failed");
-+				return;
-+			}
-+			hostinfo = gethostbyname(buf);
-+			free(*host);
-+			if (hostinfo == NULL || hostinfo->h_name == NULL) {
-+				*host = xstrdup(buf);
-+			} else {
-+				*host = xstrdup(hostinfo->h_name);
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/canohost.h openssh-8.6p1/canohost.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/canohost.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.343951170 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/canohost.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.605078308 +0200
-@@ -26,4 +26,6 @@
- 
- #endif /* _CANOHOST_H */
- 
-+void		 resolve_localhost(char **host);
-+
- void		 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/configure.ac	2021-05-04 10:47:33.430951367 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac	2021-05-04 10:48:29.607078312 +0200
-@@ -4718,6 +4718,14 @@
- 			AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
- 					[ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
- 
-+			# If we're using some other GSSAPI
-+			if test -n "$GSSAPI" ; then
-+				AC_MSG_ERROR([Previously configured GSSAPI library conflicts with Kerberos GSI.])
-+			fi
-+
-+			if test -z "$GSSAPI"; then
-+				GSSAPI="KRB5";
-+			fi
- 		fi
- 		if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
- 			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
-@@ -4757,6 +4765,40 @@
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether the user wants GSI (Globus) support
-+gsi="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(gsi,
-+	[  --with-gsi              Enable Globus GSI authentication support],
-+	[
-+		gsi="$withval"
-+	]
-+)
-+
-+if test "x$gsi" != "xno" ; then
-+	# Globus GSSAPI configuration
-+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for Globus GSI)
-+	AC_DEFINE(GSI, 1, [Define if you want GSI/Globus authentication support.])
-+
-+	if test -n "$GSSAPI" ; then
-+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Previously configured GSSAPI library conflicts with Globus GSI.])
-+	fi
-+
-+	if test -z "$GSSAPI" ; then
-+		GSSAPI="GSI"
-+	fi
-+
-+	AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+	if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
-+		LIBS="$LIBS `$PKGCONFIG --libs globus-gss-assist globus-gssapi-gsi globus-common`"
-+		CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags globus-gss-assist globus-gssapi-gsi globus-common`"
-+	fi
-+
-+	AC_DEFINE(GSSAPI)
-+	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
-+
-+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize)
-+fi
-+
- # Check whether user wants systemd support
- SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
- AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-8.6p1/gss-genr.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/gss-genr.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.465951446 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-genr.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.607078312 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
-+#include "canohost.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "cipher.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -408,9 +409,18 @@
- ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
- {
- 	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+	char *xhost;
- 	char *val;
- 
--	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host);
-+	/* Make a copy of the host name, in case it was returned by a
-+	 * previous call to gethostbyname(). */
-+	xhost = xstrdup(host);
-+
-+	/* Make sure we have the FQDN. Some GSSAPI implementations don't do
-+	 * this for us themselves */
-+	resolve_localhost(&xhost);
-+
-+	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", xhost);
- 	gssbuf.value = val;
- 	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
- 
-@@ -418,6 +428,7 @@
- 	    &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
- 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
- 
-+	free(xhost);
- 	free(gssbuf.value);
- 	return (ctx->major);
- }
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/gss-serv.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.369951229 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.608078315 +0200
-@@ -50,10 +50,12 @@
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- 
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
--    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
--    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
-+    { {0, NULL}, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+      GSS_C_NO_NAME, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL},
-+      GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, 0, 0};
- 
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-@@ -61,14 +63,26 @@
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
- #endif
-+#ifdef GSI
-+extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech;
-+extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2;
-+#endif
- 
- ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
- #ifdef KRB5
- 	&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
- #endif
-+#ifdef GSI
-+	&gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2,
-+	&gssapi_gsi_mech,
-+#endif
- 	&gssapi_null_mech,
- };
- 
-+#ifdef GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG
-+static int limited = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- /*
-  * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
-  * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
-@@ -229,6 +243,10 @@
- 	    (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
- 		if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
- 			fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
-+#ifdef GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG
-+		if (flags && (*flags & GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG))
-+			limited=1;
-+#endif
- 	}
- 
- 	return (status);
-@@ -248,6 +266,20 @@
- 
- 	tok = ename->value;
- 
-+#ifdef GSI /* GSI gss_export_name() is broken. */
-+	if (((ctx->oid->length == gssapi_gsi_mech.oid.length) &&
-+	     (memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, gssapi_gsi_mech.oid.elements,
-+		     gssapi_gsi_mech.oid.length) == 0)) ||
-+	    ((ctx->oid->length == gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2.oid.length) &&
-+	     (memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2.oid.elements,
-+		     gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2.oid.length) == 0))) {
-+		name->length = ename->length;
-+		name->value = xmalloc(ename->length+1);
-+		memcpy(name->value, ename->value, ename->length);
-+		return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
- 	 * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
-@@ -308,21 +340,24 @@
- 	gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- 
- 	if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
--		if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
--		    (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+		if (client->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+		    (memcmp(client->oid.elements,
- 		     ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
- 			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
- 			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- 		}
- 
--		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
--		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
-+		/* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech
-+		   because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */
-+
-+		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+		    ctx->client_creds, &new_name,
- 		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
- 			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
- 			return (ctx->major);
- 		}
- 
--		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
-+		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->cred_name,
- 		    new_name, &equal);
- 
- 		if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-@@ -337,9 +372,9 @@
- 
- 		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
- 
--		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->cred_name);
- 		gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
--		client->name = new_name;
-+		client->cred_name = new_name;
- 		client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- 		ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- 		client->updated = 1;
-@@ -356,12 +391,17 @@
- 		i++;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (client->oid.elements == NULL)
-+		client->oid = *ctx->oid;
- 	if (client->mech == NULL)
- 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- 
-+	/* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech
-+	   because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */
-+
- 	if (ctx->client_creds &&
--	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
--	     ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+	     ctx->client_creds, &client->cred_name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
- 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
- 		return (ctx->major);
- 	}
-@@ -378,16 +418,25 @@
- 		return (ctx->major);
- 	}
- 
--	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
-+	if ((client->mech->oid.elements != NULL) &&
-+	    (ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
- 	    &client->exportedname))) {
- 		return (ctx->major);
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((ctx->major = gss_duplicate_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
-+	    &client->ctx_name)))
-+		return ctx->major;
-+
- 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
- 
- 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- 	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+
-+	/* needed for globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() */
-+	client->context = ctx->context;
-+
- 	return (ctx->major);
- }
- 
-@@ -395,6 +444,7 @@
- void
- ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- {
-+#ifdef KRB5
- 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
- 	krb5_error_code problem;
- 
-@@ -410,6 +460,14 @@
- 			gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
- 		}
- 	}
-+#else
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
-+		/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
-+		debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
-+		    gssapi_client.store.filename);
-+		unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
-+	}
-+#endif
- }
- 
- /* As user */
-@@ -417,6 +475,11 @@
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
-+		if (options.gss_creds_path) {
-+			gssapi_client.store.filename =
-+			    expand_authorized_keys(options.gss_creds_path,
-+			    the_authctxt->pw);
-+		}
- 		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-@@ -449,11 +512,13 @@
- 
- 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
- 
--	if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
--	    gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
--		debug("No suitable client data");
-+#ifdef GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG
-+	if (limited && options.gsi_allow_limited_proxy != 1) {
-+		debug("limited proxy not acceptable for remote login");
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
- 		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
- 			gssapi_client.used = 1;
-@@ -464,6 +529,7 @@
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
- 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
-+			gss_release_name(&lmin, &gssapi_client.ctx_name);
- 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
- 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
- 			return 0;
-@@ -473,6 +539,24 @@
- 	return (0);
- }
- 
-+/* Priviledged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_localname(char **user)
-+{
-+	*user = NULL;
-+	if (gssapi_client.displayname.length == 0 ||
-+	    gssapi_client.displayname.value == NULL) {
-+		debug("No suitable client data");
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->localname) {
-+		return((*gssapi_client.mech->localname)(&gssapi_client,user));
-+	} else {
-+		debug("Unknown client authentication type");
-+	}
-+	return (0);
-+}
-+
- /* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
-  * as the user, the monitor is root.
-  *
-@@ -499,9 +583,11 @@
- 	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
- 	struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
- 	char *envstr;
-+	char **p; char **pw;
- #endif
- 
--	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-+	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-@@ -526,6 +612,18 @@
- 	if (ret)
- 		return;
- 
-+	/* Put ssh pam stack env variables in this new pam stack env
-+	 * Using pam-pkinit, KRB5CCNAME is set during do_pam_session
-+	 * this addition enables pam-pkinit to access KRB5CCNAME if used
-+	 * in sshd-rekey stack too
-+	 */
-+	pw = p = fetch_pam_environment();
-+	while ( *pw != NULL ) {
-+		pam_putenv(pamh, *pw);
-+		pw++;
-+	}
-+	free_pam_environment(p);
-+
- 	xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
- 	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-gsi.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-gsi.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.609078317 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#ifdef GSI
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
-+#include <globus_gss_assist.h>
-+
-+static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name);
-+static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user);
-+static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client);
-+static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds_micv2(ssh_gssapi_client *client);
-+static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-+    ssh_gssapi_client *client);
-+static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds_micv2(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-+    ssh_gssapi_client *client);
-+
-+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech = {
-+	"dZuIebMjgUqaxvbF7hDbAw==",
-+	"GSI",
-+	{9, "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x9B\x50\x01\x01"},
-+	NULL,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds
-+};
-+
-+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2 = {
-+	"vz8J1E9PzLr8b1K+0remTg==",
-+	"GSI",
-+	{10, "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x9b\x50\x01\x01\x01"},
-+	NULL,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds_micv2,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds_micv2
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check if this user is OK to login under GSI. User has been authenticated
-+ * as identity in global 'client_name.value' and is trying to log in as passed
-+ * username in 'name'.
-+ *
-+ * Returns non-zero if user is authorized, 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
-+{
-+    int authorized = 0;
-+    globus_result_t res;
-+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
-+    char lname[256] = "";
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE
-+    if (globus_module_activate(GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE) != 0) {
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+/* use new globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() interface if available */
-+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
-+    debug("calling globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize()");
-+    if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
-+        (res = globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize(client->context, "ssh",
-+                                                   name, lname, 256))) {
-+        debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
-+    } else if (lname[0] && strcmp(name, lname) != 0) {
-+        debug("GSI user maps to %s, not %s", lname, name);
-+    } else {
-+        authorized = 1;
-+    }
-+#else
-+    debug("calling globus_gss_assist_userok()");
-+    if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
-+        (res = (globus_gss_assist_userok(client->displayname.value,
-+                                         name)))) {
-+        debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
-+    } else {
-+        authorized = 1;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+    logit("GSI user %s is%s authorized as target user %s",
-+        (char *) client->displayname.value, (authorized ? "" : " not"), name);
-+
-+    return authorized;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the local username associated with the GSI credentials.
-+ */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user)
-+{
-+    globus_result_t res;
-+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
-+    char lname[256] = "";
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE
-+    if (globus_module_activate(GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE) != 0) {
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+/* use new globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() interface if available */
-+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
-+    debug("calling globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize()");
-+    if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
-+        (res = globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize(client->context, "ssh",
-+                                                   NULL, lname, 256))) {
-+        debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
-+        logit("failed to map GSI user %s", (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+    *user = strdup(lname);
-+#else
-+    debug("calling globus_gss_assist_gridmap()");
-+    if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
-+        (res = globus_gss_assist_gridmap(client->displayname.value, user))) {
-+        debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
-+        logit("failed to map GSI user %s", (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+    logit("GSI user %s mapped to target user %s",
-+        (char *) client->displayname.value, *user);
-+
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Export GSI credentials to disk.
-+ */
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32	major_status;
-+	OM_uint32	minor_status;
-+	gss_buffer_desc	export_cred = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	char *		p;
-+
-+	if (!client || !client->creds) {
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	major_status = gss_export_cred(&minor_status,
-+				       client->creds,
-+				       GSS_C_NO_OID,
-+				       1,
-+				       &export_cred);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) && major_status != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
-+		Gssctxt *ctx;
-+		ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctx);
-+		ctx->major = major_status;
-+		ctx->minor = minor_status;
-+		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, &gssapi_gsi_mech.oid);
-+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	p = strchr((char *) export_cred.value, '=');
-+	if (p == NULL) {
-+		logit("Failed to parse exported credentials string '%.100s'",
-+		    (char *)export_cred.value);
-+		gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	*p++ = '\0';
-+	if (strcmp((char *)export_cred.value,"X509_USER_DELEG_PROXY") == 0) {
-+		client->store.envvar = strdup("X509_USER_PROXY");
-+	} else {
-+		client->store.envvar = strdup((char *)export_cred.value);
-+	}
-+	if (access(p, R_OK) == 0) {
-+		if (client->store.filename) {
-+			if (rename(p, client->store.filename) < 0) {
-+				logit("Failed to rename %s to %s: %s", p,
-+				    client->store.filename, strerror(errno));
-+				free(client->store.filename);
-+				client->store.filename = strdup(p);
-+			} else {
-+				p = client->store.filename;
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			client->store.filename = strdup(p);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	client->store.envval = strdup(p);
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+	if (options.use_pam)
-+		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
-+#endif
-+	gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Export GSI credentials to disk.
-+ */
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds_micv2(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32	major_status;
-+	OM_uint32	minor_status;
-+	gss_buffer_desc	export_cred = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	char *		p;
-+
-+	if (!client || !client->creds) {
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	major_status = gss_export_cred(&minor_status,
-+				       client->creds,
-+				       GSS_C_NO_OID,
-+				       1,
-+				       &export_cred);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) && major_status != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
-+		Gssctxt *ctx;
-+		ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctx);
-+		ctx->major = major_status;
-+		ctx->minor = minor_status;
-+		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, &gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2.oid);
-+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	p = strchr((char *) export_cred.value, '=');
-+	if (p == NULL) {
-+		logit("Failed to parse exported credentials string '%.100s'",
-+		    (char *)export_cred.value);
-+		gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	*p++ = '\0';
-+	if (strcmp((char *)export_cred.value,"X509_USER_DELEG_PROXY") == 0) {
-+		client->store.envvar = strdup("X509_USER_PROXY");
-+	} else {
-+		client->store.envvar = strdup((char *)export_cred.value);
-+	}
-+	if (access(p, R_OK) == 0) {
-+		if (client->store.filename) {
-+			if (rename(p, client->store.filename) < 0) {
-+				logit("Failed to rename %s to %s: %s", p,
-+				    client->store.filename, strerror(errno));
-+				free(client->store.filename);
-+				client->store.filename = strdup(p);
-+			} else {
-+				p = client->store.filename;
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			client->store.filename = strdup(p);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	client->store.envval = strdup(p);
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+	if (options.use_pam)
-+		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
-+#endif
-+	gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Export updated GSI credentials to disk.
-+ */
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+	return ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds(client);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Export updated GSI credentials to disk.
-+ */
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds_micv2(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+	return ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds_micv2(client);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSI */
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.392951281 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.609078317 +0200
-@@ -379,6 +379,34 @@
- 	return found_principal;
- }
-  
-+/* Retrieve the local username associated with a set of Kerberos
-+ * credentials. Hopefully we can use this for the 'empty' username
-+ * logins discussed in the draft  */
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user) {
-+	krb5_principal princ;
-+	int retval;
-+
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if ((retval=krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->displayname.value,
-+	    &princ))) {
-+		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s",
-+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context,retval));
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* We've got to return a malloc'd string */
-+	*user = (char *)xmalloc(256);
-+	if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, princ, 256, *user)) {
-+		free(*user);
-+		*user = NULL;
-+		return(0);
-+	}
-+
-+	return(1);
-+}
- 
- /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
-  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-@@ -473,7 +501,7 @@
- 	return set_env;
- }
- 
--int
-+static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-     ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
-@@ -544,7 +572,7 @@
- 	{9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
- 	NULL,
- 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
--	NULL,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_localname,
- 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
- 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
- };
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-8.6p1/kexgsss.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/kexgsss.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.475951468 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgsss.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.609078317 +0200
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
- 
-+static void kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh);
- extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- int
-@@ -96,8 +97,10 @@
- 
- 	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
- 
--	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) {
-+		kex_gss_send_error(ctxt, ssh);
- 		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+	}
- 
- 	do {
- 		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
-@@ -195,13 +198,14 @@
- 	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
- 
- 	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		kex_gss_send_error(ctxt, ssh);
- 		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
- 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
- 			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
- 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- 				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
- 		}
--		fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "GSSAPI Key Exchange handshake failed");
- 	}
- 
- 	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-@@ -479,4 +483,26 @@
- 	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
- 	return r;
- }
-+
-+static void
-+kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh) {
-+	char *errstr;
-+	OM_uint32 maj, min;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	errstr = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min));
-+	if (errstr) {
-+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, maj)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errstr)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+		if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
-+			fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+		/* XXX - We should probably log the error locally here */
-+		free(errstr);
-+	}
-+}
- #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/Makefile.in	2021-05-04 10:47:33.447951405 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-05-04 10:48:29.610078319 +0200
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@
- 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
- 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
-+	gss-serv-gsi.o \
- 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/misc.c openssh-8.6p1/misc.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/misc.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.466951448 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/misc.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.612078324 +0200
-@@ -378,11 +378,14 @@
- #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
- #define QUOTE	"\""
- 
-+/* Characters considered as quotations. */
-+#define QUOTES "'\""
-+
- /* return next token in configuration line */
- static char *
- strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals)
- {
--	char *old;
-+	char *old, *p, *q;
- 	int wspace = 0;
- 
- 	if (*s == NULL)
-@@ -390,6 +393,21 @@
- 
- 	old = *s;
- 
-+	if ((q=strchr(QUOTES, (int) *old)) && *q)
-+	{
-+		/* find next quote character, point old to start of quoted
-+		 * string */
-+		for (p = ++old; *p && *p != *q; p++)
-+			;
-+
-+		/* find start of next token */
-+		*s = (*p) ? p + strspn(p + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1 : NULL;
-+
-+		/* terminate 'old' token */
-+		*p = '\0';
-+		return (old);
-+	}
-+
- 	*s = strpbrk(*s,
- 	    split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE);
- 	if (*s == NULL)
-@@ -465,6 +483,20 @@
- 	return copy;
- }
- 
-+void
-+pwfree(struct passwd *pw)
-+{
-+	free(pw->pw_name);
-+	free(pw->pw_passwd);
-+	free(pw->pw_gecos);
-+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
-+	free(pw->pw_class);
-+#endif
-+	free(pw->pw_dir);
-+	free(pw->pw_shell);
-+	free(pw);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
-  * Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/misc.h openssh-8.6p1/misc.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/misc.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.408951317 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/misc.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.612078324 +0200
-@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@
- void	 sock_set_v6only(int);
- 
- struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
-+void pwfree(struct passwd *);
- const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
- 
- typedef void privdrop_fn(struct passwd *);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/monitor.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.467951450 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.614078329 +0200
-@@ -154,6 +154,9 @@
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_error(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_localname(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -206,7 +209,7 @@
-     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
- #endif
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
--    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
-@@ -214,7 +217,7 @@
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- #ifdef USE_PAM
--    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_start},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
-@@ -238,8 +241,11 @@
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
--    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, MON_ISAUTH | MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_error},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_localname},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -249,6 +255,8 @@
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 0, mm_answer_gss_error},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 0, mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-@@ -329,6 +337,8 @@
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 1);
-+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 1);
- #endif
- 
- 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
-@@ -446,6 +456,8 @@
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 1);
-+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 1);
- #endif
- 
- 	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
-@@ -762,15 +774,18 @@
- 
- 	debug3_f("entering");
- 
--	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
--		fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
--
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- 
- 	pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
- 
-+	if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user);
- 	authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+	if (options.permit_pam_user_change)
-+		setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? "[pam]" : "unknown");
-+	else
-+#endif
- 	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
- 	free(username);
- 
-@@ -2113,6 +2128,79 @@
- }
- 
- int
-+mm_answer_gss_error(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+	char *msg;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	msg=ssh_gssapi_last_error(gsscontext, &major, &minor);
-+	sshbuf_reset(m);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, minor)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, msg)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR, m);
-+
-+	free(msg);
-+
-+	return(0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+	gss_OID_set mech_set;
-+	size_t i;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	major=gss_indicate_mechs(&minor, &mech_set);
-+
-+	sshbuf_reset(m);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, mech_set->count)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	for (i = 0; i < mech_set->count; i++) {
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, mech_set->elements[i].elements,
-+		    mech_set->elements[i].length)) != 0)
-+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	}
-+
-+	gss_release_oid_set(&minor, &mech_set);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS, m);
-+
-+	return(0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_localname(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	char *name;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	ssh_gssapi_localname(&name);
-+
-+	sshbuf_reset(m);
-+	if (name) {
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0)
-+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+		debug3_f("sending result %s", name);
-+		free(name);
-+	} else {
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "")) != 0)
-+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+		debug3_f("sending result \"\"");
-+	}
-+
-+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME, m);
-+
-+	return(0);
-+}
-+
-+int
- mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
- {
- 	gss_buffer_desc data;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/monitor.h openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/monitor.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.447951405 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.614078329 +0200
-@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@
- 
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
-+
-+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS = 200, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS = 201,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME = 202, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME = 203,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR = 204, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR = 205
- };
- 
- struct ssh;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.467951450 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.615078331 +0200
-@@ -1084,6 +1084,94 @@
- 	return (authenticated);
- }
- 
-+char *
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctx, OM_uint32 *major, OM_uint32 *minor)
-+{
-+	struct sshbuf *m = NULL;
-+	OM_uint32 maj,min;
-+	char *errstr;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR, m);
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maj)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	if (major) *major=maj;
-+	if (minor) *minor=min;
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &errstr, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+
-+	return(errstr);
-+}
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_OID_set *mech_set)
-+{
-+	struct sshbuf *m = NULL;
-+	OM_uint32 major,minor;
-+	int count;
-+	gss_OID_desc oid;
-+	size_t length;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS, m);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &count)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&minor, mech_set);
-+	while(count-->0) {
-+	    if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&oid.elements, &length)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	    oid.length = length;
-+	    gss_add_oid_set_member(&minor, &oid, mech_set);
-+	}
-+
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+
-+	return(major);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(char **lname)
-+{
-+	struct sshbuf *m = NULL;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME, m);
-+
-+	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME");
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME,
-+	    m);
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, lname, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+	if ((*lname == NULL) || (*lname[0] == '\0')) {
-+		debug3_f("gssapi identity mapping failed");
-+	} else {
-+		debug3_f("gssapi identity mapped to %s", *lname);
-+	}
-+
-+	return(0);
-+}
-+
- OM_uint32
- mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
- {
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.453951418 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.616078333 +0200
-@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@
- int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int kex);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(char **user);
-+OM_uint32 mm_gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
-+    gss_OID_set *mech_set);
-+char *mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *maj, OM_uint32 *min);
- int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/readconf.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.468951452 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.617078335 +0200
-@@ -2391,11 +2391,11 @@
- 	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
- 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
--		options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+		options->gss_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
--		options->gss_keyex = 0;
-+		options->gss_keyex = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
--		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+		options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
- 		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-8.6p1/readconf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/readconf.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.355951197 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.618078338 +0200
-@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@
- 	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
- 	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
- 	char   *user;		/* User to log in as. */
-+	int     implicit;	/* Login user was not specified.
-+				   Server may choose based on authctxt. */
- 	int     escape_char;	/* Escape character; -2 = none */
- 
- 	u_int	num_system_hostfiles;	/* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/servconf.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.469951455 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.619078340 +0200
-@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
- 
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	options->use_pam = -1;
-+	options->permit_pam_user_change = -1;
- 
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	options->num_ports = 0;
-@@ -139,9 +140,11 @@
- 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
- 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
- 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
- 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
-+	options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = -1;
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
- 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
-@@ -292,6 +295,8 @@
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
- 		options->use_pam = 0;
-+	if (options->permit_pam_user_change == -1)
-+		options->permit_pam_user_change = 0;
- 
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
-@@ -373,13 +378,17 @@
- 	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
- 		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
--		options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+		options->gss_authentication = 1;
-+	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
-+		options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
--		options->gss_keyex = 0;
-+		options->gss_keyex = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
- 		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
-+	if (options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy == -1)
-+		options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
- 		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-@@ -517,7 +526,7 @@
- typedef enum {
- 	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
--	sUsePAM,
-+	sUsePAM, sPermitPAMUserChange,
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-@@ -539,6 +548,9 @@
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
- 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-+	sGssDelegateCreds,
-+	sGssCredsPath,
-+	sGsiAllowLimitedProxy,
- 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
- 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-@@ -571,8 +583,10 @@
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "permitpamuserchange", sPermitPAMUserChange, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- 	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "permitpamuserchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	/* Standard Options */
-@@ -625,8 +639,15 @@
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sGssDelegateCreds, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapicredentialspath", sGssCredsPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+#ifdef GSI
-+	{ "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sGsiAllowLimitedProxy, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+#else
-+	{ "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+#endif
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -634,8 +655,11 @@
- 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapicredentialspath", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -707,6 +731,8 @@
- 	{ "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "disableusagestats", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
-+	{ "usagestatstargets", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
- 	{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -1360,6 +1386,10 @@
- 		intptr = &options->use_pam;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sPermitPAMUserChange:
-+		intptr = &options->permit_pam_user_change;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	/* Standard Options */
- 	case sBadOption:
- 		return -1;
-@@ -1606,6 +1636,10 @@
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssDelegateCreds:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sGssKeyEx:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1614,6 +1648,10 @@
- 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssCredsPath:
-+		charptr = &options->gss_creds_path;
-+		goto parse_filename;
-+
- 	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1634,6 +1672,12 @@
- 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+#ifdef GSI
-+	case sGsiAllowLimitedProxy:
-+		intptr = &options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+#endif
-+
- 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2621,6 +2665,7 @@
- 
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_deleg_creds);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/servconf.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.402951303 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.620078342 +0200
-@@ -146,9 +146,12 @@
- 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
- 	int	use_kuserok;
- 	int		enable_k5users;
-+	int     gsi_allow_limited_proxy;	/* If true, accept limited proxies */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
-+	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* If true, store delegated GSSAPI credentials*/
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+	char   *gss_creds_path;		/* Use non-default credentials path */
- 	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
- 	int 	gss_store_rekey;
- 	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
-@@ -210,6 +213,7 @@
- 	char   *adm_forced_command;
- 
- 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
-+	int	permit_pam_user_change;	/* Allow PAM to change user name */
- 
- 	int	permit_tun;
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-8.6p1/ssh.1
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh.1	2021-05-04 10:47:33.357951202 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.1	2021-05-04 10:48:29.621078345 +0200
-@@ -1473,6 +1473,18 @@
- on to new connections).
- .It Ev USER
- Set to the name of the user logging in.
-+.It Ev X509_CERT_DIR
-+Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
-+CA certificates directory.
-+.It Ev X509_USER_CERT
-+Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
-+certificate to be used for authentication to the server.
-+.It Ev X509_USER_KEY
-+Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
-+private key to be used for authentication to the server.
-+.It Ev X509_USER_PROXY
-+Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
-+proxy credential to be used for authentication to the server.
- .El
- .Pp
- Additionally,
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.472951462 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.622078347 +0200
-@@ -575,6 +575,38 @@
- 			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
- 			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
- 	} else {
-+	    /*
-+	     * Since the config file parsing code aborts if it sees
-+	     * options it doesn't recognize, allow users to put
-+	     * options specific to compile-time add-ons in alternate
-+	     * config files so their primary config file will
-+	     * interoperate SSH versions that don't support those
-+	     * options.
-+	     */
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gssapi", pw->pw_dir,
-+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
-+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
-+			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
-+			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
-+#ifdef GSI
-+		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gsi", pw->pw_dir,
-+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
-+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
-+			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
-+			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
-+#endif
-+#if defined(KRB5)
-+		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.krb", pw->pw_dir,
-+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
-+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
-+			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
-+			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
-+#endif
-+#endif
- 		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
- 		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
- 		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-@@ -1247,8 +1279,12 @@
- 	if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0)
- 		cleanup_exit(255);
- 
--	if (options.user == NULL)
-+	if (options.user == NULL) {
- 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
-+		options.implicit = 1;
-+	} else {
-+		options.implicit = 0;
-+	}
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh_config	2021-05-04 10:47:33.358951204 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config	2021-05-04 10:48:29.622078347 +0200
-@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
- #   ForwardX11 no
- #   PasswordAuthentication yes
- #   HostbasedAuthentication no
--#   GSSAPIAuthentication no
--#   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
--#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#   GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+#   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials yes
-+#   GSSAPIKeyExchange yes
- #   GSSAPITrustDNS no
- #   BatchMode no
- #   CheckHostIP yes
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh_config.5	2021-05-04 10:47:33.424951353 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5	2021-05-04 10:48:29.623078349 +0200
-@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@
- user's configuration file
- .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
- .It
-+GSSAPI configuration file
-+.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config.gssapi
-+.It
-+Kerberos configuration file
-+.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config.krb
-+.It
- system-wide configuration file
- .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
- .El
-@@ -775,7 +781,7 @@
- .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
- Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
- The default is
--.Cm no .
-+.Cm yes .
- .It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
- If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
- connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
-@@ -783,12 +789,12 @@
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
--.Cm no .
-+.Cm yes .
- .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
- Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
- GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
- The default is
--.Dq no .
-+.Dq yes .
- .It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
- If set to
- .Dq yes
-@@ -1410,7 +1416,7 @@
- .Cm password ) .
- The default is:
- .Bd -literal -offset indent
--gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
-+gssapi-keyex,gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
- keyboard-interactive,password
- .Ed
- .It Cm ProxyCommand
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.459951432 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.624078351 +0200
-@@ -854,6 +854,11 @@
- 	gss_OID mech = NULL;
- 	char *gss_host = NULL;
- 
-+	if (!options.gss_authentication) {
-+		verbose("GSSAPI authentication disabled.");
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (options.gss_server_identity) {
- 		gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
- 	} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-@@ -965,7 +970,8 @@
- 
- 	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- 		/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
--		if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
-+		if (strcmp(authctxt->method->name, "gssapi") == 0 ||
-+		    !(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
- 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
- 			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
- 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-@@ -1136,6 +1142,20 @@
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef GSI
-+extern
-+const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl;
-+extern
-+const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl_micv2;
-+#define is_gsi_oid(oid) \
-+  ((oid->length == gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl->length && \
-+    (memcmp(oid->elements, gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl->elements, \
-+	    oid->length) == 0)) || \
-+   (oid->length == gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl_micv2->length && \
-+    (memcmp(oid->elements, gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl_micv2->elements, \
-+	    oid->length) == 0)))
-+#endif
-+
- int
- userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
-@@ -1158,6 +1178,12 @@
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- 
-+#ifdef GSI
-+	if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid))
-+		ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, "", authctxt->service,
-+		    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
-+	else
-+#endif
- 	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
- 
-@@ -1171,7 +1197,9 @@
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
--	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
-+		(options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) ?
-+		"" : authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-8.6p1/sshd.8
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd.8	2021-05-04 10:47:33.375951242 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.8	2021-05-04 10:48:29.624078351 +0200
-@@ -815,6 +815,29 @@
- # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
- @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
- .Ed
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Nm
-+will normally set the following environment variables:
-+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
-+.It Ev GRIDMAP
-+Applies to GSI authentication/authorization. Specifies the location of the
-+gridmapfile. If not specified, the gridmap file is assumed to be available at
-+/etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile for services running as root and at
-+HOME/.gridmap for services running as non-root where HOME is the home directory
-+of the effective user from the password file entry.
-+.It Ev X509_CERT_DIR
-+Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
-+CA certificates directory.
-+.It Ev X509_USER_CERT
-+Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
-+certificate to be used for authentication to the client.
-+.It Ev X509_USER_KEY
-+Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
-+private key to be used for authentication to the client.
-+.It Ev X509_USER_PROXY
-+Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
-+proxy credential to be used for authentication to the client.
-+.El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
- .It Pa ~/.hushlogin
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd.c	2021-05-04 10:47:33.472951462 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-04 10:48:29.625078353 +0200
-@@ -2364,7 +2364,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
--	if (options.gss_authentication) {
-+	if (options.gss_authentication && options.gss_deleg_creds) {
- 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
- 		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
- 		restore_uid();
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd_config	2021-05-04 10:47:33.393951283 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-05-04 10:48:29.626078356 +0200
-@@ -76,10 +76,11 @@
- #KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
--#GSSAPIAuthentication no
-+#GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+#GSSAPIDelegateCredentials yes
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
--#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange yes
- #GSSAPIEnablek5users no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
-@@ -95,6 +96,10 @@
- # problems.
- #UsePAM no
- 
-+# Set to 'yes' to allow the PAM stack to change the user name during
-+# calls to authentication
-+#PermitPAMUserChange no
-+
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd_config.5	2021-05-04 10:47:33.424951353 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-05-04 10:48:29.627078358 +0200
-@@ -632,15 +632,34 @@
- to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
- The default is
- .Cm no .
-+.It Cm GSIAllowLimitedProxy
-+Specifies whether to accept limited proxy credentials for authentication.
-+The default is
-+.Cm no .
- .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
- Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
- The default is
--.Cm no .
-+.Cm yes .
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
-+.It Cm GSSAPICredentialsPath
-+If specified, the delegated GSSAPI credential is stored in the
-+given path, overwriting any existing credentials.
-+Paths can be specified with syntax similar to the AuthorizedKeysFile
-+option (i.e., accepting %h and %u tokens).
-+When using this option,
-+setting 'GssapiCleanupCredentials no' is recommended,
-+so logging out of one session
-+doesn't remove the credentials in use by another session of
-+the same user.
-+Currently only implemented for the GSI mechanism.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
-+Specifies whether delegated credentials are stored in the user's environment.
-+The default is
-+.Cm yes .
- .It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
- Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
- access control. Further details are described in
-@@ -651,7 +670,7 @@
- Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
- doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
- The default is
--.Cm no .
-+.Cm yes .
- .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
- Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
- a client authenticates against.
-@@ -1783,6 +1802,12 @@
- as a non-root user.
- The default is
- .Cm no .
-+.It Cm PermitPAMUserChange
-+If set to
-+.Cm yes
-+this will enable PAM authentication to change the name of the user being
-+authenticated.  The default is
-+.Cm no .
- .It Cm VersionAddendum
- Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
- sent by the server upon connection.
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config_redhat
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat	2021-05-04 10:47:33.336951154 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config_redhat	2021-05-04 10:48:29.627078358 +0200
-@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@
- 
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- 
--GSSAPIAuthentication yes
--GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
--
- UsePAM yes
- 
- X11Forwarding yes
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh-gss.h	2021-05-04 10:47:33.372951235 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.628078360 +0200
-@@ -97,12 +97,14 @@
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
- 
- typedef struct {
-+	gss_OID_desc oid;
- 	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
- 	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
- 	gss_cred_id_t creds;
--	gss_name_t name;
-+	gss_name_t cred_name, ctx_name;
- 	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
- 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+	gss_ctx_id_t context; /* needed for globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() */
- 	int used;
- 	int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
-@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@
- 	OM_uint32	minor; /* both */
- 	gss_ctx_id_t	context; /* both */
- 	gss_name_t	name; /* both */
--	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
-+	gss_OID		oid; /* both */
- 	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
- 	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
- 	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
-@@ -161,6 +163,9 @@
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
- int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
- 
-+int ssh_gssapi_localname(char **name);
-+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+
- /* In the server */
- typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
-     const char *);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/version.h openssh-8.6p1/version.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/version.h	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/version.h	2021-05-04 10:48:29.628078360 +0200
-@@ -2,5 +2,19 @@
- 
- #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_8.6"
- 
-+#ifdef GSI
-+#define GSI_VERSION	" GSI"
-+#else
-+#define GSI_VERSION	""
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef KRB5
-+#define KRB5_VERSION	" KRB5"
-+#else
-+#define KRB5_VERSION	""
-+#endif
-+
- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
-+#define GSI_PORTABLE	"c-GSI"
-+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \
-+			GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION
diff --git a/openssh-8.6p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch b/openssh-8.6p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c38562..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.6p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2593 +0,0 @@
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/auth2.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.056175731 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.539345593 +0200
-@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "canohost.h"
-+
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
-@@ -75,6 +77,8 @@
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
- 
-+static int log_flag = 0;
-+
- Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- 	&method_none,
- 	&method_pubkey,
-@@ -299,6 +303,11 @@
- 
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s",
- 	    user[0] ? user : "<implicit>", service, method);
-+	if (!log_flag) {
-+		logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Authname;Remote: %s-%d;Name: %s",
-+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), user);
-+		log_flag = 1;
-+	}
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/channels.c openssh-8.6p1/channels.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/channels.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.043175700 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/channels.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.540345595 +0200
-@@ -220,6 +220,9 @@
- /* Setup helper */
- static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
- 
-+static int hpn_disabled = 0;
-+static int hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
-+
- /* -- channel core */
- 
- void
-@@ -407,6 +410,7 @@
- 	c->local_window = window;
- 	c->local_window_max = window;
- 	c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
-+	c->dynamic_window = 0;
- 	c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
- 	c->ctl_chan = -1;
- 	c->delayed = 1;		/* prevent call to channel_post handler */
-@@ -1098,6 +1102,28 @@
- 	FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
- }
- 
-+static int
-+channel_tcpwinsz(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0;
-+	socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz);
-+	int ret = -1;
-+
-+	/* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */
-+	if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
-+		return 128 * 1024;
-+
-+	ret = getsockopt(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
-+	    SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz);
-+	/* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
-+	if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
-+		tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
-+
-+	debug2("tcpwinsz: tcp connection %d, Receive window: %d",
-+	    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), tcpwinsz);
-+	return tcpwinsz;
-+}
-+
- static void
- channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
-     fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-@@ -2136,22 +2162,31 @@
- 
- 	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
- 	    !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
--	    ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
--	    c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
-+	    ((ssh_packet_is_interactive(ssh) &&
-+	    c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
- 	    c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
- 	    c->local_consumed > 0) {
-+		u_int addition = 0;
-+		u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(ssh);
-+		/* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment */
-+		if (c->dynamic_window && (tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) {
-+			/* grow the window somewhat aggressively to maintain pressure */
-+			addition = 1.5 * (tcpwinsz - c->local_window_max);
-+			c->local_window_max += addition;
-+			debug("Channel: Window growth to %d by %d bytes", c->local_window_max, addition);
-+		}
- 		if (!c->have_remote_id)
- 			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
- 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
- 		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
--		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed + addition)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- 			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
- 		}
- 		debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self,
--		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed);
--		c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
-+		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed + addition);
-+		c->local_window += c->local_consumed + addition;
- 		c->local_consumed = 0;
- 	}
- 	return 1;
-@@ -3318,6 +3353,14 @@
- 	return addr;
- }
- 
-+void
-+channel_set_hpn(int external_hpn_disabled, int external_hpn_buffer_size)
-+{
-+	hpn_disabled = external_hpn_disabled;
-+	hpn_buffer_size = external_hpn_buffer_size;
-+	debug("HPN Disabled: %d, HPN Buffer Size: %d", hpn_disabled, hpn_buffer_size);
-+}
-+
- static int
- channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
-     struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
-@@ -3458,8 +3501,10 @@
- 		}
- 
- 		/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
-+		/* explicitly test for hpn disabled option. if true use smaller window size */
- 		c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
--		    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-+		    hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : hpn_buffer_size,
-+		    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 		    0, "port listener", 1);
- 		c->path = xstrdup(host);
- 		c->host_port = fwd->connect_port;
-@@ -4645,7 +4690,8 @@
- 		sock = socks[n];
- 		nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener",
- 		    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
--		    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-+		    hpn_disabled ? CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT : hpn_buffer_size,
-+		    CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 		    0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
- 		nc->single_connection = single_connection;
- 		(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/channels.h openssh-8.6p1/channels.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/channels.h	2021-05-22 08:23:21.020175646 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/channels.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.541345597 +0200
-@@ -158,8 +158,10 @@
- 	u_int	local_window_max;
- 	u_int	local_consumed;
- 	u_int	local_maxpacket;
-+	int	dynamic_window;
- 	int     extended_usage;
- 	int	single_connection;
-+	u_int	tcpwinsz;
- 
- 	char   *ctype;		/* type */
- 
-@@ -228,7 +230,7 @@
- #define CHAN_LOCAL			0x10
- 
- /* Read buffer size */
--#define CHAN_RBUF	(16*1024)
-+#define CHAN_RBUF	CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT
- 
- /* Maximum channel input buffer size */
- #define CHAN_INPUT_MAX	(16*1024*1024)
-@@ -359,4 +361,7 @@
- void	 chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
- void	 chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
- 
-+/* hpn handler */
-+void	 channel_set_hpn(int, int);
-+
- #endif
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/cipher.c openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/cipher.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.024175656 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.542345600 +0200
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
-@@ -55,6 +56,9 @@
- #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
- #endif
- 
-+/* for multi-threaded aes-ctr cipher */
-+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
-+
- struct sshcipher_ctx {
- 	int	plaintext;
- 	int	encrypt;
-@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@
- 	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
- };
- 
--static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
-+static struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
- 	{ "3des-cbc",		8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-@@ -133,6 +137,29 @@
- #endif
- }
- 
-+/* used to get the cipher name so when force rekeying to handle the
-+ * single to multithreaded ctr cipher swap we only rekey when appropriate
-+ */
-+const char *
-+cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
-+{
-+	return cc->cipher->name;
-+}
-+
-+/* in order to get around sandbox and forking issues with a threaded cipher
-+ * we set the initial pre-auth aes-ctr cipher to the default OpenSSH cipher
-+ * post auth we set them to the new evp as defined by cipher-ctr-mt
-+ */
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+void
-+cipher_reset_multithreaded(void)
-+{
-+	cipher_by_name("aes128-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
-+	cipher_by_name("aes192-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
-+	cipher_by_name("aes256-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- u_int
- cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
- {
-@@ -182,10 +209,10 @@
- 	return cc->plaintext;
- }
- 
--const struct sshcipher *
-+struct sshcipher *
- cipher_by_name(const char *name)
- {
--	const struct sshcipher *c;
-+	struct sshcipher *c;
- 	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- 			return c;
-@@ -207,7 +234,8 @@
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
- 		c = cipher_by_name(p);
--		if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) {
-+		if (c == NULL || ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0 &&
-+				  (c->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)) {
- 			free(cipher_list);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.543345602 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
-+/*
-+ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher
-+ *
-+ * Author: Benjamin Bennett <ben@psc.edu>
-+ * Author: Mike Tasota <tasota@gmail.com>
-+ * Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
-+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2013 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged,
-+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+
-+/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/
-+/* maximum number of threads and queues */
-+#define MAX_THREADS	32
-+#define MAX_NUMKQ	(MAX_THREADS * 2)
-+
-+/* Number of pregen threads to use */
-+int cipher_threads = 2;
-+
-+/* Number of keystream queues */
-+int numkq = 4;
-+
-+/* Length of a keystream queue */
-+#define KQLEN		4096
-+
-+/* Processor cacheline length */
-+#define CACHELINE_LEN	64
-+
-+/* Collect thread stats and print at cancellation when in debug mode */
-+#define CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+
-+/* Can the system do unaligned loads natively? */
-+#if defined(__aarch64__) || \
-+    defined(__i386__)    || \
-+    defined(__powerpc__) || \
-+    defined(__x86_64__)
-+# define CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
-+#endif
-+#if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__)
-+# define CIPHER_INT128_OK
-+#endif
-+/*-------------------- END TUNABLES --------------------*/
-+
-+
-+const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
-+
-+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+/*
-+ * Struct to collect thread stats
-+ */
-+struct thread_stats {
-+	u_int	fills;
-+	u_int	skips;
-+	u_int	waits;
-+	u_int	drains;
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Debug print the thread stats
-+ * Use with pthread_cleanup_push for displaying at thread cancellation
-+ */
-+static void
-+thread_loop_stats(void *x)
-+{
-+	struct thread_stats *s = x;
-+	debug("AES-CTR MT tid %lu - %u fills, %u skips, %u waits", pthread_self(),
-+			s->fills, s->skips, s->waits);
-+}
-+
-+# define STATS_STRUCT(s)	struct thread_stats s
-+# define STATS_INIT(s)		{ memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); }
-+# define STATS_FILL(s)		{ s.fills++; }
-+# define STATS_SKIP(s)		{ s.skips++; }
-+# define STATS_WAIT(s)		{ s.waits++; }
-+# define STATS_DRAIN(s)		{ s.drains++; }
-+#else
-+# define STATS_STRUCT(s)
-+# define STATS_INIT(s)
-+# define STATS_FILL(s)
-+# define STATS_SKIP(s)
-+# define STATS_WAIT(s)
-+# define STATS_DRAIN(s)
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Keystream Queue state */
-+enum {
-+	KQINIT,
-+	KQEMPTY,
-+	KQFILLING,
-+	KQFULL,
-+	KQDRAINING
-+};
-+
-+/* Keystream Queue struct */
-+struct kq {
-+	u_char		keys[KQLEN][AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char		ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char		pad0[CACHELINE_LEN];
-+	int		qstate;
-+	pthread_mutex_t	lock;
-+	pthread_cond_t	cond;
-+	u_char		pad1[CACHELINE_LEN];
-+};
-+
-+/* Context struct */
-+struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt
-+{
-+	int		struct_id;
-+	struct kq	q[MAX_NUMKQ];
-+	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	STATS_STRUCT(stats);
-+	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	pthread_t	tid[MAX_THREADS];
-+	int		id[MAX_THREADS];
-+	pthread_rwlock_t tid_lock;
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+	pthread_rwlock_t stop_lock;
-+	int		exit_flag;
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+	int		state;
-+	int		qidx;
-+	int		ridx;
-+};
-+
-+/* <friedl>
-+ * increment counter 'ctr',
-+ * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
-+ * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
-+ */
-+static void
-+ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, size_t len)
-+{
-+	int i;
-+
-+	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+		if (++ctr[i])	/* continue on overflow */
-+			return;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Add num to counter 'ctr'
-+ */
-+static void
-+ssh_ctr_add(u_char *ctr, uint32_t num, u_int len)
-+{
-+	int i;
-+	uint16_t n;
-+
-+	for (n = 0, i = len - 1; i >= 0 && (num || n); i--) {
-+		n = ctr[i] + (num & 0xff) + n;
-+		num >>= 8;
-+		ctr[i] = n & 0xff;
-+		n >>= 8;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Threads may be cancelled in a pthread_cond_wait, we must free the mutex
-+ */
-+static void
-+thread_loop_cleanup(void *x)
-+{
-+	pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)x);
-+}
-+
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+/* Check if we should exit, we are doing both cancel and exit condition
-+ * since on OSX threads seem to occasionally fail to notice when they have
-+ * been cancelled. We want to have a backup to make sure that we won't hang
-+ * when the main process join()-s the cancelled thread.
-+ */
-+static void
-+thread_loop_check_exit(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c)
-+{
-+	int exit_flag;
-+
-+	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->stop_lock);
-+	exit_flag = c->exit_flag;
-+	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
-+
-+	if (exit_flag)
-+		pthread_exit(NULL);
-+}
-+#else
-+# define thread_loop_check_exit(s)
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Helper function to terminate the helper threads
-+ */
-+static void
-+stop_and_join_pregen_threads(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c)
-+{
-+	int i;
-+
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+	/* notify threads that they should exit */
-+	pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->stop_lock);
-+	c->exit_flag = TRUE;
-+	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+
-+	/* Cancel pregen threads */
-+	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
-+		debug ("Canceled %lu (%d,%d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
-+		pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
-+	}
-+	/* shouldn't need this - see commit logs for hpn-7_7_P1 -cjr 11/7/19*/
-+	/* for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) { */
-+	/* 	pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[i].lock); */
-+	/* 	pthread_cond_broadcast(&c->q[i].cond); */
-+	/* 	pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[i].lock); */
-+	/* } */
-+	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
-+		if (pthread_kill(c->tid[i], 0) != 0)
-+			debug3("AES-CTR MT pthread_join failure: Invalid thread id %lu in %s", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__);
-+		else {
-+			debug ("Joining %lu (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
-+			pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL);
-+		}
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * The life of a pregen thread:
-+ *    Find empty keystream queues and fill them using their counter.
-+ *    When done, update counter for the next fill.
-+ */
-+static void *
-+thread_loop(void *x)
-+{
-+	AES_KEY key;
-+	STATS_STRUCT(stats);
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c = x;
-+	struct kq *q;
-+	int i;
-+	int qidx;
-+	pthread_t first_tid;
-+
-+	/* Threads stats on cancellation */
-+	STATS_INIT(stats);
-+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+	pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_stats, &stats);
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* Thread local copy of AES key */
-+	memcpy(&key, &c->aes_ctx, sizeof(key));
-+
-+	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+	first_tid = c->tid[0];
-+	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Handle the special case of startup, one thread must fill
-+	 * the first KQ then mark it as draining. Lock held throughout.
-+	 */
-+	if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), first_tid)) {
-+		q = &c->q[0];
-+		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
-+		if (q->qstate == KQINIT) {
-+			for (i = 0; i < KQLEN; i++) {
-+				AES_encrypt(q->ctr, q->keys[i], &key);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(q->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+			ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (numkq - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
-+			STATS_FILL(stats);
-+			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
-+		}
-+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+	} else
-+		STATS_SKIP(stats);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Normal case is to find empty queues and fill them, skipping over
-+	 * queues already filled by other threads and stopping to wait for
-+	 * a draining queue to become empty.
-+	 *
-+	 * Multiple threads may be waiting on a draining queue and awoken
-+	 * when empty.  The first thread to wake will mark it as filling,
-+	 * others will move on to fill, skip, or wait on the next queue.
-+	 */
-+	for (qidx = 1;; qidx = (qidx + 1) % numkq) {
-+		/* Check if I was cancelled, also checked in cond_wait */
-+		pthread_testcancel();
-+
-+		/* Check if we should exit as well */
-+		thread_loop_check_exit(c);
-+
-+		/* Lock queue and block if its draining */
-+		q = &c->q[qidx];
-+		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
-+		pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock);
-+		while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) {
-+			STATS_WAIT(stats);
-+			thread_loop_check_exit(c);
-+			pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
-+		}
-+		pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
-+
-+		/* If filling or full, somebody else got it, skip */
-+		if (q->qstate != KQEMPTY) {
-+			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+			STATS_SKIP(stats);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Empty, let's fill it.
-+		 * Queue lock is relinquished while we do this so others
-+		 * can see that it's being filled.
-+		 */
-+		q->qstate = KQFILLING;
-+		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
-+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+		for (i = 0; i < KQLEN; i++) {
-+			AES_encrypt(q->ctr, q->keys[i], &key);
-+			ssh_ctr_inc(q->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		}
-+
-+		/* Re-lock, mark full and signal consumer */
-+		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
-+		ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (numkq - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		q->qstate = KQFULL;
-+		STATS_FILL(stats);
-+		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
-+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+	/* Stats */
-+	pthread_cleanup_pop(1);
-+#endif
-+
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
-+    LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
-+{
-+	typedef union {
-+#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
-+		__uint128_t *u128;
-+#endif
-+		uint64_t *u64;
-+		uint32_t *u32;
-+		uint8_t *u8;
-+		const uint8_t *cu8;
-+		uintptr_t u;
-+	} ptrs_t;
-+	ptrs_t destp, srcp, bufp;
-+	uintptr_t align;
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+	struct kq *q, *oldq;
-+	int ridx;
-+	u_char *buf;
-+
-+	if (len == 0)
-+		return 1;
-+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	q = &c->q[c->qidx];
-+	ridx = c->ridx;
-+
-+	/* src already padded to block multiple */
-+	srcp.cu8 = src;
-+	destp.u8 = dest;
-+	while (len > 0) {
-+		buf = q->keys[ridx];
-+		bufp.u8 = buf;
-+
-+		/* figure out the alignment on the fly */
-+#ifdef CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
-+		align = 0;
-+#else
-+		align = destp.u | srcp.u | bufp.u;
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
-+		if ((align & 0xf) == 0) {
-+			destp.u128[0] = srcp.u128[0] ^ bufp.u128[0];
-+		} else
-+#endif
-+		if ((align & 0x7) == 0) {
-+			destp.u64[0] = srcp.u64[0] ^ bufp.u64[0];
-+			destp.u64[1] = srcp.u64[1] ^ bufp.u64[1];
-+		} else if ((align & 0x3) == 0) {
-+			destp.u32[0] = srcp.u32[0] ^ bufp.u32[0];
-+			destp.u32[1] = srcp.u32[1] ^ bufp.u32[1];
-+			destp.u32[2] = srcp.u32[2] ^ bufp.u32[2];
-+			destp.u32[3] = srcp.u32[3] ^ bufp.u32[3];
-+		} else {
-+			size_t i;
-+			for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
-+				dest[i] = src[i] ^ buf[i];
-+		}
-+
-+		destp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+		srcp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+		len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+		ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+
-+		/* Increment read index, switch queues on rollover */
-+		if ((ridx = (ridx + 1) % KQLEN) == 0) {
-+			oldq = q;
-+
-+			/* Mark next queue draining, may need to wait */
-+			c->qidx = (c->qidx + 1) % numkq;
-+			q = &c->q[c->qidx];
-+			pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
-+			while (q->qstate != KQFULL) {
-+				STATS_WAIT(c->stats);
-+				pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
-+			}
-+			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
-+			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
-+			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+
-+			/* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */
-+			pthread_mutex_lock(&oldq->lock);
-+			oldq->qstate = KQEMPTY;
-+			STATS_DRAIN(c->stats);
-+			pthread_cond_broadcast(&oldq->cond);
-+			pthread_mutex_unlock(&oldq->lock);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	c->ridx = ridx;
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+#define HAVE_NONE	0
-+#define HAVE_KEY	1
-+#define HAVE_IV		2
-+
-+int X = 0;
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
-+    int enc)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	/* get the number of cores in the system */
-+	/* if it's not linux it currently defaults to 2 */
-+	/* divide by 2 to get threads for each direction (MODE_IN||MODE_OUT) */
-+#ifdef __linux__
-+	cipher_threads = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) / 2;
-+#endif /*__linux__*/
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+	cipher_threads = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) / 2;
-+#endif /*__APPLE__*/
-+#ifdef __FREEBSD__
-+	int req[2];
-+	size_t len;
-+
-+	req[0] = CTL_HW;
-+	req[1] = HW_NCPU;
-+
-+	len = sizeof(ncpu);
-+	sysctl(req, 2, &cipher_threads, &len, NULL, 0);
-+	cipher_threads = cipher_threads / 2;
-+#endif /*__FREEBSD__*/
-+
-+	/* if they have less than 4 cores spin up 4 threads anyway */
-+	if (cipher_threads < 2)
-+		cipher_threads = 2;
-+
-+	/* assure that we aren't trying to create more threads */
-+	/* than we have in the struct. cipher_threads is half the */
-+	/* total of allowable threads hence the odd looking math here */
-+	if (cipher_threads * 2 > MAX_THREADS)
-+		cipher_threads = MAX_THREADS / 2;
-+
-+	/* set the number of keystream queues */
-+	numkq = cipher_threads * 2;
-+
-+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
-+		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
-+		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->tid_lock, NULL);
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->stop_lock, NULL);
-+		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+
-+		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
-+		for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) {
-+			pthread_mutex_init(&c->q[i].lock, NULL);
-+			pthread_cond_init(&c->q[i].cond, NULL);
-+		}
-+
-+		STATS_INIT(c->stats);
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
-+		/* tell the pregen threads to exit */
-+		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
-+
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+		/* reset the exit flag */
-+		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+
-+		/* Start over getting key & iv */
-+		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
-+		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+		c->state |= HAVE_KEY;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (iv != NULL) {
-+		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		c->state |= HAVE_IV;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
-+		/* Clear queues */
-+		memcpy(c->q[0].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		c->q[0].qstate = KQINIT;
-+		for (i = 1; i < numkq; i++) {
-+			memcpy(c->q[i].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			ssh_ctr_add(c->q[i].ctr, i * KQLEN, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			c->q[i].qstate = KQEMPTY;
-+		}
-+		c->qidx = 0;
-+		c->ridx = 0;
-+
-+		/* Start threads */
-+		for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
-+			pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+			if (pthread_create(&c->tid[i], NULL, thread_loop, c) != 0)
-+				debug ("AES-CTR MT Could not create thread in %s", __FUNCTION__); /*should die here */
-+			else {
-+				if (!c->struct_id)
-+					c->struct_id = X++;
-+				c->id[i] = i;
-+				debug ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__, c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
-+			}
-+			pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+		}
-+		pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[0].lock);
-+		while (c->q[0].qstate == KQINIT)
-+			pthread_cond_wait(&c->q[0].cond, &c->q[0].lock);
-+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[0].lock);
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/* this function is no longer used but might prove handy in the future
-+ * this comment also applies to ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction
-+ */
-+void
-+ssh_aes_ctr_thread_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+
-+	c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
-+	stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+	int i;
-+	c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
-+	/* reconstruct threads */
-+	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
-+		pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+		if (pthread_create(&c->tid[i], NULL, thread_loop, c) !=0 )
-+			debug("AES-CTR MT could not create thread in %s", __FUNCTION__);
-+		else {
-+			c->struct_id = X++;
-+			c->id[i] = i;
-+			debug ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__, c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
-+			debug("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__);
-+		}
-+		pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+
-+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+		debug("AES-CTR MT main thread: %u drains, %u waits", c->stats.drains,
-+		    c->stats.waits);
-+#endif
-+		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
-+
-+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
-+		free(c);
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/* <friedl> */
-+const EVP_CIPHER *
-+evp_aes_ctr_mt(void)
-+{
-+# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000UL
-+	static EVP_CIPHER *aes_ctr;
-+	aes_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 16/*block*/, 16/*key*/);
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(aes_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_init);
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup);
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr);
-+#  ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(aes_ctr, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
-+				      | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH
-+				      | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT
-+				      | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV);
-+#  endif /*SSH_OLD_EVP*/
-+	return (aes_ctr);
-+# else /*earlier versions of openssl*/
-+	static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr;
-+	memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
-+	aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef;
-+	aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+	aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+	aes_ctr.key_len = 16;
-+	aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init;
-+	aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup;
-+	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
-+#  ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
-+	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
-+		EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+#  endif /*SSH_OLD_EVP*/
-+	return &aes_ctr;
-+# endif /*OPENSSH_VERSION_NUMBER*/
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/cipher.h openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/cipher.h	2021-05-22 08:23:21.025175658 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.543345602 +0200
-@@ -68,7 +68,9 @@
- 
- struct sshcipher_ctx;
- 
--const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
-+void ssh_aes_ctr_thread_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); // defined in cipher-ctr-mt.c
-+void ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
- const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
- int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
- char	*cipher_alg_list(char, int);
-@@ -86,6 +88,8 @@
- u_int	 cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
-+void	 cipher_reset_multithreaded(void);
-+const char *cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
- 
- u_int	 cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/clientloop.c openssh-8.6p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/clientloop.c	2021-05-22 08:23:20.932175440 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/clientloop.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.544345604 +0200
-@@ -1593,7 +1593,9 @@
- 		return NULL;
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
- 	    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
--	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
-+	    /* again is this really necessary for X11? */
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
-+	    CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
- 	c->force_drain = 1;
- 	return c;
- }
-@@ -1622,7 +1624,8 @@
- 	}
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
- 	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
--	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
-+	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
- 	    "authentication agent connection", 1);
- 	c->force_drain = 1;
- 	return c;
-@@ -1649,7 +1652,8 @@
- 	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
- 
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
--	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
-+	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
- 	c->datagram = 1;
- 
- #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/compat.c openssh-8.6p1/compat.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/compat.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.044175703 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/compat.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.544345604 +0200
-@@ -150,6 +150,17 @@
- 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
- 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
- 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
-+			/* Check to see if the remote side is OpenSSH and not HPN */
-+			/* TODO: See if we can work this into the new method for bug checks */
-+			if (strstr(version, "OpenSSH") != NULL) {
-+				if (strstr(version, "hpn") == NULL) {
-+					ssh->compat |= SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW;
-+					debug("Remote is NOT HPN enabled");
-+				} else {
-+					debug("Remote is HPN Enabled");
-+				}
-+			}
-+			debug("ssh->compat is %u", ssh->compat);
- 			return;
- 		}
- 	}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/compat.h openssh-8.6p1/compat.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/compat.h	2021-05-22 08:23:21.013175630 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/compat.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.545345607 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
- #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD	0x10000000
- #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS	0x20000000
- #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE	0x40000000
-+#define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW	0x80000000
- 
- struct ssh;
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/defines.h openssh-8.6p1/defines.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/defines.h	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/defines.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.545345607 +0200
-@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- #ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
--# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
-+# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 32*1024
- #endif
- 
- /*
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/digest.h openssh-8.6p1/digest.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/digest.h	2021-05-22 08:23:21.003175607 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/digest.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.545345607 +0200
-@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
- #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256	2
- #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384	3
- #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512	4
--#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		5
-+#define SSH_DIGEST_NULL		5
-+#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		6
- 
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/digest-openssl.c openssh-8.6p1/digest-openssl.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/digest-openssl.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.003175607 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/digest-openssl.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.546345609 +0200
-@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
- 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,	"SHA256",	32,	EVP_sha256 },
- 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,	"SHA384",	48,	EVP_sha384 },
- 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,	"SHA512",	64,	EVP_sha512 },
-+	{ SSH_DIGEST_NULL,	"NONEMAC",	0,	EVP_md_null},
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/HPN-README openssh-8.6p1/HPN-README
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/HPN-README	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/HPN-README	2021-05-22 08:24:33.546345609 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
-+Notes:
-+
-+MULTI-THREADED CIPHER:
-+The AES cipher in CTR mode has been multithreaded (MTR-AES-CTR). This will allow ssh installations
-+on hosts with multiple cores to use more than one processing core during encryption.
-+Tests have show significant throughput performance increases when using MTR-AES-CTR up
-+to and including a full gigabit per second on quad core systems. It should be possible to
-+achieve full line rate on dual core systems but OS and data management overhead makes this
-+more difficult to achieve. The cipher stream from MTR-AES-CTR is entirely compatible with single
-+thread AES-CTR (ST-AES-CTR) implementations and should be 100% backward compatible. Optimal
-+performance requires the MTR-AES-CTR mode be enabled on both ends of the connection.
-+The MTR-AES-CTR replaces ST-AES-CTR and is used in exactly the same way with the same
-+nomenclature.
-+Use examples:
-+		ssh -caes128-ctr you@host.com
-+		scp -oCipher=aes256-ctr file you@host.com:~/file
-+
-+NONE CIPHER:
-+To use the NONE option you must have the NoneEnabled switch set on the server and
-+you *must* have *both* NoneEnabled and NoneSwitch set to yes on the client. The NONE
-+feature works with ALL ssh subsystems (as far as we can tell) *AS LONG AS* a tty is not
-+spawned. If a user uses the -T switch to prevent a tty being created the NONE cipher will
-+be disabled.
-+
-+The performance increase will only be as good as the network and TCP stack tuning
-+on the reciever side of the connection allows. As a rule of thumb a user will need
-+at least 10Mb/s connection with a 100ms RTT to see a doubling of performance. The
-+HPN-SSH home page describes this in greater detail.
-+
-+http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh
-+
-+NONE MAC:
-+Starting with HPN 15v1 users will have the option to disable HMAC (message
-+authentication ciphers) when using the NONE cipher. You must enable the following:
-+NoneEnabled, NoneSwitch, and NoneMacEnabled. If all three are not enabled the None MAC
-+will be automatically disabled. In tests the use of the None MAC improved throuput by
-+more than 30%.
-+
-+ex: scp -oNoneSwitch=yes -oNoneEnabled=yes -oNoneMacEnabled=yes file host:~
-+
-+BUFFER SIZES:
-+
-+If HPN is disabled the receive buffer size will be set to the
-+OpenSSH default of 2MB (for OpenSSH versions before 4.7: 64KB).
-+
-+If an HPN system connects to a nonHPN system the receive buffer will
-+be set to the HPNBufferSize value. The default is 2MB but user adjustable.
-+
-+If an HPN to HPN connection is established a number of different things might
-+happen based on the user options and conditions.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
-+HPN Buffer Size = up to 64MB
-+This is the default state. The HPN buffer size will grow to a maximum of 64MB
-+as the TCP receive buffer grows. The maximum HPN Buffer size of 64MB is
-+geared towards 10GigE transcontinental connections.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
-+HPN Buffer Size = TCP receive buffer value.
-+Users on non-autotuning systems should disable TCPRcvBufPoll in the
-+ssh_config and sshd_config
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
-+HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCP receive buffer and HPNBufferSize.
-+This would be the system defined TCP receive buffer (RWIN).
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
-+HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
-+Generally there is no need to set both.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
-+HPN Buffer Size = grows to HPNBufferSize
-+The buffer will grow up to the maximum size specified here.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
-+HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
-+Generally there is no need to set both of these, especially on autotuning
-+systems. However, if the users wishes to override the autotuning this would be
-+one way to do it.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
-+HPN Buffer Size = TCPRcvBuf.
-+This will override autotuning and set the TCP recieve buffer to the user defined
-+value.
-+
-+
-+HPN Specific Configuration options
-+
-+TcpRcvBuf=[int]KB client
-+      Set the TCP socket receive buffer to n Kilobytes. It can be set up to the
-+maximum socket size allowed by the system. This is useful in situations where
-+the tcp receive window is set low but the maximum buffer size is set
-+higher (as is typical). This works on a per TCP connection basis. You can also
-+use this to artifically limit the transfer rate of the connection. In these
-+cases the throughput will be no more than n/RTT. The minimum buffer size is 1KB.
-+Default is the current system wide tcp receive buffer size.
-+
-+TcpRcvBufPoll=[yes/no] client/server
-+      Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life
-+of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled
-+for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista)
-+default is yes.
-+
-+NoneEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
-+      Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used
-+when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However,
-+it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted
-+even if this option is enabled. Set to no by default.
-+
-+NoneMacEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
-+      Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh
-+will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use
-+with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and
-+protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication
-+remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is no.
-+
-+NoneSwitch=[yes/no] client
-+     Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after
-+authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client
-+and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE
-+cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an
-+error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly
-+have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in
-+interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to no by default.
-+
-+HPNDisabled=[yes/no] client/server
-+     In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact
-+of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is
-+helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to no.
-+
-+HPNBufferSize=[int]KB client/server
-+     This is the default buffer size the HPN functionality uses when interacting
-+with nonHPN SSH installations. Conceptually this is similar to the TcpRcvBuf
-+option as applied to the internal SSH flow control. This value can range from
-+1KB to 64MB (1-65536). Use of oversized or undersized buffers can cause performance
-+problems depending on the length of the network path. The default size of this buffer
-+is 2MB.
-+
-+DisableMTAES=[yes/no] client/server
-+     Switch the encryption cipher being used from the multithreaded MT-AES-CTR cipher
-+back to the stock single-threaded AES-CTR cipher. Useful on modern processors with
-+AES-NI instructions which make the stock single-threaded AES-CTR cipher faster than
-+the multithreaded MT-AES-CTR cipher. Set to no by default.
-+
-+
-+Credits: This patch was conceived, designed, and led by Chris Rapier (rapier@psc.edu)
-+         The majority of the actual coding for versions up to HPN12v1 was performed
-+         by Michael Stevens (mstevens@andrew.cmu.edu). The MT-AES-CTR cipher was
-+         implemented by Ben Bennet (ben@psc.edu) and improved by Mike Tasota
-+         (tasota@gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013.
-+         Allan Jude provided the code for the NoneMac and buffer normalization.
-+         This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National
-+         Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation.
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/kex.c openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/kex.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.036175684 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.547345612 +0200
-@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
- 
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "canohost.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "audit.h"
- 
-@@ -969,6 +970,11 @@
- 	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
- 	u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
- 	int r, first_kex_follows;
-+	int auth_flag = 0;
-+	int log_flag = 0;
-+
-+	auth_flag = packet_authentication_state(ssh);
-+	debug("AUTH STATE IS %d", auth_flag);
- 
- 	debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
- 	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
-@@ -1039,11 +1045,40 @@
- 			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
-+		debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name);
-+		debug("REQUESTED MAC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->mac.name);
-+		if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) {
-+			if (auth_flag == 1) {
-+				debug("None requested post authentication.");
-+				ssh->none = 1;
-+			}
-+			else
-+				fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed.");
-+			if (newkeys->mac.name != NULL && strcmp(newkeys->mac.name, "none") == 0)
-+				debug("Requesting: NONEMAC. Authflag is %d", auth_flag);
-+		}
-+
- 		debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
- 		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
- 		    newkeys->enc.name,
- 		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
- 		    newkeys->comp.name);
-+		/*
-+		 * client starts with ctos = 0 && log flag = 0 and no log.
-+		 * 2nd client pass ctos = 1 and flag = 1 so no log.
-+		 * server starts with ctos = 1 && log_flag = 0 so log.
-+		 * 2nd sever pass ctos = 1 && log flag = 1 so no log.
-+		 * -cjr
-+		 */
-+		if (ctos && !log_flag) {
-+			logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Kex;Remote: %s-%d;Enc: %s;MAC: %s;Comp: %s",
-+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-+			    newkeys->enc.name,
-+			    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
-+			    newkeys->comp.name);
-+		}
-+		log_flag = 1;
- 	}
- 	need = dh_need = 0;
- 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
-@@ -1391,7 +1426,7 @@
- 	if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
- 		version_addendum = NULL;
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
--	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
-+	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
- 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
- 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
- 		oerrno = errno;
-@@ -1527,6 +1562,14 @@
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
-+	/* report the version information to syslog if this is the server */
-+	if (timeout_ms == -1) { /* only the server uses this value */
-+		logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Version;Remote: %s-%d;Protocol: %d.%d;Client: %.100s",
-+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-+		    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
-+	}
-+
- 	debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
- 	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
- 	compat_banner(ssh, remote_version);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/log.c openssh-8.6p1/log.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/log.c	2021-05-22 08:23:20.963175513 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.547345612 +0200
-@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@
- #include <syslog.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <errno.h>
-+#include "packet.h" /* needed for host and port look ups */
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-+# include <sys/time.h> /* to get current time */
-+#endif
-+
- #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
- # include <vis.h>
- #endif
-@@ -65,6 +70,8 @@
- 
- extern char *__progname;
- 
-+extern struct ssh *active_state;
-+
- #define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS	(VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
- #define LOG_STDERR_VIS	(VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/mac.c openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/mac.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.025175658 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.547345612 +0200
-@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
- 	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ "hmac-md5",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ "hmac-md5-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
-+	{ "none",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
- 	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/Makefile.in	2021-05-22 08:23:21.061175742 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-05-22 08:24:33.548345614 +0200
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
- CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
- PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
--LIBS=@LIBS@
-+LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
- K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
-@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
- LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	authfd.o authfile.o \
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
--	cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \
-+	cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o cipher-ctr-mt.o \
- 	compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- 	log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
- 	readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addr.o addrmatch.o \
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/packet.c openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/packet.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.028175665 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.549345616 +0200
-@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
- 	TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
- 	state->connection_in = -1;
- 	state->connection_out = -1;
--	state->max_packet_size = 32768;
-+	state->max_packet_size = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
- 	state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
- 	state->initialized = 1;
-@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
- ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
- {
- 	struct session_state *state;
--	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
-+	struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
- 	int r;
- 
- 	if (none == NULL) {
-@@ -958,10 +958,19 @@
- 	 * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
- 	 * See RFC4344 section 3.2.
- 	 */
--	if (enc->block_size >= 16)
--		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
--	else
--		*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
-+
-+	/* we really don't need to rekey if we are using the none cipher
-+	 * but there isn't a good way to disable it entirely that I can find
-+	 * and using a blocksize larger that 16 doesn't work (dunno why)
-+	 * so this seems to be a good limit for now - CJR 10/16/2020*/
-+	if (ssh->none == 1) {
-+		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (16*2);
-+	} else {
-+		if (enc->block_size >= 16)
-+			*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
-+		else
-+			*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
-+	}
- 	if (state->rekey_limit)
- 		*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
- 		    state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
-@@ -970,6 +979,24 @@
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
-+int rekey_requested = 0;
-+void
-+packet_request_rekeying(void)
-+{
-+	rekey_requested = 1;
-+}
-+
-+/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr
-+ * and none cipher switch */
-+int
-+packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
-+
-+	return state->after_authentication;
-+}
-+
- #define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
- static int
- ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
-@@ -996,6 +1023,13 @@
- 	if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
- 		return 0;
- 
-+	/* used to force rekeying when called for by the none
-+	 * cipher switch and aes-mt-ctr methods -cjr */
-+	if (rekey_requested == 1) {
-+		rekey_requested = 0;
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Time-based rekeying */
- 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
- 	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
-@@ -1333,7 +1367,7 @@
- 	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
- 	int len, r, ms_remain;
- 	fd_set *setp;
--	char buf[8192];
-+	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
- 	struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
- 
- 	DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
-@@ -1865,17 +1899,21 @@
- 	switch (r) {
- 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
- 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 		logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
- 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
- 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 		logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
- 		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
- 	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
- 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 		logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
- 	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
- 		if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
- 			ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+			sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 			logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
- 		}
- 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
-@@ -1917,6 +1955,24 @@
- 	logdie_f("should have exited");
- }
- 
-+/* this prints out the final log entry */
-+void
-+sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *ssh) {
-+	double total_time;
-+
-+	if (ssh->start_time < 1)
-+		/* this will produce a NaN in the output. -cjr */
-+		total_time = 0;
-+	else
-+		total_time = monotime_double() - ssh->start_time;
-+
-+	logit("SSH: Server;LType: Throughput;Remote: %s-%d;IN: %lu;OUT: %lu;Duration: %.1f;tPut_in: %.1f;tPut_out: %.1f",
-+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-+	    ssh->stdin_bytes, ssh->fdout_bytes, total_time,
-+	    ssh->stdin_bytes / total_time,
-+	    ssh->fdout_bytes / total_time);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
-  * connection, and exits.  This function never returns. The error message
-@@ -2789,3 +2845,10 @@
- 	ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
- 	return 0;
- }
-+
-+/* need this for the moment for the aes-ctr cipher */
-+void *
-+ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	return ssh->state->send_context;
-+}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/packet.h openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/packet.h	2021-05-22 08:23:21.028175665 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.549345616 +0200
-@@ -86,6 +86,14 @@
- 
- 	/* APP data */
- 	void *app_data;
-+
-+	/* logging data for ServerLogging patch*/
-+	double start_time;
-+	u_long fdout_bytes;
-+	u_long stdin_bytes;
-+
-+	/* track that we are in a none cipher/mac state */
-+	int none;
- };
- 
- typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *,
-@@ -155,6 +163,8 @@
- int	 ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int);
- u_int	 ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *);
- 
-+int	 packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *);
-+
- int	 ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
- int	 ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
- 
-@@ -169,6 +179,13 @@
- 
- void	*ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
- void	*ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *);
-+void	*ssh_packet_get_receive_context(struct ssh *);
-+void	*ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *);
-+
-+/* for forced packet rekeying post auth */
-+void	 packet_request_rekeying(void);
-+/* final log entry support */
-+void	 sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *);
- 
- /* new API */
- int	sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/progressmeter.c openssh-8.6p1/progressmeter.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/progressmeter.c	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/progressmeter.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.549345616 +0200
-@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
- static off_t start_pos;		/* initial position of transfer */
- static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
- static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
-+static off_t last_pos;
-+static off_t max_delta_pos = 0;
- static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
- static long stalled;		/* how long we have been stalled */
- static int bytes_per_second;	/* current speed in bytes per second */
-@@ -127,6 +129,7 @@
- 	int cur_speed;
- 	int hours, minutes, seconds;
- 	int file_len;
-+	off_t delta_pos;
- 
- 	if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
- 		return;
-@@ -142,6 +145,10 @@
- 	now = monotime_double();
- 	bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
- 
-+	delta_pos = cur_pos - last_pos;
-+	if (delta_pos > max_delta_pos)
-+		max_delta_pos = delta_pos;
-+
- 	if (bytes_left > 0)
- 		elapsed = now - last_update;
- 	else {
-@@ -166,7 +173,7 @@
- 
- 	/* filename */
- 	buf[0] = '\0';
--	file_len = win_size - 36;
-+	file_len = win_size - 45;
- 	if (file_len > 0) {
- 		buf[0] = '\r';
- 		snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s",
-@@ -191,6 +198,15 @@
- 	    (off_t)bytes_per_second);
- 	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
- 
-+	/* instantaneous rate */
-+	if (bytes_left > 0)
-+		format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
-+		    delta_pos);
-+	else
-+		format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
-+		    max_delta_pos);
-+	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
-+
- 	/* ETA */
- 	if (!transferred)
- 		stalled += elapsed;
-@@ -227,6 +243,7 @@
- 
- 	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
- 	last_update = now;
-+	last_pos = cur_pos;
- }
- 
- /*ARGSUSED*/
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/readconf.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.064175750 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.550345619 +0200
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
- #include "uidswap.h"
- #include "myproposal.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
- /* Format of the configuration file:
-@@ -169,6 +170,9 @@
- 	oHashKnownHosts,
- 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
- 	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
-+	oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize,
-+	oNoneEnabled, oNoneMacEnabled, oNoneSwitch,
-+	oDisableMTAES,
- 	oVisualHostKey,
- 	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
- 	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
-@@ -312,6 +316,10 @@
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
- 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
- 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
-+	{ "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
-+	{ "nonemacenabled", oNoneMacEnabled },
-+	{ "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
-+	{ "disablemtaes", oDisableMTAES },
- 	{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
- 	{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
- 	{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
-@@ -332,6 +340,11 @@
- 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
- 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
- 
-+	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
-+	{ "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
-+	{ "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
-+	{ "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
-+
- 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
- };
- 
-@@ -1138,6 +1151,46 @@
- 		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case oHPNDisabled:
-+		intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oHPNBufferSize:
-+		intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
-+	case oTcpRcvBufPoll:
-+		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oNoneEnabled:
-+		intptr = &options->none_enabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oNoneMacEnabled:
-+		intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oDisableMTAES:
-+		intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * We check to see if the command comes from the command
-+	 * line or not. If it does then enable it otherwise fail.
-+	 *  NONE should never be a default configuration.
-+	 */
-+	case oNoneSwitch:
-+		if (strcmp(filename, "command-line") == 0) {
-+			intptr = &options->none_switch;
-+			goto parse_flag;
-+		} else {
-+			error("NoneSwitch is found in %.200s.\nYou may only use this configuration option from the command line", filename);
-+			error("Continuing...");
-+			debug("NoneSwitch directive found in %.200s.", filename);
-+			return 0;
-+		}
-+
- 	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
- 		intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
-@@ -1371,6 +1424,10 @@
- 			*intptr = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case oTcpRcvBuf:
-+		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case oCiphers:
- 		arg = strdelim(&s);
- 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-@@ -2316,6 +2373,14 @@
- 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- 	options->request_tty = -1;
-+	options->none_switch = -1;
-+	options->none_enabled = -1;
-+	options->nonemac_enabled = -1;
-+	options->disable_multithreaded = -1;
-+	options->hpn_disabled = -1;
-+	options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
-+	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
-+	options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
- 	options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
- 	options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
- 	options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
-@@ -2490,6 +2555,43 @@
- 		options->server_alive_interval = 0;
- 	if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
- 		options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
-+	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
-+		options->hpn_disabled = 0;
-+	if (options->hpn_buffer_size > -1) {
-+		/* if a user tries to set the size to 0 set it to 1KB */
-+		if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
-+		/* limit the buffer to SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
-+		if (options->hpn_buffer_size > (SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 1024)) {
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
-+			debug("User requested buffer larger than 256MB. Request reverted to 256MB");
-+		} else
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
-+		debug("hpn_buffer_size set to %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
-+	}
-+	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf == 0)
-+		options->tcp_rcv_buf = 1;
-+	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf > -1)
-+		options->tcp_rcv_buf *=1024;
-+	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1)
-+		options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1;
-+	if (options->none_switch == -1)
-+		options->none_switch = 0;
-+	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
-+		options->none_enabled = 0;
-+	if (options->none_enabled == 0 && options->none_switch > 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "NoneEnabled must be enabled to use the None Switch option. None cipher disabled.\n");
-+		options->none_enabled = 0;
-+	}
-+	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
-+		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
-+	if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && (options->none_enabled == 0 ||
-+					     options->none_switch == 0)) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "None MAC can only be used with the None cipher. None MAC disabled.\n");
-+		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
-+	}
-+	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
-+		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
- 	if (options->control_master == -1)
- 		options->control_master = 0;
- 	if (options->control_persist == -1) {
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-8.6p1/readconf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/readconf.h	2021-05-22 08:23:21.064175750 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.551345621 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@
- 	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
- 	int     compression;	/* Compress packets in both directions. */
- 	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
-+	int     tcp_rcv_buf; /* user switch to set tcp recv buffer */
-+	int     tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* Option to poll recv buf every window transfer */
-+	int     hpn_disabled;    /* Switch to disable HPN buffer management */
-+	int     hpn_buffer_size; /* User definable size for HPN buffer window */
- 	int	ip_qos_interactive;	/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
- 	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
- 	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
-@@ -128,7 +132,12 @@
- 
- 	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
- 	int64_t rekey_limit;
-+	int     none_switch;    /* Use none cipher */
-+	int     none_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */
-+	int     nonemac_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */	
-+	int     disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/
- 	int	rekey_interval;
-+
- 	int	no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
- 	int	identities_only;
- 	int	server_alive_interval;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/regress/integrity.sh openssh-8.6p1/regress/integrity.sh
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/regress/integrity.sh	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/integrity.sh	2021-05-22 08:24:33.551345621 +0200
-@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@
- cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
- 
- for m in $macs; do
-+	# the none mac is now valid but tests against it will succeed when we expect it to
-+	# fail. so we need to explicity remove it from the list of macs returned.
-+	if [ "$m" = "none" ]; then
-+		continue
-+	fi
-+
- 	trace "test $tid: mac $m"
- 	elen=0
- 	epad=0
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.037175686 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.552345623 +0200
-@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getpeername /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpeername),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpgid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
- #endif
-@@ -318,6 +321,9 @@
- #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socketcall
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_socketcall),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_time
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
- #endif
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/scp.c openssh-8.6p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/scp.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.048175712 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/scp.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.552345623 +0200
-@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@
- 	off_t size, statbytes;
- 	unsigned long long ull;
- 	int setimes, targisdir, wrerr;
--	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
-+	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[16384], visbuf[16384];
- 	char **patterns = NULL;
- 	size_t n, npatterns = 0;
- 	struct timeval tv[2];
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/servconf.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.064175750 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.553345625 +0200
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "myproposal.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
-@@ -201,6 +202,12 @@
- 	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
- 	options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
- 	options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
-+	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
-+	options->hpn_disabled = -1;
-+	options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
-+	options->none_enabled = -1;
-+	options->nonemac_enabled = -1;
-+	options->disable_multithreaded = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
-@@ -291,6 +298,10 @@
- fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- {
- 	u_int i;
-+	/* needed for hpn socket tests */
-+	int sock;
-+	int socksize;
-+	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
- 
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
-@@ -464,6 +475,51 @@
- 	}
- 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
- 		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
-+	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
-+		options->none_enabled = 0;
-+	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
-+		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
-+	if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && options->none_enabled == 0) {
-+		debug ("Attempted to enabled None MAC without setting None Enabled to true. None MAC disabled.");
-+		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
-+	}
-+	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
-+		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
-+	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
-+		options->hpn_disabled = 0;
-+
-+	if (options->hpn_buffer_size == -1) {
-+		/* option not explicitly set. Now we have to figure out */
-+		/* what value to use */
-+		if (options->hpn_disabled == 1) {
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
-+		} else {
-+			/* get the current RCV size and set it to that */
-+			/*create a socket but don't connect it */
-+			/* we use that the get the rcv socket size */
-+			sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+			getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+				   &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+			close(sock);
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
-+			debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
-+		}
-+	} else {
-+		/* we have to do this in case the user sets both values in a contradictory */
-+		/* manner. hpn_disabled overrrides hpn_buffer_size*/
-+		if (options->hpn_disabled <= 0) {
-+			if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
-+				options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
-+			/* limit the maximum buffer to SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
-+			if (options->hpn_buffer_size > (SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 1024)) {
-+				options->hpn_buffer_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
-+			} else {
-+				options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
-+			}
-+		} else
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
- 		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
- 	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
-@@ -537,6 +593,9 @@
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-+	sNoneEnabled, sNoneMacEnabled,
-+	sDisableMTAES,
-+	sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
- 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
- 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
- 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
-@@ -737,6 +796,12 @@
- 	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "hpnbuffersize", sHPNBufferSize, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "disableMTAES", sDisableMTAES, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "nonemacenabled", sNoneMacEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -795,6 +860,7 @@
- 
- 	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
- 		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
-+			debug("Config token is %s", keywords[i].name);
- 			*flags = keywords[i].flags;
- 			return keywords[i].opcode;
- 		}
-@@ -1546,12 +1612,36 @@
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts;
- 		goto parse_multistate;
- 
-+	case sTcpRcvBufPoll:
-+		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sHPNDisabled:
-+		intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sHPNBufferSize:
-+		intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
- 		intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
-  parse_flag:
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
- 		goto parse_multistate;
- 
-+	case sNoneEnabled:
-+		intptr = &options->none_enabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sNoneMacEnabled:
-+		intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sDisableMTAES:
-+		intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sHostbasedAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/servconf.h	2021-05-22 08:23:21.065175752 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.554345628 +0200
-@@ -215,6 +215,13 @@
- 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
- 	int	permit_pam_user_change;	/* Allow PAM to change user name */
- 
-+	int     tcp_rcv_buf_poll;       /* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/
-+	int	hpn_disabled;		/* disable hpn functionality. false by default */
-+	int	hpn_buffer_size;	/* set the hpn buffer size - default 3MB */
-+	int	none_enabled;		/* Enable NONE cipher switch */
-+	int     disable_multithreaded;  /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr cipher */
-+	int     nonemac_enabled;        /* Enable NONE MAC switch */
-+
- 	int	permit_tun;
- 
- 	char   **permitted_opens;	/* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/serverloop.c openssh-8.6p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/serverloop.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.049175714 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/serverloop.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.554345628 +0200
-@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@
- process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in)
- {
- 	int r, len;
--	char buf[16384];
-+	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
- 
- 	/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
- 	if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
-@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@
- 		/* Buffer any received data. */
- 		if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "ssh_packet_process_incoming");
-+		ssh->fdout_bytes += len;
- 	}
- 	return 0;
- }
-@@ -401,6 +402,7 @@
- 	u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
- 
- 	debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
-+	ssh->start_time = monotime_double();
- 
- 	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
- 	child_terminated = 0;
-@@ -439,6 +441,7 @@
- 
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
-+			sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
- 			cleanup_exit(255);
- 		}
-@@ -458,6 +461,9 @@
- 	/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
- 	channel_free_all(ssh);
- 
-+	/* final entry must come after channels close -cjr */
-+	sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
-+
- 	/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
- 	session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL);
- }
-@@ -608,7 +614,8 @@
- 	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
- 
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
--	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
-+	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
- 	c->datagram = 1;
- #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
- 	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
-@@ -659,6 +666,8 @@
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
- 	    -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 	    0, "server-session", 1);
-+	if ((options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll) && (!options.hpn_disabled))
-+		c->dynamic_window = 1;
- 	if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
- 		debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
- 		channel_free(ssh, c);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/session.c openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/session.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.050175717 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.555345630 +0200
-@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@
- 		goto authsock_err;
- 
- 	/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
-+	/* this shouldn't matter if its hpn or not - cjr */
- 	nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket",
- 	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
- 	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-@@ -2364,7 +2365,8 @@
- 	channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
- 	    fdout, fdin, fderr,
- 	    ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
--	    1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
-+	    1, is_tty,
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size);
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sftp.1 openssh-8.6p1/sftp.1
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sftp.1	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.1	2021-05-22 08:24:33.556345633 +0200
-@@ -296,7 +296,8 @@
- Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
- Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
- but will increase memory usage.
--The default is 64 outstanding requests.
-+The default is 256 outstanding requests providing for 8MB
-+of outstanding data with a 32KB buffer.
- .It Fl r
- Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
- Note that
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sftp-client.c openssh-8.6p1/sftp-client.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sftp-client.c	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-client.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.556345633 +0200
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
- #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN	32768
- 
- /* Default number of concurrent outstanding requests */
--#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	64
-+#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	256
- 
- /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
- #define MIN_READ_SIZE	512
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh_api.c openssh-8.6p1/ssh_api.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh_api.c	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_api.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.557345635 +0200
-@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@
- 	char *cp;
- 	int r;
- 
--	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0)
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_RELEASE)) != 0)
- 		return r;
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0)
- 		return r;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshbuf.h openssh-8.6p1/sshbuf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshbuf.h	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshbuf.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.557345635 +0200
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 
--#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0x8000000	/* Hard maximum size */
-+#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0xF000000	/* Hard maximum size 256MB */
- #define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX		0x100000	/* Max child buffers */
- #define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM	(16384 / 8)	/* Max bignum *bytes* */
- #define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT	((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/ssh.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.066175754 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.558345637 +0200
-@@ -1070,6 +1070,10 @@
- 			break;
- 		case 'T':
- 			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
-+			/* ensure that the user doesn't try to backdoor a */
-+			/* null cipher switch on an interactive session */
-+			/* so explicitly disable it no matter what */
-+			options.none_switch=0;
- 			break;
- 		case 'o':
- 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
-@@ -1797,6 +1801,8 @@
- 	setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
- }
- 
-+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
-+
- /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
- static void
- fork_postauth(void)
-@@ -2109,6 +2115,79 @@
- 	    NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+hpn_options_init(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	/*
-+	 * We need to check to see if what they want to do about buffer
-+	 * sizes here. In a hpn to nonhpn connection we want to limit
-+	 * the window size to something reasonable in case the far side
-+	 * has the large window bug. In hpn to hpn connection we want to
-+	 * use the max window size but allow the user to override it
-+	 * lastly if they disabled hpn then use the ssh std window size.
-+	 *
-+	 * So why don't we just do a getsockopt() here and set the
-+	 * ssh window to that? In the case of a autotuning receive
-+	 * window the window would get stuck at the initial buffer
-+	 * size generally less than 96k. Therefore we need to set the
-+	 * maximum ssh window size to the maximum hpn buffer size
-+	 * unless the user has specifically set the tcprcvbufpoll
-+	 * to no. In which case we *can* just set the window to the
-+	 * minimum of the hpn buffer size and tcp receive buffer size.
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (tty_flag)
-+		options.hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
-+	else
-+		options.hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
-+
-+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW) {
-+		debug("HPN to Non-HPN connection");
-+	} else {
-+		debug("HPN to HPN connection");
-+		int sock, socksize;
-+		socklen_t socksizelen;
-+		if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll <= 0) {
-+			sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+			socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
-+			getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+				   &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+			close(sock);
-+			debug("socksize %d", socksize);
-+			options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
-+			debug("HPNBufferSize set to TCP RWIN: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+		} else {
-+			if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0) {
-+				/*
-+				 * Create a socket but don't connect it:
-+				 * we use that the get the rcv socket size
-+				 */
-+				sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+				/*
-+				 * If they are using the tcp_rcv_buf option,
-+				 * attempt to set the buffer size to that.
-+				 */
-+				if (options.tcp_rcv_buf) {
-+					socksizelen = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf);
-+					setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+						   &options.tcp_rcv_buf, socksizelen);
-+				}
-+				socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
-+				getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+					   &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+				close(sock);
-+				debug("socksize %d", socksize);
-+				options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
-+				debug("HPNBufferSize set to user TCPRcvBuf: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	debug("Final hpn_buffer_size = %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+
-+	channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+}
-+
- /* open new channel for a session */
- static int
- ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
-@@ -2127,9 +2206,11 @@
- 	if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
- 		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
- 
--	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
-+	window = options.hpn_buffer_size;
-+
- 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	if (tty_flag) {
-+		window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- 		window >>= 1;
- 		packetmax >>= 1;
- 	}
-@@ -2140,6 +2221,11 @@
- 
- 	debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self);
- 
-+	if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll > 0 && !options.hpn_disabled) {
-+		c->dynamic_window = 1;
-+		debug("Enabled Dynamic Window Scaling");
-+	}
-+
- 	channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
- 	if (!no_shell_flag)
- 		channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self,
-@@ -2154,6 +2240,13 @@
- 	int r, id = -1;
- 	char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * We need to initialize this early because the forwarding logic below
-+	 * might open channels that use the hpn buffer sizes.  We can't send a
-+	 * window of -1 (the default) to the server as it breaks things.
-+	 */
-+	hpn_options_init(ssh);
-+
- 	/* XXX should be pre-session */
- 	if (!options.control_persist)
- 		ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.067175757 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.559345640 +0200
-@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@
- extern Options options;
- 
- /*
-+ * tty_flag is set in ssh.c. Use this in ssh_userauth2:
-+ * if it is set, then prevent the switch to the null cipher.
-+ */
-+
-+extern int tty_flag;
-+
-+/*
-  * SSH2 key exchange
-  */
- 
-@@ -212,6 +219,8 @@
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
-+static const char *myproposal_default[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- void
- ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
-     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
-@@ -225,6 +234,10 @@
- 	char *gss_host = NULL;
- #endif
- 
-+	memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
-+
-+	memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
-+
- 	xxx_host = host;
- 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
- 	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
-@@ -571,6 +584,53 @@
- 
- 	if (!authctxt.success)
- 		fatal("Authentication failed.");
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * If the user wants to use the none cipher and/or none mac, do it post authentication
-+	 * and only if the right conditions are met -- both of the NONE commands
-+	 * must be true and there must be no tty allocated.
-+	 */
-+	if (options.none_switch == 1 && options.none_enabled == 1) {
-+		if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */
-+			debug("Requesting none rekeying...");
-+			memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
-+			myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
-+			myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
-+			fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER!!!\n");
-+			/* NONEMAC can only be used in context of the NONE CIPHER */
-+			if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
-+				myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
-+				myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
-+				fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE MAC\n");
-+			}
-+			kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal);
-+			packet_request_rekeying();
-+		} else {
-+			/* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */
-+			debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated");
-+			fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
-+		/* if we are using aes-ctr there can be issues in either a fork or sandbox
-+		 * so the initial aes-ctr is defined to point to the original single process
-+		 * evp. After authentication we'll be past the fork and the sandboxed privsep
-+		 * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we
-+		 * then force a rekey
-+		 */
-+		const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh);
-+
-+		/* only do this for the ctr cipher. otherwise gcm mode breaks. Don't know why though */
-+		if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) {
-+			debug("Single to Multithread CTR cipher swap - client request");
-+			cipher_reset_multithreaded();
-+			packet_request_rekeying();
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
- }
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshconnect.c openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshconnect.c	2021-05-22 08:23:20.987175569 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.560345642 +0200
-@@ -345,6 +345,30 @@
- #endif
- 
- /*
-+ * Set TCP receive buffer if requested.
-+ * Note: tuning needs to happen after the socket is
-+ * created but before the connection happens
-+ * so winscale is negotiated properly -cjr
-+ */
-+static void
-+ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(int sock)
-+{
-+	void *buf = (void *)&options.tcp_rcv_buf;
-+	int sz = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf);
-+	int socksize;
-+	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
-+
-+	debug("setsockopt Attempting to set SO_RCVBUF to %d", options.tcp_rcv_buf);
-+	if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, buf, sz) >= 0) {
-+		getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+		debug("setsockopt SO_RCVBUF: %.100s %d", strerror(errno), socksize);
-+	}
-+	else
-+		error("Couldn't set socket receive buffer to %d: %.100s",
-+		    options.tcp_rcv_buf, strerror(errno));
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection.
-  */
- static int
-@@ -366,6 +390,9 @@
- 	}
- 	fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- 
-+	if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0)
-+		ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(sock);
-+
- 	/* Use interactive QOS (if specified) until authentication completed */
- 	if (options.ip_qos_interactive != INT_MAX)
- 		set_sock_tos(sock, options.ip_qos_interactive);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd.c	2021-05-22 08:23:21.068175759 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-22 08:24:33.561345644 +0200
-@@ -1107,6 +1107,8 @@
- 	int ret, listen_sock;
- 	struct addrinfo *ai;
- 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
-+	int socksize;
-+	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
- 
- 	for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- 		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
-@@ -1152,6 +1154,11 @@
- 
- 		debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
- 
-+		getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+		    &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+		debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize);
-+		debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+
- 		/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
- 		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
-@@ -1834,6 +1841,19 @@
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
- 
-+	if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
-+		char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers;
-+		xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers);
-+		free(old_ciphers);
-+
-+		/* only enable the none MAC in context of the none cipher -cjr */
-+		if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
-+			char *old_macs = options.macs;
-+			xasprintf(&options.macs, "%s,none", old_macs);
-+			free(old_macs);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	/* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
- 	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
- 		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
-@@ -2285,6 +2305,9 @@
- 	    rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
- 	free(laddr);
- 
-+	/* set the HPN options for the child */
-+	channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- 	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2397,6 +2420,25 @@
- 	/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
- 	notify_hostkeys(ssh);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
-+		/* if we are using aes-ctr there can be issues in either a fork or sandbox
-+		 * so the initial aes-ctr is defined to point ot the original single process
-+		 * evp. After authentication we'll be past the fork and the sandboxed privsep
-+		 * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we
-+		 * then force a rekey
-+		 */
-+		const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(the_active_state);
-+
-+		/* only rekey if necessary. If we don't do this gcm mode cipher breaks */
-+		if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) {
-+			debug("Single to Multithreaded CTR cipher swap - server request");
-+			cipher_reset_multithreaded();
-+			packet_request_rekeying();
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Start session. */
- 	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
- 
-@@ -2470,6 +2512,11 @@
- 	struct kex *kex;
- 	int r;
- 
-+	if (options.none_enabled == 1)
-+		debug("WARNING: None cipher enabled");
-+	if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1)
-+		debug("WARNING: None MAC enabled");
-+
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
- 	    options.kex_algorithms);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/sshd_config	2021-05-22 08:23:21.068175759 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-05-22 08:24:33.561345644 +0200
-@@ -127,6 +127,28 @@
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 
-+# the following are HPN related configuration options
-+# tcp receive buffer polling. disable in non autotuning kernels
-+#TcpRcvBufPoll yes
-+
-+# disable hpn performance boosts
-+#HPNDisabled no
-+
-+# buffer size for hpn to non-hpn connections
-+#HPNBufferSize 2048
-+
-+# allow the use of the none cipher
-+#NoneEnabled no
-+
-+# allow the use of the none MAC
-+#NoneMacEnabled no
-+
-+# Disable MT-AES-CTR cipher on server
-+# * needed for GSI-OpenSSH 7.4p1 because it's broken on the server side there
-+# * useful for modern processors with AES-NI instructions making the stock
-+#   AES-CTR cipher faster than the MT-AES-CTR cipher
-+DisableMTAES yes
-+
- # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
- #Match User anoncvs
- #	X11Forwarding no
-diff -Nur openssh-8.6p1.orig/version.h openssh-8.6p1/version.h
---- openssh-8.6p1.orig/version.h	2021-05-22 08:23:21.069175761 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/version.h	2021-05-22 08:24:33.561345644 +0200
-@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@
- 
- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
- #define GSI_PORTABLE	"c-GSI"
-+#define SSH_HPN		"-hpn15v2"
- #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \
--			GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION
-+			GSI_VERSION SSH_HPN KRB5_VERSION
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f19161c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2449 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.517723813 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.862876709 +0200
+@@ -277,7 +277,28 @@
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (user[0] == '\0') {
++		debug("received empty username for %s", method);
++		if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) {
++			char *lname = NULL;
++			PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname));
++			if (lname && lname[0] != '\0') {
++				free(user);
++				user = lname;
++				debug("set username to %s from gssapi context", user);
++			} else {
++				debug("failed to set username from gssapi context");
++				ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh,
++				    "failed to set username from gssapi context");
++			}
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
++	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s",
++	    user[0] ? user : "<implicit>", service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+@@ -288,17 +309,42 @@
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+-	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
+-		/* setup auth context */
+-		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
++	/* If first time or username changed or empty username,
++	   setup/reset authentication context. */
++	if ((authctxt->attempt++ == 0) ||
++	    (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0) ||
++	    (strcmp(user, "") == 0)) {
++		if (authctxt->user) {
++			free(authctxt->user);
++			authctxt->user = NULL;
++		}
++		authctxt->valid = 0;
+ 		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
+-		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
++		if (strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Unsupported service %s",
++			    service);
++		}
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++		/* If we're going to set the username based on the
++		   GSSAPI context later, then wait until then to
++		   verify it. Just put in placeholders for now. */
++		if ((strcmp(user, "") == 0) &&
++		    ((strcmp(method, "gssapi") == 0) ||
++		     (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0))) {
++			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
++		} else {
++#endif
++		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
++		if (authctxt->pw) {
+ 			authctxt->valid = 1;
+ 			debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user);
+ 		} else {
+ 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
+ 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+ 		}
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++		} /* endif for setting username based on GSSAPI context */
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (options.use_pam)
+ 			PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
+@@ -307,6 +353,7 @@
+ 		    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
+ 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
++		if (authctxt->attempt == 1) {
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+@@ -322,9 +369,10 @@
+ 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+ 			    "no authentication methods enabled");
+-	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
+-	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
+-		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service "
++		}
++	}
++	if (strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of service "
+ 		    "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
+ 		    authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
+ 	}
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.388723503 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.863876712 +0200
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
++static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh);
+ static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+@@ -63,8 +64,8 @@
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+-	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+-	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *b2 = NULL;
++	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf, gssbuf2;
+ 	u_char *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+@@ -75,6 +76,9 @@
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ 
++	if ((b2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++
+ 	mic.value = p;
+ 	mic.length = len;
+ 
+@@ -85,13 +89,29 @@
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
+ 	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+ 
++	/* client may have used empty username to determine target
++	   name from GSSAPI context */
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b2, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex",
++	    ssh->kex->session_id);
++
++	if ((gssbuf2.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b2)) == NULL)
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
++	gssbuf2.length = sshbuf_len(b2);
++
+ 	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
+-	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+-		    authctxt->pw, 1));
++	    &gssbuf, &mic))) ||
++	    !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++	    &gssbuf2, &mic)))) {
++		if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
++			authenticated =
++			    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++			    authctxt->pw, 1));
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
++	sshbuf_free(b2);
+ 	free(mic.value);
+ 
+ 	return (authenticated);
+@@ -146,7 +166,9 @@
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
++	/* authctxt->valid may be 0 if we haven't yet determined
++	   username from gssapi context. */
++	if (authctxt->user == NULL) {
+ 		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+ 		free(doid);
+ 		return (0);
+@@ -184,7 +206,7 @@
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+-	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
++	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags = 0;
+ 	u_char *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	int r;
+@@ -205,6 +227,7 @@
+ 	free(p);
+ 
+ 	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++		ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(gssctxt, ssh);
+ 		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+ 			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 ||
+@@ -279,6 +302,34 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static void
++gssapi_set_username(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
++	char *lname = NULL;
++
++	if ((authctxt->user == NULL) || (authctxt->user[0] == '\0')) {
++		PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname));
++		if (lname && lname[0] != '\0') {
++			if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user);
++			authctxt->user = lname;
++			debug("set username to %s from gssapi context", lname);
++			authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user));
++			if (authctxt->pw) {
++				authctxt->valid = 1;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++				if (options.use_pam)
++					PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
++#endif
++			}
++		} else {
++			debug("failed to set username from gssapi context");
++			ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh,
++			    "failed to set username from gssapi context");
++		}
++	}
++}
++
+ /*
+  * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
+  * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
+@@ -289,12 +340,14 @@
+ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+-	int r, authenticated;
++	int r, authenticated = 0;
+ 	const char *displayname;
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ 		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+ 
++	gssapi_set_username(ssh);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
+ 	 * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
+@@ -303,8 +356,11 @@
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+ 
+-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+-	    authctxt->pw, 1));
++	/* user should be set if valid but we double-check here */
++	if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
++		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw, 1));
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+@@ -356,11 +412,17 @@
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
+ 	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+ 
+-	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+-		    authctxt->pw, 0));
+-	else
++	gssapi_set_username(ssh);
++
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) {
++		if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
++			authenticated =
++			    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++			    authctxt->pw, 0));
++		}
++	} else {
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
++	}
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
+@@ -380,6 +442,26 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh) {
++	char *errstr;
++	OM_uint32 maj, min;
++	int r;
++
++	errstr = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min));
++	if (errstr) {
++		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
++		    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, maj)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errstr)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal_fr(r, "");
++		free(errstr);
++	}
++}
++
+ Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+ 	"gssapi-keyex",
+ 	userauth_gsskeyex,
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.c openssh-8.7p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.519723818 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/auth.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.864876714 +0200
+@@ -344,7 +344,8 @@
+ 	    method,
+ 	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
+ 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+-	    authctxt->user,
++	    (authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) ?
++		authctxt->user : "unknown",
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ 	    extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
+@@ -588,13 +589,18 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	pw = getpwnam(user);
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++	if (options.use_pam && options.permit_pam_user_change && pw == NULL)
++		pw = sshpam_getpw(user);
++#endif
+ 
+ #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
+ 	aix_restoreauthdb();
+ #endif
+ 	if (pw == NULL) {
+ 		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
+-		    user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
++		    (user && user[0]) ? user : "unknown",
++		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+ 		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
+ 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.h openssh-8.7p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.519723818 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/auth.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.864876714 +0200
+@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++#endif
++#ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.510723796 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.865876716 +0200
+@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@
+ static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL;
+ static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL;
+ static char *sshpam_conninfo = NULL;
++static struct ssh *sshpam_ssh = NULL;
+ 
+ /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
+ #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+@@ -301,6 +302,56 @@
+ # define pam_chauthtok(a,b)	(sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
+ #endif
+ 
++struct passwd *
++sshpam_getpw(const char *user)
++{
++	struct passwd *pw;
++
++	if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) != NULL)
++		return(pw);
++
++	debug("PAM: faking passwd struct for user '%.100s'", user);
++	if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++	pw->pw_name = xstrdup(user);	/* XXX leak */
++	pw->pw_shell = "/bin/true";
++	pw->pw_gecos = "sshd fake PAM user";
++	return (pw);
++}
++
++void
++sshpam_check_userchanged(void)
++{
++	int sshpam_err;
++	struct passwd *pw;
++	const char *user;
++
++	debug("sshpam_check_userchanged");
++	sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
++				  (sshpam_const void **)&user);
++	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
++		fatal("PAM: could not get PAM_USER: %s",
++		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
++	debug("sshpam_check_userchanged: user was '%.100s'",
++	    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	if (strcmp(user, sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name) != 0) {
++		debug("PAM: user mapped from '%.100s' to '%.100s'",
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name, user);
++		if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
++			fatal("PAM: could not get passwd entry for user "
++			    "'%.100s' provided by PAM_USER", user);
++		pwfree(sshpam_authctxt->pw);
++		sshpam_authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pw);
++		sshpam_authctxt->valid = allowed_user(sshpam_ssh, pw);
++		free(sshpam_authctxt->user);
++		sshpam_authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
++		debug("PAM: user '%.100s' now %svalid", user,
++		    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "in");
++	}
++	debug("sshpam_check_userchanged: user is '%.100s'",
++	    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++}
++
+ static void
+ sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
+ {
+@@ -332,7 +383,7 @@
+ static void
+ import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
+ {
+-	char *env;
++	char *env, *user;
+ 	u_int n, i, num_env;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+@@ -348,6 +399,19 @@
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0);
++	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
++		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		debug("PAM: user is '%.100s'",
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++		debug("PAM: got username '%.100s' from thread", user);
++		if ((sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, user))
++		    != PAM_SUCCESS)
++			fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_USER: %s",
++			    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
++		pwfree(sshpam_authctxt->pw);
++		sshpam_authctxt->pw = pwcopy(sshpam_getpw(user));
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* Import environment from subprocess */
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
+@@ -522,6 +586,13 @@
+ 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 
++	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
++		debug("sshpam_thread: user is '%.100s'",
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++		sshpam_check_userchanged();
++		debug("sshpam_thread: user is '%.100s'",
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	}
+ 	if (!do_pam_account()) {
+ 		/* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN.
+ 		 * Backward compatibility for other errors. */
+@@ -546,6 +617,13 @@
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
++		debug("sshpam_thread: user is '%.100s'",
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name)) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* Export any environment strings set in child */
+ 	for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+@@ -738,6 +816,8 @@
+ 		xasprintf(&sshpam_conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d",
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ 		    sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
++		/* Save so allowed_user can be called later */
++		sshpam_ssh = ssh;
+ 	}
+ 	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
+ 		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
+@@ -1082,6 +1162,18 @@
+ 	debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
+ 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ 
++	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
++		debug("do_pam_account: user is '%.100s'",
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++		sshpam_check_userchanged();
++		debug("do_pam_account: user is '%.100s'",
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++		if (getpwnam(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name) == NULL)
++			fatal("PAM: completed authentication but PAM account invalid");
++		debug("do_pam_account: user is '%.100s'",
++		    sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	}
++
+ 	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
+ 		sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ 		return (sshpam_account_status);
+@@ -1370,6 +1462,9 @@
+ 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+ 
+ 	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
++	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
++		sshpam_check_userchanged();
++	}
+ 	sshpam_password = NULL;
+ 	free(fake);
+ 	if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.h openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.356723425 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.865876716 +0200
+@@ -43,5 +43,6 @@
+ int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void);
+ void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int);
+ int is_pam_session_open(void);
++struct passwd *sshpam_getpw(const char *);
+ 
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-8.7p1/canohost.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.388723503 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/canohost.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.866876718 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <sys/un.h>
++#include <sys/param.h>          /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
+ 
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+@@ -295,3 +296,33 @@
+ {
+ 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ }
++
++void
++resolve_localhost(char **host)
++{
++	struct hostent *hostinfo;
++
++	hostinfo = gethostbyname(*host);
++	if (hostinfo == NULL || hostinfo->h_name == NULL) {
++		debug("gethostbyname(%s) failed", *host);
++		return;
++	}
++	if (hostinfo->h_addrtype == AF_INET) {
++		struct in_addr addr;
++		addr = *(struct in_addr *)(hostinfo->h_addr);
++		if (ntohl(addr.s_addr) == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
++			char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
++			if (gethostname(buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
++				debug("gethostname() failed");
++				return;
++			}
++			hostinfo = gethostbyname(buf);
++			free(*host);
++			if (hostinfo == NULL || hostinfo->h_name == NULL) {
++				*host = xstrdup(buf);
++			} else {
++				*host = xstrdup(hostinfo->h_name);
++			}
++		}
++	}
++}
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.h openssh-8.7p1/canohost.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.388723503 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/canohost.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.866876718 +0200
+@@ -26,4 +26,6 @@
+ 
+ #endif /* _CANOHOST_H */
+ 
++void		 resolve_localhost(char **host);
++
+ void		 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/configure.ac	2021-10-24 07:32:35.498723767 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac	2021-10-24 07:49:48.431180638 +0200
+@@ -4777,6 +4777,14 @@
+ 				AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
+ 						[ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
+ 
++				# If we're using some other GSSAPI
++				if test -n "$GSSAPI" ; then
++					AC_MSG_ERROR([Previously configured GSSAPI library conflicts with Kerberos GSI.])
++				fi
++	
++				if test -z "$GSSAPI"; then
++					GSSAPI="KRB5";
++				fi
+ 			fi
+ 		fi
+ 		if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
+@@ -4817,6 +4825,40 @@
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
++# Check whether the user wants GSI (Globus) support
++gsi="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(gsi,
++	[  --with-gsi              Enable Globus GSI authentication support],
++	[
++		gsi="$withval"
++	]
++)
++
++if test "x$gsi" != "xno" ; then
++	# Globus GSSAPI configuration
++	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for Globus GSI)
++	AC_DEFINE(GSI, 1, [Define if you want GSI/Globus authentication support.])
++
++	if test -n "$GSSAPI" ; then
++		AC_MSG_ERROR([Previously configured GSSAPI library conflicts with Globus GSI.])
++	fi
++
++	if test -z "$GSSAPI" ; then
++		GSSAPI="GSI"
++	fi
++
++	AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
++	if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
++		LIBS="$LIBS `$PKGCONFIG --libs globus-gss-assist globus-gssapi-gsi globus-common`"
++		CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags globus-gss-assist globus-gssapi-gsi globus-common`"
++	fi
++
++	AC_DEFINE(GSSAPI)
++	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
++
++	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize)
++fi
++
+ # Check whether user wants systemd support
+ SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-genr.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.551723895 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/gss-genr.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.870876728 +0200
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
++#include "canohost.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "cipher.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+@@ -408,9 +409,18 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+ {
+ 	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++	char *xhost;
+ 	char *val;
+ 
+-	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host);
++	/* Make a copy of the host name, in case it was returned by a
++	 * previous call to gethostbyname(). */
++	xhost = xstrdup(host);
++
++	/* Make sure we have the FQDN. Some GSSAPI implementations don't do
++	 * this for us themselves */
++	resolve_localhost(&xhost);
++
++	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", xhost);
+ 	gssbuf.value = val;
+ 	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+ 
+@@ -418,6 +428,7 @@
+ 	    &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
+ 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ 
++	free(xhost);
+ 	free(gssbuf.value);
+ 	return (ctx->major);
+ }
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.410723555 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.870876728 +0200
+@@ -50,10 +50,12 @@
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+-    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
++    { {0, NULL}, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++      GSS_C_NO_NAME, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL},
++      GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, 0, 0};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+@@ -61,14 +63,26 @@
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+ #endif
++#ifdef GSI
++extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech;
++extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2;
++#endif
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ 	&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
+ #endif
++#ifdef GSI
++	&gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2,
++	&gssapi_gsi_mech,
++#endif
+ 	&gssapi_null_mech,
+ };
+ 
++#ifdef GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG
++static int limited = 0;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
+  * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
+@@ -229,6 +243,10 @@
+ 	    (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
+ 		if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
+ 			fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
++#ifdef GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG
++		if (flags && (*flags & GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG))
++			limited=1;
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return (status);
+@@ -248,6 +266,20 @@
+ 
+ 	tok = ename->value;
+ 
++#ifdef GSI /* GSI gss_export_name() is broken. */
++	if (((ctx->oid->length == gssapi_gsi_mech.oid.length) &&
++	     (memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, gssapi_gsi_mech.oid.elements,
++		     gssapi_gsi_mech.oid.length) == 0)) ||
++	    ((ctx->oid->length == gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2.oid.length) &&
++	     (memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2.oid.elements,
++		     gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2.oid.length) == 0))) {
++		name->length = ename->length;
++		name->value = xmalloc(ename->length+1);
++		memcpy(name->value, ename->value, ename->length);
++		return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
+ 	 * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
+@@ -308,21 +340,24 @@
+ 	gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ 
+ 	if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
+-		if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
+-		    (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++		if (client->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++		    (memcmp(client->oid.elements,
+ 		     ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
+ 			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
+ 			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
+-		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
++		/* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech
++		   because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */
++
++		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++		    ctx->client_creds, &new_name,
+ 		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+ 			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ 			return (ctx->major);
+ 		}
+ 
+-		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
++		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->cred_name,
+ 		    new_name, &equal);
+ 
+ 		if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
+@@ -337,9 +372,9 @@
+ 
+ 		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
+ 
+-		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->cred_name);
+ 		gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
+-		client->name = new_name;
++		client->cred_name = new_name;
+ 		client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ 		ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ 		client->updated = 1;
+@@ -356,12 +391,17 @@
+ 		i++;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (client->oid.elements == NULL)
++		client->oid = *ctx->oid;
+ 	if (client->mech == NULL)
+ 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ 
++	/* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech
++	   because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */
++
+ 	if (ctx->client_creds &&
+-	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
+-	     ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++	     ctx->client_creds, &client->cred_name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+ 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ 		return (ctx->major);
+ 	}
+@@ -378,16 +418,25 @@
+ 		return (ctx->major);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
++	if ((client->mech->oid.elements != NULL) &&
++	    (ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
+ 	    &client->exportedname))) {
+ 		return (ctx->major);
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((ctx->major = gss_duplicate_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
++	    &client->ctx_name)))
++		return ctx->major;
++
+ 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+ 
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ 	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++
++	/* needed for globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() */
++	client->context = ctx->context;
++
+ 	return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -395,6 +444,7 @@
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ {
++#ifdef KRB5
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ 	krb5_error_code problem;
+ 
+@@ -410,6 +460,14 @@
+ 			gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++#else
++	if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
++		/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
++		debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
++		    gssapi_client.store.filename);
++		unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
++	}
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ /* As user */
+@@ -417,6 +475,11 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
++		if (options.gss_creds_path) {
++			gssapi_client.store.filename =
++			    expand_authorized_keys(options.gss_creds_path,
++			    the_authctxt->pw);
++		}
+ 		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
+@@ -449,11 +512,13 @@
+ 
+ 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
+-	    gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
+-		debug("No suitable client data");
++#ifdef GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG
++	if (limited && options.gsi_allow_limited_proxy != 1) {
++		debug("limited proxy not acceptable for remote login");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+ 		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
+ 			gssapi_client.used = 1;
+@@ -464,6 +529,7 @@
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+ 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
++			gss_release_name(&lmin, &gssapi_client.ctx_name);
+ 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+ 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+ 			return 0;
+@@ -473,6 +539,24 @@
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
++/* Priviledged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_localname(char **user)
++{
++	*user = NULL;
++	if (gssapi_client.displayname.length == 0 ||
++	    gssapi_client.displayname.value == NULL) {
++		debug("No suitable client data");
++		return (0);
++	}
++	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->localname) {
++		return((*gssapi_client.mech->localname)(&gssapi_client,user));
++	} else {
++		debug("Unknown client authentication type");
++	}
++	return (0);
++}
++
+ /* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
+  * as the user, the monitor is root.
+  *
+@@ -499,9 +583,11 @@
+ 	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ 	struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
+ 	char *envstr;
++	char **p; char **pw;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
++	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+@@ -526,6 +612,18 @@
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return;
+ 
++	/* Put ssh pam stack env variables in this new pam stack env
++	 * Using pam-pkinit, KRB5CCNAME is set during do_pam_session
++	 * this addition enables pam-pkinit to access KRB5CCNAME if used
++	 * in sshd-rekey stack too
++	 */
++	pw = p = fetch_pam_environment();
++	while ( *pw != NULL ) {
++		pam_putenv(pamh, *pw);
++		pw++;
++	}
++	free_pam_environment(p);
++
+ 	xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+ 	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-gsi.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-gsi.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.871876730 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#ifdef GSI
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++#include <globus_gss_assist.h>
++
++static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name);
++static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user);
++static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client);
++static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds_micv2(ssh_gssapi_client *client);
++static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
++    ssh_gssapi_client *client);
++static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds_micv2(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
++    ssh_gssapi_client *client);
++
++ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech = {
++	"dZuIebMjgUqaxvbF7hDbAw==",
++	"GSI",
++	{9, "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x9B\x50\x01\x01"},
++	NULL,
++	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok,
++	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname,
++	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds,
++	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds
++};
++
++ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2 = {
++	"vz8J1E9PzLr8b1K+0remTg==",
++	"GSI",
++	{10, "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x9b\x50\x01\x01\x01"},
++	NULL,
++	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok,
++	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname,
++	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds_micv2,
++	&ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds_micv2
++};
++
++/*
++ * Check if this user is OK to login under GSI. User has been authenticated
++ * as identity in global 'client_name.value' and is trying to log in as passed
++ * username in 'name'.
++ *
++ * Returns non-zero if user is authorized, 0 otherwise.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
++{
++    int authorized = 0;
++    globus_result_t res;
++#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
++    char lname[256] = "";
++#endif
++
++#ifdef GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE
++    if (globus_module_activate(GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE) != 0) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++/* use new globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() interface if available */
++#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
++    debug("calling globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize()");
++    if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
++        (res = globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize(client->context, "ssh",
++                                                   name, lname, 256))) {
++        debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
++    } else if (lname[0] && strcmp(name, lname) != 0) {
++        debug("GSI user maps to %s, not %s", lname, name);
++    } else {
++        authorized = 1;
++    }
++#else
++    debug("calling globus_gss_assist_userok()");
++    if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
++        (res = (globus_gss_assist_userok(client->displayname.value,
++                                         name)))) {
++        debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
++    } else {
++        authorized = 1;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    logit("GSI user %s is%s authorized as target user %s",
++        (char *) client->displayname.value, (authorized ? "" : " not"), name);
++
++    return authorized;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the local username associated with the GSI credentials.
++ */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user)
++{
++    globus_result_t res;
++#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
++    char lname[256] = "";
++#endif
++
++#ifdef GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE
++    if (globus_module_activate(GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE) != 0) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++/* use new globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() interface if available */
++#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
++    debug("calling globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize()");
++    if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
++        (res = globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize(client->context, "ssh",
++                                                   NULL, lname, 256))) {
++        debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
++        logit("failed to map GSI user %s", (char *)client->displayname.value);
++        return 0;
++    }
++    *user = strdup(lname);
++#else
++    debug("calling globus_gss_assist_gridmap()");
++    if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
++        (res = globus_gss_assist_gridmap(client->displayname.value, user))) {
++        debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
++        logit("failed to map GSI user %s", (char *)client->displayname.value);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    logit("GSI user %s mapped to target user %s",
++        (char *) client->displayname.value, *user);
++
++    return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Export GSI credentials to disk.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	OM_uint32	major_status;
++	OM_uint32	minor_status;
++	gss_buffer_desc	export_cred = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	char *		p;
++
++	if (!client || !client->creds) {
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	major_status = gss_export_cred(&minor_status,
++				       client->creds,
++				       GSS_C_NO_OID,
++				       1,
++				       &export_cred);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) && major_status != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
++		Gssctxt *ctx;
++		ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctx);
++		ctx->major = major_status;
++		ctx->minor = minor_status;
++		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, &gssapi_gsi_mech.oid);
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	p = strchr((char *) export_cred.value, '=');
++	if (p == NULL) {
++		logit("Failed to parse exported credentials string '%.100s'",
++		    (char *)export_cred.value);
++		gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	*p++ = '\0';
++	if (strcmp((char *)export_cred.value,"X509_USER_DELEG_PROXY") == 0) {
++		client->store.envvar = strdup("X509_USER_PROXY");
++	} else {
++		client->store.envvar = strdup((char *)export_cred.value);
++	}
++	if (access(p, R_OK) == 0) {
++		if (client->store.filename) {
++			if (rename(p, client->store.filename) < 0) {
++				logit("Failed to rename %s to %s: %s", p,
++				    client->store.filename, strerror(errno));
++				free(client->store.filename);
++				client->store.filename = strdup(p);
++			} else {
++				p = client->store.filename;
++			}
++		} else {
++			client->store.filename = strdup(p);
++		}
++	}
++	client->store.envval = strdup(p);
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++	if (options.use_pam)
++		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
++#endif
++	gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Export GSI credentials to disk.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds_micv2(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	OM_uint32	major_status;
++	OM_uint32	minor_status;
++	gss_buffer_desc	export_cred = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	char *		p;
++
++	if (!client || !client->creds) {
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	major_status = gss_export_cred(&minor_status,
++				       client->creds,
++				       GSS_C_NO_OID,
++				       1,
++				       &export_cred);
++	if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) && major_status != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
++		Gssctxt *ctx;
++		ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctx);
++		ctx->major = major_status;
++		ctx->minor = minor_status;
++		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, &gssapi_gsi_mech_micv2.oid);
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	p = strchr((char *) export_cred.value, '=');
++	if (p == NULL) {
++		logit("Failed to parse exported credentials string '%.100s'",
++		    (char *)export_cred.value);
++		gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	*p++ = '\0';
++	if (strcmp((char *)export_cred.value,"X509_USER_DELEG_PROXY") == 0) {
++		client->store.envvar = strdup("X509_USER_PROXY");
++	} else {
++		client->store.envvar = strdup((char *)export_cred.value);
++	}
++	if (access(p, R_OK) == 0) {
++		if (client->store.filename) {
++			if (rename(p, client->store.filename) < 0) {
++				logit("Failed to rename %s to %s: %s", p,
++				    client->store.filename, strerror(errno));
++				free(client->store.filename);
++				client->store.filename = strdup(p);
++			} else {
++				p = client->store.filename;
++			}
++		} else {
++			client->store.filename = strdup(p);
++		}
++	}
++	client->store.envval = strdup(p);
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++	if (options.use_pam)
++		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
++#endif
++	gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Export updated GSI credentials to disk.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	return ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds(client);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Export updated GSI credentials to disk.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_gsi_updatecreds_micv2(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	return ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds_micv2(client);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSI */
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.440723628 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.871876730 +0200
+@@ -379,6 +379,34 @@
+ 	return found_principal;
+ }
+  
++/* Retrieve the local username associated with a set of Kerberos
++ * credentials. Hopefully we can use this for the 'empty' username
++ * logins discussed in the draft  */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user) {
++	krb5_principal princ;
++	int retval;
++
++	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
++		return 0;
++
++	if ((retval=krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->displayname.value,
++	    &princ))) {
++		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s",
++		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context,retval));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	/* We've got to return a malloc'd string */
++	*user = (char *)xmalloc(256);
++	if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, princ, 256, *user)) {
++		free(*user);
++		*user = NULL;
++		return(0);
++	}
++
++	return(1);
++}
+ 
+ /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+@@ -473,7 +501,7 @@
+ 	return set_env;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
+     ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+@@ -544,7 +572,7 @@
+ 	{9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
+ 	NULL,
+ 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+-	NULL,
++	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_localname,
+ 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
+ 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-8.7p1/kexgsss.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/kexgsss.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.567723933 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgsss.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.871876730 +0200
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ 
++static void kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh);
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ int
+@@ -96,8 +97,10 @@
+ 
+ 	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
+ 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) {
++		kex_gss_send_error(ctxt, ssh);
+ 		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++	}
+ 
+ 	do {
+ 		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
+@@ -195,13 +198,14 @@
+ 	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+ 
+ 	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++		kex_gss_send_error(ctxt, ssh);
+ 		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ 				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 		}
+-		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "GSSAPI Key Exchange handshake failed");
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+@@ -479,4 +483,26 @@
+ 	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++
++static void
++kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh) {
++	char *errstr;
++	OM_uint32 maj, min;
++	int r;
++
++	errstr = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min));
++	if (errstr) {
++		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, maj)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errstr)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* XXX - We should probably log the error locally here */
++		free(errstr);
++	}
++}
+ #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/Makefile.in	2021-10-24 07:32:35.522723825 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in	2021-10-24 07:33:38.872876733 +0200
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+ 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
++	gss-serv-gsi.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.c openssh-8.7p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.553723900 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/misc.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.873876735 +0200
+@@ -393,11 +393,14 @@
+ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+ #define QUOTE	"\""
+ 
++/* Characters considered as quotations. */
++#define QUOTES "'\""
++
+ /* return next token in configuration line */
+ static char *
+ strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals)
+ {
+-	char *old;
++	char *old, *p, *q;
+ 	int wspace = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (*s == NULL)
+@@ -405,6 +408,21 @@
+ 
+ 	old = *s;
+ 
++	if ((q=strchr(QUOTES, (int) *old)) && *q)
++	{
++		/* find next quote character, point old to start of quoted
++		 * string */
++		for (p = ++old; *p && *p != *q; p++)
++			;
++
++		/* find start of next token */
++		*s = (*p) ? p + strspn(p + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1 : NULL;
++
++		/* terminate 'old' token */
++		*p = '\0';
++		return (old);
++	}
++
+ 	*s = strpbrk(*s,
+ 	    split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE);
+ 	if (*s == NULL)
+@@ -480,6 +498,20 @@
+ 	return copy;
+ }
+ 
++void
++pwfree(struct passwd *pw)
++{
++	free(pw->pw_name);
++	free(pw->pw_passwd);
++	free(pw->pw_gecos);
++#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
++	free(pw->pw_class);
++#endif
++	free(pw->pw_dir);
++	free(pw->pw_shell);
++	free(pw);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
+  * Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.h openssh-8.7p1/misc.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.466723690 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/misc.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.874876737 +0200
+@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
+ void	 sock_set_v6only(int);
+ 
+ struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
++void pwfree(struct passwd *);
+ const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
+ 
+ typedef void privdrop_fn(struct passwd *);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.554723902 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.875876740 +0200
+@@ -152,6 +152,9 @@
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_gss_error(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_gss_localname(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -204,7 +207,7 @@
+     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+ #endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+-    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+@@ -212,7 +215,7 @@
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_start},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
+@@ -236,8 +239,11 @@
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+-    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, MON_ISAUTH | MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_error},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_localname},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -247,6 +253,8 @@
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 0, mm_answer_gss_error},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 0, mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+@@ -327,6 +335,8 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 1);
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 1);
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+@@ -444,6 +454,8 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 1);
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 1);
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
+@@ -760,15 +772,18 @@
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+-	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
+-		fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
+-
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ 
+ 	pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
+ 
++	if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user);
+ 	authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++	if (options.permit_pam_user_change)
++		setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? "[pam]" : "unknown");
++	else
++#endif
+ 	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
+ 	free(username);
+ 
+@@ -2109,6 +2124,79 @@
+ }
+ 
+ int
++mm_answer_gss_error(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++	OM_uint32 major, minor;
++	char *msg;
++	int r;
++
++	msg=ssh_gssapi_last_error(gsscontext, &major, &minor);
++	sshbuf_reset(m);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, minor)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, msg)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR, m);
++
++	free(msg);
++
++	return(0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++	OM_uint32 major, minor;
++	gss_OID_set mech_set;
++	size_t i;
++	int r;
++
++	major=gss_indicate_mechs(&minor, &mech_set);
++
++	sshbuf_reset(m);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, mech_set->count)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++	for (i = 0; i < mech_set->count; i++) {
++		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, mech_set->elements[i].elements,
++		    mech_set->elements[i].length)) != 0)
++			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++	}
++
++	gss_release_oid_set(&minor, &mech_set);
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS, m);
++
++	return(0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_localname(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++	char *name;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_gssapi_localname(&name);
++
++	sshbuf_reset(m);
++	if (name) {
++		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0)
++			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		debug3_f("sending result %s", name);
++		free(name);
++	} else {
++		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "")) != 0)
++			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		debug3_f("sending result \"\"");
++	}
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME, m);
++
++	return(0);
++}
++
++int
+ mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
+ {
+ 	gss_buffer_desc data;
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.h openssh-8.7p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.523723828 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.876876743 +0200
+@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@
+ 
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
++
++	MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS = 200, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS = 201,
++	MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME = 202, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME = 203,
++	MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR = 204, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR = 205
+ };
+ 
+ struct ssh;
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.555723904 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.876876743 +0200
+@@ -1084,6 +1084,94 @@
+ 	return (authenticated);
+ }
+ 
++char *
++mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctx, OM_uint32 *major, OM_uint32 *minor)
++{
++	struct sshbuf *m = NULL;
++	OM_uint32 maj,min;
++	char *errstr;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR, m);
++
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maj)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++	if (major) *major=maj;
++	if (minor) *minor=min;
++
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &errstr, NULL)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++
++	return(errstr);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_OID_set *mech_set)
++{
++	struct sshbuf *m = NULL;
++	OM_uint32 major,minor;
++	int count;
++	gss_OID_desc oid;
++	size_t length;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS, m);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &count)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&minor, mech_set);
++	while(count-->0) {
++	    if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&oid.elements, &length)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++	    oid.length = length;
++	    gss_add_oid_set_member(&minor, &oid, mech_set);
++	}
++
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++
++	return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(char **lname)
++{
++	struct sshbuf *m = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME, m);
++
++	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME");
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME,
++	    m);
++
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, lname, NULL)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++	if ((*lname == NULL) || (*lname[0] == '\0')) {
++		debug3_f("gssapi identity mapping failed");
++	} else {
++		debug3_f("gssapi identity mapped to %s", *lname);
++	}
++
++	return(0);
++}
++
+ OM_uint32
+ mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+ {
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.533723852 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.877876745 +0200
+@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@
+ int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int kex);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(char **user);
++OM_uint32 mm_gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++    gss_OID_set *mech_set);
++char *mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *maj, OM_uint32 *min);
+ int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.557723909 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.878876747 +0200
+@@ -2516,11 +2516,11 @@
+ 	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+-		options->gss_authentication = 0;
++		options->gss_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+-		options->gss_keyex = 0;
++		options->gss_keyex = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+-		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++		options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+ 		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.395723519 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.879876750 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@
+ 	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
+ 	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
+ 	char   *user;		/* User to log in as. */
++	int     implicit;	/* Login user was not specified.
++				   Server may choose based on authctxt. */
+ 	int     escape_char;	/* Escape character; -2 = none */
+ 
+ 	u_int	num_system_hostfiles;	/* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.558723912 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.880876752 +0200
+@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	options->use_pam = -1;
++	options->permit_pam_user_change = -1;
+ 
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	options->num_ports = 0;
+@@ -139,9 +140,11 @@
+ 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
++	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+ 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++	options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+@@ -291,6 +294,8 @@
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+ 		options->use_pam = 0;
++	if (options->permit_pam_user_change == -1)
++		options->permit_pam_user_change = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+@@ -372,13 +377,17 @@
+ 	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
+ 		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+-		options->gss_authentication = 0;
++		options->gss_authentication = 1;
++	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
++		options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+-		options->gss_keyex = 0;
++		options->gss_keyex = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+ 		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
++	if (options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy == -1)
++		options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+ 		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+@@ -514,7 +523,7 @@
+ typedef enum {
+ 	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+-	sUsePAM,
++	sUsePAM, sPermitPAMUserChange,
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+@@ -535,6 +544,9 @@
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
++	sGssDelegateCreds,
++	sGssCredsPath,
++	sGsiAllowLimitedProxy,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+@@ -567,8 +579,10 @@
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "permitpamuserchange", sPermitPAMUserChange, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "permitpamuserchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+@@ -621,8 +635,15 @@
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sGssDelegateCreds, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapicredentialspath", sGssCredsPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++#ifdef GSI
++	{ "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sGsiAllowLimitedProxy, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++#else
++	{ "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++#endif
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -630,8 +651,11 @@
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapicredentialspath", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -703,6 +727,8 @@
+ 	{ "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "disableusagestats", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
++	{ "usagestatstargets", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
+ 	{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -1381,6 +1407,10 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->use_pam;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sPermitPAMUserChange:
++		intptr = &options->permit_pam_user_change;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	/* Standard Options */
+ 	case sBadOption:
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1628,6 +1658,10 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssDelegateCreds:
++		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sGssKeyEx:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1636,6 +1670,10 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssCredsPath:
++		charptr = &options->gss_creds_path;
++		goto parse_filename;
++
+ 	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1656,6 +1694,12 @@
+ 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++#ifdef GSI
++	case sGsiAllowLimitedProxy:
++		intptr = &options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy;
++		goto parse_flag;
++#endif
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2661,6 +2705,7 @@
+ 
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_deleg_creds);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.456723666 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.881876754 +0200
+@@ -146,9 +146,12 @@
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int	use_kuserok;
+ 	int		enable_k5users;
++	int     gsi_allow_limited_proxy;	/* If true, accept limited proxies */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* If true, store delegated GSSAPI credentials*/
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++	char   *gss_creds_path;		/* Use non-default credentials path */
+ 	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ 	int 	gss_store_rekey;
+ 	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
+@@ -209,6 +212,7 @@
+ 	char   *adm_forced_command;
+ 
+ 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
++	int	permit_pam_user_change;	/* Allow PAM to change user name */
+ 
+ 	int	permit_tun;
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-8.7p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.1	2021-10-24 07:32:35.397723524 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.1	2021-10-24 07:33:38.882876757 +0200
+@@ -1492,6 +1492,18 @@
+ on to new connections).
+ .It Ev USER
+ Set to the name of the user logging in.
++.It Ev X509_CERT_DIR
++Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
++CA certificates directory.
++.It Ev X509_USER_CERT
++Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
++certificate to be used for authentication to the server.
++.It Ev X509_USER_KEY
++Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
++private key to be used for authentication to the server.
++.It Ev X509_USER_PROXY
++Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
++proxy credential to be used for authentication to the server.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ Additionally,
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.562723921 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.883876759 +0200
+@@ -558,6 +558,38 @@
+ 			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
+ 			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
+ 	} else {
++	    /*
++	     * Since the config file parsing code aborts if it sees
++	     * options it doesn't recognize, allow users to put
++	     * options specific to compile-time add-ons in alternate
++	     * config files so their primary config file will
++	     * interoperate SSH versions that don't support those
++	     * options.
++	     */
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gssapi", pw->pw_dir,
++		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
++		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
++			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
++			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
++			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
++#ifdef GSI
++		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gsi", pw->pw_dir,
++		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
++		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
++			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
++			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
++			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
++#endif
++#if defined(KRB5)
++		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.krb", pw->pw_dir,
++		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
++		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
++			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
++			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
++			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
++#endif
++#endif
+ 		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+ 		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+ 		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+@@ -1236,8 +1268,12 @@
+ 	if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0)
+ 		cleanup_exit(255);
+ 
+-	if (options.user == NULL)
++	if (options.user == NULL) {
+ 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
++		options.implicit = 1;
++	} else {
++		options.implicit = 0;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config	2021-10-24 07:32:35.398723526 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config	2021-10-24 07:33:38.884876762 +0200
+@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
+ #   ForwardX11 no
+ #   PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+-#   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+-#   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+-#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#   GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++#   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials yes
++#   GSSAPIKeyExchange yes
+ #   GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config.5	2021-10-24 07:32:35.489723746 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2021-10-24 07:33:38.885876764 +0200
+@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@
+ user's configuration file
+ .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
+ .It
++GSSAPI configuration file
++.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config.gssapi
++.It
++Kerberos configuration file
++.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config.krb
++.It
+ system-wide configuration file
+ .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ .El
+@@ -821,7 +827,7 @@
+ .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+-.Cm no .
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
+ If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
+ connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
+@@ -829,12 +835,12 @@
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+-.Cm no .
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
+ GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
+ The default is
+-.Dq no .
++.Dq yes .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+ If set to
+ .Dq yes
+@@ -1458,7 +1464,7 @@
+ .Cm password ) .
+ The default is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset indent
+-gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
++gssapi-keyex,gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
+ keyboard-interactive,password
+ .Ed
+ .It Cm ProxyCommand
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.542723873 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.886876767 +0200
+@@ -860,6 +860,11 @@
+ 	gss_OID mech = NULL;
+ 	char *gss_host = NULL;
+ 
++	if (!options.gss_authentication) {
++		verbose("GSSAPI authentication disabled.");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+ 		gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+ 	} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+@@ -971,7 +976,8 @@
+ 
+ 	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ 		/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
+-		if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
++		if (strcmp(authctxt->method->name, "gssapi") == 0 ||
++		    !(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+ 			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -1142,6 +1148,20 @@
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef GSI
++extern
++const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl;
++extern
++const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl_micv2;
++#define is_gsi_oid(oid) \
++  ((oid->length == gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl->length && \
++    (memcmp(oid->elements, gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl->elements, \
++	    oid->length) == 0)) || \
++   (oid->length == gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl_micv2->length && \
++    (memcmp(oid->elements, gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl_micv2->elements, \
++	    oid->length) == 0)))
++#endif
++
+ int
+ userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+@@ -1164,6 +1184,12 @@
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ 
++#ifdef GSI
++	if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid))
++		ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, "", authctxt->service,
++		    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
++	else
++#endif
+ 	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+ 	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
+ 
+@@ -1177,7 +1203,9 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
++		(options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) ?
++		"" : authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-8.7p1/sshd.8
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.8	2021-10-24 07:32:35.418723575 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.8	2021-10-24 07:33:38.887876769 +0200
+@@ -818,6 +818,29 @@
+ # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
+ @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+ .Ed
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Nm
++will normally set the following environment variables:
++.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
++.It Ev GRIDMAP
++Applies to GSI authentication/authorization. Specifies the location of the
++gridmapfile. If not specified, the gridmap file is assumed to be available at
++/etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile for services running as root and at
++HOME/.gridmap for services running as non-root where HOME is the home directory
++of the effective user from the password file entry.
++.It Ev X509_CERT_DIR
++Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
++CA certificates directory.
++.It Ev X509_USER_CERT
++Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
++certificate to be used for authentication to the client.
++.It Ev X509_USER_KEY
++Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
++private key to be used for authentication to the client.
++.It Ev X509_USER_PROXY
++Used for GSI authentication. Specifies a non-standard location for the
++proxy credential to be used for authentication to the client.
++.El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+ .It Pa ~/.hushlogin
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.563723924 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.888876772 +0200
+@@ -2380,7 +2380,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+-	if (options.gss_authentication) {
++	if (options.gss_authentication && options.gss_deleg_creds) {
+ 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+ 		restore_uid();
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config	2021-10-24 07:32:35.443723635 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config	2021-10-24 07:33:38.889876774 +0200
+@@ -76,10 +76,11 @@
+ #KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+-#GSSAPIAuthentication no
++#GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++#GSSAPIDelegateCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+-#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange yes
+ #GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+@@ -95,6 +96,10 @@
+ # problems.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
++# Set to 'yes' to allow the PAM stack to change the user name during
++# calls to authentication
++#PermitPAMUserChange no
++
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5	2021-10-24 07:32:35.490723748 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5	2021-10-24 07:33:38.890876776 +0200
+@@ -635,15 +635,34 @@
+ to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++.It Cm GSIAllowLimitedProxy
++Specifies whether to accept limited proxy credentials for authentication.
++The default is
++.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+-.Cm no .
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm GSSAPICredentialsPath
++If specified, the delegated GSSAPI credential is stored in the
++given path, overwriting any existing credentials.
++Paths can be specified with syntax similar to the AuthorizedKeysFile
++option (i.e., accepting %h and %u tokens).
++When using this option,
++setting 'GssapiCleanupCredentials no' is recommended,
++so logging out of one session
++doesn't remove the credentials in use by another session of
++the same user.
++Currently only implemented for the GSI mechanism.
++.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
++Specifies whether delegated credentials are stored in the user's environment.
++The default is
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
+ Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
+ access control. Further details are described in
+@@ -654,7 +673,7 @@
+ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+ The default is
+-.Cm no .
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+ Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
+ a client authenticates against.
+@@ -1788,6 +1807,12 @@
+ as a non-root user.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++.It Cm PermitPAMUserChange
++If set to
++.Cm yes
++this will enable PAM authentication to change the name of the user being
++authenticated.  The default is
++.Cm no .
+ .It Cm VersionAddendum
+ Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
+ sent by the server upon connection.
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat	2021-10-24 07:32:35.382723488 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config_redhat	2021-10-24 07:33:38.891876779 +0200
+@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@
+ 
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ 
+-GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+-GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+-
+ UsePAM yes
+ 
+ X11Forwarding yes
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-8.7p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh-gss.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.415723567 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.891876779 +0200
+@@ -97,12 +97,14 @@
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
++	gss_OID_desc oid;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ 	gss_cred_id_t creds;
+-	gss_name_t name;
++	gss_name_t cred_name, ctx_name;
+ 	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++	gss_ctx_id_t context; /* needed for globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() */
+ 	int used;
+ 	int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@
+ 	OM_uint32	minor; /* both */
+ 	gss_ctx_id_t	context; /* both */
+ 	gss_name_t	name; /* both */
+-	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
++	gss_OID		oid; /* both */
+ 	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
+ 	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
+ 	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
+@@ -161,6 +163,9 @@
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+ int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+ 
++int ssh_gssapi_localname(char **name);
++void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++
+ /* In the server */
+ typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
+     const char *);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h openssh-8.7p1/version.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/version.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.891876779 +0200
+@@ -2,5 +2,19 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_8.7"
+ 
++#ifdef GSI
++#define GSI_VERSION	" GSI"
++#else
++#define GSI_VERSION	""
++#endif
++
++#ifdef KRB5
++#define KRB5_VERSION	" KRB5"
++#else
++#define KRB5_VERSION	""
++#endif
++
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+-#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
++#define GSI_PORTABLE	"c-GSI"
++#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \
++			GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75a4908
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2593 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.863834186 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.844029990 +0200
+@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
+ #include "dispatch.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "canohost.h"
++
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -75,6 +77,8 @@
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ 
++static int log_flag = 0;
++
+ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ 	&method_none,
+ 	&method_pubkey,
+@@ -299,6 +303,11 @@
+ 
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s",
+ 	    user[0] ? user : "<implicit>", service, method);
++	if (!log_flag) {
++		logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Authname;Remote: %s-%d;Name: %s",
++		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), user);
++		log_flag = 1;
++	}
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/channels.c openssh-8.7p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/channels.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.849834155 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/channels.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.845029992 +0200
+@@ -220,6 +220,9 @@
+ /* Setup helper */
+ static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
+ 
++static int hpn_disabled = 0;
++static int hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
++
+ /* -- channel core */
+ 
+ void
+@@ -415,6 +418,7 @@
+ 	c->local_window = window;
+ 	c->local_window_max = window;
+ 	c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
++	c->dynamic_window = 0;
+ 	c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
+ 	c->ctl_chan = -1;
+ 	c->delayed = 1;		/* prevent call to channel_post handler */
+@@ -1108,6 +1112,28 @@
+ 	FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+ }
+ 
++static int
++channel_tcpwinsz(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0;
++	socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz);
++	int ret = -1;
++
++	/* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */
++	if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
++		return 128 * 1024;
++
++	ret = getsockopt(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz);
++	/* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
++	if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
++		tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
++
++	debug2("tcpwinsz: tcp connection %d, Receive window: %d",
++	    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), tcpwinsz);
++	return tcpwinsz;
++}
++
+ static void
+ channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
+     fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+@@ -2147,22 +2173,31 @@
+ 
+ 	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+ 	    !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
+-	    ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
+-	    c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
++	    ((ssh_packet_is_interactive(ssh) &&
++	    c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
+ 	    c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
+ 	    c->local_consumed > 0) {
++		u_int addition = 0;
++		u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(ssh);
++		/* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment */
++		if (c->dynamic_window && (tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) {
++			/* grow the window somewhat aggressively to maintain pressure */
++			addition = 1.5 * (tcpwinsz - c->local_window_max);
++			c->local_window_max += addition;
++			debug("Channel: Window growth to %d by %d bytes", c->local_window_max, addition);
++		}
+ 		if (!c->have_remote_id)
+ 			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+ 		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+-		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed + addition)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
+ 		}
+ 		debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self,
+-		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed);
+-		c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
++		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed + addition);
++		c->local_window += c->local_consumed + addition;
+ 		c->local_consumed = 0;
+ 	}
+ 	return 1;
+@@ -3329,6 +3364,14 @@
+ 	return addr;
+ }
+ 
++void
++channel_set_hpn(int external_hpn_disabled, int external_hpn_buffer_size)
++{
++	hpn_disabled = external_hpn_disabled;
++	hpn_buffer_size = external_hpn_buffer_size;
++	debug("HPN Disabled: %d, HPN Buffer Size: %d", hpn_disabled, hpn_buffer_size);
++}
++
+ static int
+ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
+     struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
+@@ -3468,8 +3511,10 @@
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
++		/* explicitly test for hpn disabled option. if true use smaller window size */
+ 		c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+-		    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
++		    hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : hpn_buffer_size,
++		    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 		    0, "port listener", 1);
+ 		c->path = xstrdup(host);
+ 		c->host_port = fwd->connect_port;
+@@ -4655,7 +4700,8 @@
+ 		sock = socks[n];
+ 		nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener",
+ 		    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
+-		    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
++		    hpn_disabled ? CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT : hpn_buffer_size,
++		    CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 		    0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
+ 		nc->single_connection = single_connection;
+ 		(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/channels.h openssh-8.7p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/channels.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.785834012 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/channels.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.846029995 +0200
+@@ -169,8 +169,10 @@
+ 	u_int	local_window_max;
+ 	u_int	local_consumed;
+ 	u_int	local_maxpacket;
++	int	dynamic_window;
+ 	int     extended_usage;
+ 	int	single_connection;
++	u_int	tcpwinsz;
+ 
+ 	char   *ctype;		/* type */
+ 
+@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@
+ #define CHAN_LOCAL			0x10
+ 
+ /* Read buffer size */
+-#define CHAN_RBUF	(16*1024)
++#define CHAN_RBUF	CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT
+ 
+ /* Maximum channel input buffer size */
+ #define CHAN_INPUT_MAX	(16*1024*1024)
+@@ -363,4 +365,7 @@
+ void	 chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+ void	 chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+ 
++/* hpn handler */
++void	 channel_set_hpn(int, int);
++
+ #endif
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher.c openssh-8.7p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.828834108 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/cipher.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.847029997 +0200
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+@@ -55,6 +56,9 @@
+ #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
+ #endif
+ 
++/* for multi-threaded aes-ctr cipher */
++extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
++
+ struct sshcipher_ctx {
+ 	int	plaintext;
+ 	int	encrypt;
+@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@
+ 	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ };
+ 
+-static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
++static struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+ 	{ "3des-cbc",		8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+@@ -133,6 +137,29 @@
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++/* used to get the cipher name so when force rekeying to handle the
++ * single to multithreaded ctr cipher swap we only rekey when appropriate
++ */
++const char *
++cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
++{
++	return cc->cipher->name;
++}
++
++/* in order to get around sandbox and forking issues with a threaded cipher
++ * we set the initial pre-auth aes-ctr cipher to the default OpenSSH cipher
++ * post auth we set them to the new evp as defined by cipher-ctr-mt
++ */
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++void
++cipher_reset_multithreaded(void)
++{
++	cipher_by_name("aes128-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
++	cipher_by_name("aes192-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
++	cipher_by_name("aes256-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
++}
++#endif
++
+ u_int
+ cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
+ {
+@@ -182,10 +209,10 @@
+ 	return cc->plaintext;
+ }
+ 
+-const struct sshcipher *
++struct sshcipher *
+ cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+-	const struct sshcipher *c;
++	struct sshcipher *c;
+ 	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c;
+@@ -207,7 +234,8 @@
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
+ 		c = cipher_by_name(p);
+-		if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) {
++		if (c == NULL || ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0 &&
++				  (c->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)) {
+ 			free(cipher_list);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c openssh-8.7p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.848029999 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
++/*
++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher
++ *
++ * Author: Benjamin Bennett <ben@psc.edu>
++ * Author: Mike Tasota <tasota@gmail.com>
++ * Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ * Copyright (c) 2008-2013 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged,
++ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include <unistd.h>
++
++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++
++#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
++#include <openssl/aes.h>
++#endif
++
++#include <pthread.h>
++
++/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/
++/* maximum number of threads and queues */
++#define MAX_THREADS	32
++#define MAX_NUMKQ	(MAX_THREADS * 2)
++
++/* Number of pregen threads to use */
++int cipher_threads = 2;
++
++/* Number of keystream queues */
++int numkq = 4;
++
++/* Length of a keystream queue */
++#define KQLEN		4096
++
++/* Processor cacheline length */
++#define CACHELINE_LEN	64
++
++/* Collect thread stats and print at cancellation when in debug mode */
++#define CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
++
++/* Can the system do unaligned loads natively? */
++#if defined(__aarch64__) || \
++    defined(__i386__)    || \
++    defined(__powerpc__) || \
++    defined(__x86_64__)
++# define CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
++#endif
++#if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__)
++# define CIPHER_INT128_OK
++#endif
++/*-------------------- END TUNABLES --------------------*/
++
++
++const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
++
++#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
++/*
++ * Struct to collect thread stats
++ */
++struct thread_stats {
++	u_int	fills;
++	u_int	skips;
++	u_int	waits;
++	u_int	drains;
++};
++
++/*
++ * Debug print the thread stats
++ * Use with pthread_cleanup_push for displaying at thread cancellation
++ */
++static void
++thread_loop_stats(void *x)
++{
++	struct thread_stats *s = x;
++	debug("AES-CTR MT tid %lu - %u fills, %u skips, %u waits", pthread_self(),
++			s->fills, s->skips, s->waits);
++}
++
++# define STATS_STRUCT(s)	struct thread_stats s
++# define STATS_INIT(s)		{ memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); }
++# define STATS_FILL(s)		{ s.fills++; }
++# define STATS_SKIP(s)		{ s.skips++; }
++# define STATS_WAIT(s)		{ s.waits++; }
++# define STATS_DRAIN(s)		{ s.drains++; }
++#else
++# define STATS_STRUCT(s)
++# define STATS_INIT(s)
++# define STATS_FILL(s)
++# define STATS_SKIP(s)
++# define STATS_WAIT(s)
++# define STATS_DRAIN(s)
++#endif
++
++/* Keystream Queue state */
++enum {
++	KQINIT,
++	KQEMPTY,
++	KQFILLING,
++	KQFULL,
++	KQDRAINING
++};
++
++/* Keystream Queue struct */
++struct kq {
++	u_char		keys[KQLEN][AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u_char		ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u_char		pad0[CACHELINE_LEN];
++	int		qstate;
++	pthread_mutex_t	lock;
++	pthread_cond_t	cond;
++	u_char		pad1[CACHELINE_LEN];
++};
++
++/* Context struct */
++struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt
++{
++	int		struct_id;
++	struct kq	q[MAX_NUMKQ];
++	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
++	STATS_STRUCT(stats);
++	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	pthread_t	tid[MAX_THREADS];
++	int		id[MAX_THREADS];
++	pthread_rwlock_t tid_lock;
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	pthread_rwlock_t stop_lock;
++	int		exit_flag;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++	int		state;
++	int		qidx;
++	int		ridx;
++};
++
++/* <friedl>
++ * increment counter 'ctr',
++ * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
++ * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
++ */
++static void
++ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, size_t len)
++{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++		if (++ctr[i])	/* continue on overflow */
++			return;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Add num to counter 'ctr'
++ */
++static void
++ssh_ctr_add(u_char *ctr, uint32_t num, u_int len)
++{
++	int i;
++	uint16_t n;
++
++	for (n = 0, i = len - 1; i >= 0 && (num || n); i--) {
++		n = ctr[i] + (num & 0xff) + n;
++		num >>= 8;
++		ctr[i] = n & 0xff;
++		n >>= 8;
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * Threads may be cancelled in a pthread_cond_wait, we must free the mutex
++ */
++static void
++thread_loop_cleanup(void *x)
++{
++	pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)x);
++}
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++/* Check if we should exit, we are doing both cancel and exit condition
++ * since on OSX threads seem to occasionally fail to notice when they have
++ * been cancelled. We want to have a backup to make sure that we won't hang
++ * when the main process join()-s the cancelled thread.
++ */
++static void
++thread_loop_check_exit(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c)
++{
++	int exit_flag;
++
++	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->stop_lock);
++	exit_flag = c->exit_flag;
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
++
++	if (exit_flag)
++		pthread_exit(NULL);
++}
++#else
++# define thread_loop_check_exit(s)
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++/*
++ * Helper function to terminate the helper threads
++ */
++static void
++stop_and_join_pregen_threads(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c)
++{
++	int i;
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	/* notify threads that they should exit */
++	pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->stop_lock);
++	c->exit_flag = TRUE;
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++	/* Cancel pregen threads */
++	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++		debug ("Canceled %lu (%d,%d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
++		pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
++	}
++	/* shouldn't need this - see commit logs for hpn-7_7_P1 -cjr 11/7/19*/
++	/* for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) { */
++	/* 	pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[i].lock); */
++	/* 	pthread_cond_broadcast(&c->q[i].cond); */
++	/* 	pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[i].lock); */
++	/* } */
++	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++		if (pthread_kill(c->tid[i], 0) != 0)
++			debug3("AES-CTR MT pthread_join failure: Invalid thread id %lu in %s", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__);
++		else {
++			debug ("Joining %lu (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
++			pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL);
++		}
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * The life of a pregen thread:
++ *    Find empty keystream queues and fill them using their counter.
++ *    When done, update counter for the next fill.
++ */
++static void *
++thread_loop(void *x)
++{
++	AES_KEY key;
++	STATS_STRUCT(stats);
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c = x;
++	struct kq *q;
++	int i;
++	int qidx;
++	pthread_t first_tid;
++
++	/* Threads stats on cancellation */
++	STATS_INIT(stats);
++#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
++	pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_stats, &stats);
++#endif
++
++	/* Thread local copy of AES key */
++	memcpy(&key, &c->aes_ctx, sizeof(key));
++
++	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->tid_lock);
++	first_tid = c->tid[0];
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
++
++	/*
++	 * Handle the special case of startup, one thread must fill
++	 * the first KQ then mark it as draining. Lock held throughout.
++	 */
++	if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), first_tid)) {
++		q = &c->q[0];
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		if (q->qstate == KQINIT) {
++			for (i = 0; i < KQLEN; i++) {
++				AES_encrypt(q->ctr, q->keys[i], &key);
++				ssh_ctr_inc(q->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			}
++			ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (numkq - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
++			STATS_FILL(stats);
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		}
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++	} else
++		STATS_SKIP(stats);
++
++	/*
++	 * Normal case is to find empty queues and fill them, skipping over
++	 * queues already filled by other threads and stopping to wait for
++	 * a draining queue to become empty.
++	 *
++	 * Multiple threads may be waiting on a draining queue and awoken
++	 * when empty.  The first thread to wake will mark it as filling,
++	 * others will move on to fill, skip, or wait on the next queue.
++	 */
++	for (qidx = 1;; qidx = (qidx + 1) % numkq) {
++		/* Check if I was cancelled, also checked in cond_wait */
++		pthread_testcancel();
++
++		/* Check if we should exit as well */
++		thread_loop_check_exit(c);
++
++		/* Lock queue and block if its draining */
++		q = &c->q[qidx];
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock);
++		while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) {
++			STATS_WAIT(stats);
++			thread_loop_check_exit(c);
++			pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
++		}
++		pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
++
++		/* If filling or full, somebody else got it, skip */
++		if (q->qstate != KQEMPTY) {
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++			STATS_SKIP(stats);
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Empty, let's fill it.
++		 * Queue lock is relinquished while we do this so others
++		 * can see that it's being filled.
++		 */
++		q->qstate = KQFILLING;
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++		for (i = 0; i < KQLEN; i++) {
++			AES_encrypt(q->ctr, q->keys[i], &key);
++			ssh_ctr_inc(q->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		}
++
++		/* Re-lock, mark full and signal consumer */
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (numkq - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		q->qstate = KQFULL;
++		STATS_FILL(stats);
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++	}
++
++#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
++	/* Stats */
++	pthread_cleanup_pop(1);
++#endif
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
++    LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
++{
++	typedef union {
++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
++		__uint128_t *u128;
++#endif
++		uint64_t *u64;
++		uint32_t *u32;
++		uint8_t *u8;
++		const uint8_t *cu8;
++		uintptr_t u;
++	} ptrs_t;
++	ptrs_t destp, srcp, bufp;
++	uintptr_t align;
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
++	struct kq *q, *oldq;
++	int ridx;
++	u_char *buf;
++
++	if (len == 0)
++		return 1;
++	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	q = &c->q[c->qidx];
++	ridx = c->ridx;
++
++	/* src already padded to block multiple */
++	srcp.cu8 = src;
++	destp.u8 = dest;
++	while (len > 0) {
++		buf = q->keys[ridx];
++		bufp.u8 = buf;
++
++		/* figure out the alignment on the fly */
++#ifdef CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
++		align = 0;
++#else
++		align = destp.u | srcp.u | bufp.u;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
++		if ((align & 0xf) == 0) {
++			destp.u128[0] = srcp.u128[0] ^ bufp.u128[0];
++		} else
++#endif
++		if ((align & 0x7) == 0) {
++			destp.u64[0] = srcp.u64[0] ^ bufp.u64[0];
++			destp.u64[1] = srcp.u64[1] ^ bufp.u64[1];
++		} else if ((align & 0x3) == 0) {
++			destp.u32[0] = srcp.u32[0] ^ bufp.u32[0];
++			destp.u32[1] = srcp.u32[1] ^ bufp.u32[1];
++			destp.u32[2] = srcp.u32[2] ^ bufp.u32[2];
++			destp.u32[3] = srcp.u32[3] ^ bufp.u32[3];
++		} else {
++			size_t i;
++			for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
++				dest[i] = src[i] ^ buf[i];
++		}
++
++		destp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++		srcp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++		len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++		ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++
++		/* Increment read index, switch queues on rollover */
++		if ((ridx = (ridx + 1) % KQLEN) == 0) {
++			oldq = q;
++
++			/* Mark next queue draining, may need to wait */
++			c->qidx = (c->qidx + 1) % numkq;
++			q = &c->q[c->qidx];
++			pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++			while (q->qstate != KQFULL) {
++				STATS_WAIT(c->stats);
++				pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
++			}
++			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++
++			/* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */
++			pthread_mutex_lock(&oldq->lock);
++			oldq->qstate = KQEMPTY;
++			STATS_DRAIN(c->stats);
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&oldq->cond);
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&oldq->lock);
++		}
++	}
++	c->ridx = ridx;
++	return 1;
++}
++
++#define HAVE_NONE	0
++#define HAVE_KEY	1
++#define HAVE_IV		2
++
++int X = 0;
++
++static int
++ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
++    int enc)
++{
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
++	int i;
++
++	/* get the number of cores in the system */
++	/* if it's not linux it currently defaults to 2 */
++	/* divide by 2 to get threads for each direction (MODE_IN||MODE_OUT) */
++#ifdef __linux__
++	cipher_threads = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) / 2;
++#endif /*__linux__*/
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	cipher_threads = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) / 2;
++#endif /*__APPLE__*/
++#ifdef __FREEBSD__
++	int req[2];
++	size_t len;
++
++	req[0] = CTL_HW;
++	req[1] = HW_NCPU;
++
++	len = sizeof(ncpu);
++	sysctl(req, 2, &cipher_threads, &len, NULL, 0);
++	cipher_threads = cipher_threads / 2;
++#endif /*__FREEBSD__*/
++
++	/* if they have less than 4 cores spin up 4 threads anyway */
++	if (cipher_threads < 2)
++		cipher_threads = 2;
++
++	/* assure that we aren't trying to create more threads */
++	/* than we have in the struct. cipher_threads is half the */
++	/* total of allowable threads hence the odd looking math here */
++	if (cipher_threads * 2 > MAX_THREADS)
++		cipher_threads = MAX_THREADS / 2;
++
++	/* set the number of keystream queues */
++	numkq = cipher_threads * 2;
++
++	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
++		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->tid_lock, NULL);
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->stop_lock, NULL);
++		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
++		for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) {
++			pthread_mutex_init(&c->q[i].lock, NULL);
++			pthread_cond_init(&c->q[i].cond, NULL);
++		}
++
++		STATS_INIT(c->stats);
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
++	}
++
++	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
++		/* tell the pregen threads to exit */
++		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		/* reset the exit flag */
++		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++		/* Start over getting key & iv */
++		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
++	}
++
++	if (key != NULL) {
++		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
++		    &c->aes_ctx);
++		c->state |= HAVE_KEY;
++	}
++
++	if (iv != NULL) {
++		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		c->state |= HAVE_IV;
++	}
++
++	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
++		/* Clear queues */
++		memcpy(c->q[0].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		c->q[0].qstate = KQINIT;
++		for (i = 1; i < numkq; i++) {
++			memcpy(c->q[i].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			ssh_ctr_add(c->q[i].ctr, i * KQLEN, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			c->q[i].qstate = KQEMPTY;
++		}
++		c->qidx = 0;
++		c->ridx = 0;
++
++		/* Start threads */
++		for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++			pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
++			if (pthread_create(&c->tid[i], NULL, thread_loop, c) != 0)
++				debug ("AES-CTR MT Could not create thread in %s", __FUNCTION__); /*should die here */
++			else {
++				if (!c->struct_id)
++					c->struct_id = X++;
++				c->id[i] = i;
++				debug ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__, c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
++			}
++			pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
++		}
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[0].lock);
++		while (c->q[0].qstate == KQINIT)
++			pthread_cond_wait(&c->q[0].cond, &c->q[0].lock);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[0].lock);
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/* this function is no longer used but might prove handy in the future
++ * this comment also applies to ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction
++ */
++void
++ssh_aes_ctr_thread_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++{
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
++
++	c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
++	stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
++}
++
++void
++ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++{
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
++	int i;
++	c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
++	/* reconstruct threads */
++	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++		pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
++		if (pthread_create(&c->tid[i], NULL, thread_loop, c) !=0 )
++			debug("AES-CTR MT could not create thread in %s", __FUNCTION__);
++		else {
++			c->struct_id = X++;
++			c->id[i] = i;
++			debug ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__, c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
++			debug("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__);
++		}
++		pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
++	}
++}
++
++static int
++ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++{
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
++
++	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
++#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
++		debug("AES-CTR MT main thread: %u drains, %u waits", c->stats.drains,
++		    c->stats.waits);
++#endif
++		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
++
++		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
++		free(c);
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/* <friedl> */
++const EVP_CIPHER *
++evp_aes_ctr_mt(void)
++{
++# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000UL
++	static EVP_CIPHER *aes_ctr;
++	aes_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 16/*block*/, 16/*key*/);
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(aes_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_init);
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup);
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr);
++#  ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(aes_ctr, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
++				      | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH
++				      | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT
++				      | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV);
++#  endif /*SSH_OLD_EVP*/
++	return (aes_ctr);
++# else /*earlier versions of openssl*/
++	static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr;
++	memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
++	aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef;
++	aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++	aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++	aes_ctr.key_len = 16;
++	aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init;
++	aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup;
++	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
++#  ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
++	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
++		EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
++#  endif /*SSH_OLD_EVP*/
++	return &aes_ctr;
++# endif /*OPENSSH_VERSION_NUMBER*/
++}
++
++#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher.h openssh-8.7p1/cipher.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.829834110 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/cipher.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.848029999 +0200
+@@ -68,7 +68,9 @@
+ 
+ struct sshcipher_ctx;
+ 
+-const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
++void ssh_aes_ctr_thread_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); // defined in cipher-ctr-mt.c
++void ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
++struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
+ const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+ int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
+ char	*cipher_alg_list(char, int);
+@@ -86,6 +88,8 @@
+ u_int	 cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
++void	 cipher_reset_multithreaded(void);
++const char *cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+ 
+ u_int	 cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/clientloop.c openssh-8.7p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/clientloop.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.738833908 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/clientloop.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.849030001 +0200
+@@ -1582,7 +1582,9 @@
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
+ 	    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+-	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
++	    /* again is this really necessary for X11? */
++	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
++	    CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
+ 	c->force_drain = 1;
+ 	return c;
+ }
+@@ -1611,7 +1613,8 @@
+ 	}
+ 	c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
+ 	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+-	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
++	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
++	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
+ 	    "authentication agent connection", 1);
+ 	c->force_drain = 1;
+ 	return c;
+@@ -1638,7 +1641,8 @@
+ 	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
+ 
+ 	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
+-	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
++	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
++	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ 	c->datagram = 1;
+ 
+ #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/compat.c openssh-8.7p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/compat.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.849834155 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.850030003 +0200
+@@ -151,6 +151,17 @@
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
++			/* Check to see if the remote side is OpenSSH and not HPN */
++			/* TODO: See if we can work this into the new method for bug checks */
++			if (strstr(version, "OpenSSH") != NULL) {
++				if (strstr(version, "hpn") == NULL) {
++					ssh->compat |= SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW;
++					debug("Remote is NOT HPN enabled");
++				} else {
++					debug("Remote is HPN Enabled");
++				}
++			}
++			debug("ssh->compat is %u", ssh->compat);
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/compat.h openssh-8.7p1/compat.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/compat.h	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.850030003 +0200
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD	0x10000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS	0x20000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE	0x40000000
++#define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW	0x80000000
+ 
+ struct ssh;
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/defines.h openssh-8.7p1/defines.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/defines.h	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/defines.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.851030005 +0200
+@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+-# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
++# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 32*1024
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/digest.h openssh-8.7p1/digest.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/digest.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.811834070 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/digest.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.852030007 +0200
+@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
+ #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256	2
+ #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384	3
+ #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512	4
+-#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		5
++#define SSH_DIGEST_NULL		5
++#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		6
+ 
+ struct sshbuf;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/digest-openssl.c openssh-8.7p1/digest-openssl.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/digest-openssl.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.810834068 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/digest-openssl.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.852030007 +0200
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
+ 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,	"SHA256",	32,	EVP_sha256 },
+ 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,	"SHA384",	48,	EVP_sha384 },
+ 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,	"SHA512",	64,	EVP_sha512 },
++	{ SSH_DIGEST_NULL,	"NONEMAC",	0,	EVP_md_null},
+ 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
+ };
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/HPN-README openssh-8.7p1/HPN-README
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/HPN-README	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/HPN-README	2021-10-24 07:56:04.852030007 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
++Notes:
++
++MULTI-THREADED CIPHER:
++The AES cipher in CTR mode has been multithreaded (MTR-AES-CTR). This will allow ssh installations
++on hosts with multiple cores to use more than one processing core during encryption.
++Tests have show significant throughput performance increases when using MTR-AES-CTR up
++to and including a full gigabit per second on quad core systems. It should be possible to
++achieve full line rate on dual core systems but OS and data management overhead makes this
++more difficult to achieve. The cipher stream from MTR-AES-CTR is entirely compatible with single
++thread AES-CTR (ST-AES-CTR) implementations and should be 100% backward compatible. Optimal
++performance requires the MTR-AES-CTR mode be enabled on both ends of the connection.
++The MTR-AES-CTR replaces ST-AES-CTR and is used in exactly the same way with the same
++nomenclature.
++Use examples:
++		ssh -caes128-ctr you@host.com
++		scp -oCipher=aes256-ctr file you@host.com:~/file
++
++NONE CIPHER:
++To use the NONE option you must have the NoneEnabled switch set on the server and
++you *must* have *both* NoneEnabled and NoneSwitch set to yes on the client. The NONE
++feature works with ALL ssh subsystems (as far as we can tell) *AS LONG AS* a tty is not
++spawned. If a user uses the -T switch to prevent a tty being created the NONE cipher will
++be disabled.
++
++The performance increase will only be as good as the network and TCP stack tuning
++on the reciever side of the connection allows. As a rule of thumb a user will need
++at least 10Mb/s connection with a 100ms RTT to see a doubling of performance. The
++HPN-SSH home page describes this in greater detail.
++
++http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh
++
++NONE MAC:
++Starting with HPN 15v1 users will have the option to disable HMAC (message
++authentication ciphers) when using the NONE cipher. You must enable the following:
++NoneEnabled, NoneSwitch, and NoneMacEnabled. If all three are not enabled the None MAC
++will be automatically disabled. In tests the use of the None MAC improved throuput by
++more than 30%.
++
++ex: scp -oNoneSwitch=yes -oNoneEnabled=yes -oNoneMacEnabled=yes file host:~
++
++BUFFER SIZES:
++
++If HPN is disabled the receive buffer size will be set to the
++OpenSSH default of 2MB (for OpenSSH versions before 4.7: 64KB).
++
++If an HPN system connects to a nonHPN system the receive buffer will
++be set to the HPNBufferSize value. The default is 2MB but user adjustable.
++
++If an HPN to HPN connection is established a number of different things might
++happen based on the user options and conditions.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = up to 64MB
++This is the default state. The HPN buffer size will grow to a maximum of 64MB
++as the TCP receive buffer grows. The maximum HPN Buffer size of 64MB is
++geared towards 10GigE transcontinental connections.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = TCP receive buffer value.
++Users on non-autotuning systems should disable TCPRcvBufPoll in the
++ssh_config and sshd_config
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCP receive buffer and HPNBufferSize.
++This would be the system defined TCP receive buffer (RWIN).
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
++Generally there is no need to set both.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = grows to HPNBufferSize
++The buffer will grow up to the maximum size specified here.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
++Generally there is no need to set both of these, especially on autotuning
++systems. However, if the users wishes to override the autotuning this would be
++one way to do it.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = TCPRcvBuf.
++This will override autotuning and set the TCP recieve buffer to the user defined
++value.
++
++
++HPN Specific Configuration options
++
++TcpRcvBuf=[int]KB client
++      Set the TCP socket receive buffer to n Kilobytes. It can be set up to the
++maximum socket size allowed by the system. This is useful in situations where
++the tcp receive window is set low but the maximum buffer size is set
++higher (as is typical). This works on a per TCP connection basis. You can also
++use this to artifically limit the transfer rate of the connection. In these
++cases the throughput will be no more than n/RTT. The minimum buffer size is 1KB.
++Default is the current system wide tcp receive buffer size.
++
++TcpRcvBufPoll=[yes/no] client/server
++      Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life
++of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled
++for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista)
++default is yes.
++
++NoneEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
++      Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used
++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However,
++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted
++even if this option is enabled. Set to no by default.
++
++NoneMacEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
++      Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh
++will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use
++with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and
++protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication
++remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is no.
++
++NoneSwitch=[yes/no] client
++     Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after
++authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client
++and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE
++cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an
++error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly
++have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in
++interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to no by default.
++
++HPNDisabled=[yes/no] client/server
++     In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact
++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is
++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to no.
++
++HPNBufferSize=[int]KB client/server
++     This is the default buffer size the HPN functionality uses when interacting
++with nonHPN SSH installations. Conceptually this is similar to the TcpRcvBuf
++option as applied to the internal SSH flow control. This value can range from
++1KB to 64MB (1-65536). Use of oversized or undersized buffers can cause performance
++problems depending on the length of the network path. The default size of this buffer
++is 2MB.
++
++DisableMTAES=[yes/no] client/server
++     Switch the encryption cipher being used from the multithreaded MT-AES-CTR cipher
++back to the stock single-threaded AES-CTR cipher. Useful on modern processors with
++AES-NI instructions which make the stock single-threaded AES-CTR cipher faster than
++the multithreaded MT-AES-CTR cipher. Set to no by default.
++
++
++Credits: This patch was conceived, designed, and led by Chris Rapier (rapier@psc.edu)
++         The majority of the actual coding for versions up to HPN12v1 was performed
++         by Michael Stevens (mstevens@andrew.cmu.edu). The MT-AES-CTR cipher was
++         implemented by Ben Bennet (ben@psc.edu) and improved by Mike Tasota
++         (tasota@gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013.
++         Allan Jude provided the code for the NoneMac and buffer normalization.
++         This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National
++         Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation.
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/kex.c openssh-8.7p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/kex.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.841834137 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/kex.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.853030010 +0200
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "canohost.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
+ 
+@@ -969,6 +970,11 @@
+ 	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+ 	u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
+ 	int r, first_kex_follows;
++	int auth_flag = 0;
++	int log_flag = 0;
++
++	auth_flag = packet_authentication_state(ssh);
++	debug("AUTH STATE IS %d", auth_flag);
+ 
+ 	debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
+ 	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
+@@ -1039,11 +1045,40 @@
+ 			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
++		debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name);
++		debug("REQUESTED MAC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->mac.name);
++		if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) {
++			if (auth_flag == 1) {
++				debug("None requested post authentication.");
++				ssh->none = 1;
++			}
++			else
++				fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed.");
++			if (newkeys->mac.name != NULL && strcmp(newkeys->mac.name, "none") == 0)
++				debug("Requesting: NONEMAC. Authflag is %d", auth_flag);
++		}
++
+ 		debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
+ 		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+ 		    newkeys->enc.name,
+ 		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
+ 		    newkeys->comp.name);
++		/*
++		 * client starts with ctos = 0 && log flag = 0 and no log.
++		 * 2nd client pass ctos = 1 and flag = 1 so no log.
++		 * server starts with ctos = 1 && log_flag = 0 so log.
++		 * 2nd sever pass ctos = 1 && log flag = 1 so no log.
++		 * -cjr
++		 */
++		if (ctos && !log_flag) {
++			logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Kex;Remote: %s-%d;Enc: %s;MAC: %s;Comp: %s",
++			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
++			    newkeys->enc.name,
++			    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
++			    newkeys->comp.name);
++		}
++		log_flag = 1;
+ 	}
+ 	need = dh_need = 0;
+ 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+@@ -1391,7 +1426,7 @@
+ 	if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
+ 		version_addendum = NULL;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+-	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
++	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
+ 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
+ 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
+ 		oerrno = errno;
+@@ -1527,6 +1562,14 @@
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
++	/* report the version information to syslog if this is the server */
++	if (timeout_ms == -1) { /* only the server uses this value */
++		logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Version;Remote: %s-%d;Protocol: %d.%d;Client: %.100s",
++		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
++		    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
++	}
++
+ 	debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+ 	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+ 	compat_banner(ssh, remote_version);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/log.c openssh-8.7p1/log.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/log.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.769833977 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/log.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.853030010 +0200
+@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@
+ #include <syslog.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include "packet.h" /* needed for host and port look ups */
++#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
++# include <sys/time.h> /* to get current time */
++#endif
++
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+ # include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -65,6 +70,8 @@
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
++extern struct ssh *active_state;
++
+ #define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS	(VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
+ #define LOG_STDERR_VIS	(VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/mac.c openssh-8.7p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/mac.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.830834112 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/mac.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.854030012 +0200
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
+ 	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ 	{ "hmac-md5",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ 	{ "hmac-md5-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ "none",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ 	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
+ 	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/Makefile.in	2021-10-24 07:54:36.867834195 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in	2021-10-24 07:56:04.854030012 +0200
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
+ CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
+ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
+-LIBS=@LIBS@
++LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
+@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
+ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	authfd.o authfile.o \
+ 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
+-	cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \
++	cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o cipher-ctr-mt.o \
+ 	compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+ 	log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+ 	readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addr.o addrmatch.o \
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/packet.c openssh-8.7p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/packet.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.832834117 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/packet.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.855030014 +0200
+@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
+ 	TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
+ 	state->connection_in = -1;
+ 	state->connection_out = -1;
+-	state->max_packet_size = 32768;
++	state->max_packet_size = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ 	state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+ 	state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
+ 	state->initialized = 1;
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
+ ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
+ {
+ 	struct session_state *state;
+-	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
++	struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+ 	int r;
+ 
+ 	if (none == NULL) {
+@@ -958,10 +958,19 @@
+ 	 * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
+ 	 * See RFC4344 section 3.2.
+ 	 */
+-	if (enc->block_size >= 16)
+-		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
+-	else
+-		*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
++
++	/* we really don't need to rekey if we are using the none cipher
++	 * but there isn't a good way to disable it entirely that I can find
++	 * and using a blocksize larger that 16 doesn't work (dunno why)
++	 * so this seems to be a good limit for now - CJR 10/16/2020*/
++	if (ssh->none == 1) {
++		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (16*2);
++	} else {
++		if (enc->block_size >= 16)
++			*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
++		else
++			*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
++	}
+ 	if (state->rekey_limit)
+ 		*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
+ 		    state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
+@@ -970,6 +979,24 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
++int rekey_requested = 0;
++void
++packet_request_rekeying(void)
++{
++	rekey_requested = 1;
++}
++
++/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr
++ * and none cipher switch */
++int
++packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
++
++	return state->after_authentication;
++}
++
+ #define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
+ static int
+ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+@@ -996,6 +1023,13 @@
+ 	if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	/* used to force rekeying when called for by the none
++	 * cipher switch and aes-mt-ctr methods -cjr */
++	if (rekey_requested == 1) {
++		rekey_requested = 0;
++		return 1;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Time-based rekeying */
+ 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
+ 	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+@@ -1342,7 +1376,7 @@
+ 	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ 	int len, r, ms_remain;
+ 	fd_set *setp;
+-	char buf[8192];
++	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
+ 	struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
+@@ -1870,17 +1904,21 @@
+ 	switch (r) {
+ 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
+ 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 		logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
+ 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
+ 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 		logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
+ 		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
+ 	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
+ 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 		logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
+ 	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+ 		if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
+ 			ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++			sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 			logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
+ 		}
+ 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+@@ -1922,6 +1960,24 @@
+ 	logdie_f("should have exited");
+ }
+ 
++/* this prints out the final log entry */
++void
++sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *ssh) {
++	double total_time;
++
++	if (ssh->start_time < 1)
++		/* this will produce a NaN in the output. -cjr */
++		total_time = 0;
++	else
++		total_time = monotime_double() - ssh->start_time;
++
++	logit("SSH: Server;LType: Throughput;Remote: %s-%d;IN: %lu;OUT: %lu;Duration: %.1f;tPut_in: %.1f;tPut_out: %.1f",
++	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
++	    ssh->stdin_bytes, ssh->fdout_bytes, total_time,
++	    ssh->stdin_bytes / total_time,
++	    ssh->fdout_bytes / total_time);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
+  * connection, and exits.  This function never returns. The error message
+@@ -2794,3 +2850,10 @@
+ 	ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++
++/* need this for the moment for the aes-ctr cipher */
++void *
++ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	return ssh->state->send_context;
++}
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/packet.h openssh-8.7p1/packet.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/packet.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.833834119 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/packet.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.856030016 +0200
+@@ -86,6 +86,14 @@
+ 
+ 	/* APP data */
+ 	void *app_data;
++
++	/* logging data for ServerLogging patch*/
++	double start_time;
++	u_long fdout_bytes;
++	u_long stdin_bytes;
++
++	/* track that we are in a none cipher/mac state */
++	int none;
+ };
+ 
+ typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *,
+@@ -156,6 +164,8 @@
+ int	 ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ u_int	 ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *);
+ 
++int	 packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *);
++
+ int	 ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+ int	 ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+ 
+@@ -170,6 +180,13 @@
+ 
+ void	*ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
+ void	*ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *);
++void	*ssh_packet_get_receive_context(struct ssh *);
++void	*ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *);
++
++/* for forced packet rekeying post auth */
++void	 packet_request_rekeying(void);
++/* final log entry support */
++void	 sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *);
+ 
+ /* new API */
+ int	sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/progressmeter.c openssh-8.7p1/progressmeter.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/progressmeter.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/progressmeter.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.857030018 +0200
+@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
+ static off_t start_pos;		/* initial position of transfer */
+ static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
+ static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
++static off_t last_pos;
++static off_t max_delta_pos = 0;
+ static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
+ static long stalled;		/* how long we have been stalled */
+ static int bytes_per_second;	/* current speed in bytes per second */
+@@ -127,6 +129,7 @@
+ 	int cur_speed;
+ 	int hours, minutes, seconds;
+ 	int file_len;
++	off_t delta_pos;
+ 
+ 	if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
+ 		return;
+@@ -142,6 +145,10 @@
+ 	now = monotime_double();
+ 	bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
+ 
++	delta_pos = cur_pos - last_pos;
++	if (delta_pos > max_delta_pos)
++		max_delta_pos = delta_pos;
++
+ 	if (bytes_left > 0)
+ 		elapsed = now - last_update;
+ 	else {
+@@ -166,7 +173,7 @@
+ 
+ 	/* filename */
+ 	buf[0] = '\0';
+-	file_len = win_size - 36;
++	file_len = win_size - 45;
+ 	if (file_len > 0) {
+ 		buf[0] = '\r';
+ 		snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s",
+@@ -191,6 +198,15 @@
+ 	    (off_t)bytes_per_second);
+ 	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
+ 
++	/* instantaneous rate */
++	if (bytes_left > 0)
++		format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
++		    delta_pos);
++	else
++		format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
++		    max_delta_pos);
++	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
++
+ 	/* ETA */
+ 	if (!transferred)
+ 		stalled += elapsed;
+@@ -227,6 +243,7 @@
+ 
+ 	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
+ 	last_update = now;
++	last_pos = cur_pos;
+ }
+ 
+ /*ARGSUSED*/
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.870834202 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c	2021-10-24 08:13:34.654331392 +0200
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ /* Format of the configuration file:
+@@ -169,6 +170,9 @@
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+ 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
+ 	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
++	oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize,
++	oNoneEnabled, oNoneMacEnabled, oNoneSwitch,
++	oDisableMTAES,
+ 	oVisualHostKey,
+ 	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull,
+ 	oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+@@ -313,6 +317,10 @@
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
+ 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
+ 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
++	{ "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
++	{ "nonemacenabled", oNoneMacEnabled },
++	{ "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
++	{ "disablemtaes", oDisableMTAES },
+ 	{ "sessiontype", oSessionType },
+ 	{ "stdinnull", oStdinNull },
+ 	{ "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication },
+@@ -336,6 +344,11 @@
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+ 
++	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
++	{ "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
++	{ "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
++	{ "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
++
+ 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -1172,6 +1185,46 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oHPNDisabled:
++		intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oHPNBufferSize:
++		intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
++		goto parse_int;
++
++	case oTcpRcvBufPoll:
++		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oNoneEnabled:
++		intptr = &options->none_enabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oNoneMacEnabled:
++		intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oDisableMTAES:
++		intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	/*
++	 * We check to see if the command comes from the command
++	 * line or not. If it does then enable it otherwise fail.
++	 *  NONE should never be a default configuration.
++	 */
++	case oNoneSwitch:
++		if (strcmp(filename, "command-line") == 0) {
++			intptr = &options->none_switch;
++			goto parse_flag;
++		} else {
++			error("NoneSwitch is found in %.200s.\nYou may only use this configuration option from the command line", filename);
++			error("Continuing...");
++			debug("NoneSwitch directive found in %.200s.", filename);
++			return 0;
++		}
++
+ 	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+ 		intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+@@ -1426,6 +1479,10 @@
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case oTcpRcvBuf:
++		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case oCiphers:
+ 		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+@@ -2440,6 +2497,14 @@
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->request_tty = -1;
++	options->none_switch = -1;
++	options->none_enabled = -1;
++	options->nonemac_enabled = -1;
++	options->disable_multithreaded = -1;
++	options->hpn_disabled = -1;
++	options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
++	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
++	options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
+ 	options->session_type = -1;
+ 	options->stdin_null = -1;
+ 	options->fork_after_authentication = -1;
+@@ -2615,6 +2680,43 @@
+ 		options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+ 	if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+ 		options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
++	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
++		options->hpn_disabled = 0;
++	if (options->hpn_buffer_size > -1) {
++		/* if a user tries to set the size to 0 set it to 1KB */
++		if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
++			options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
++		/* limit the buffer to SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
++		if (options->hpn_buffer_size > (SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 1024)) {
++			options->hpn_buffer_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
++			debug("User requested buffer larger than 256MB. Request reverted to 256MB");
++		} else
++			options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
++		debug("hpn_buffer_size set to %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
++	}
++	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf == 0)
++		options->tcp_rcv_buf = 1;
++	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf > -1)
++		options->tcp_rcv_buf *=1024;
++	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1)
++		options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1;
++	if (options->none_switch == -1)
++		options->none_switch = 0;
++	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
++		options->none_enabled = 0;
++	if (options->none_enabled == 0 && options->none_switch > 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "NoneEnabled must be enabled to use the None Switch option. None cipher disabled.\n");
++		options->none_enabled = 0;
++	}
++	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
++		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
++	if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && (options->none_enabled == 0 ||
++					     options->none_switch == 0)) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "None MAC can only be used with the None cipher. None MAC disabled.\n");
++		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
++	}
++	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
++		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
+ 	if (options->control_master == -1)
+ 		options->control_master = 0;
+ 	if (options->control_persist == -1) {
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.870834202 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.860030025 +0200
+@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
+ 	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
+ 	int     compression;	/* Compress packets in both directions. */
+ 	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
++	int     tcp_rcv_buf; /* user switch to set tcp recv buffer */
++	int     tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* Option to poll recv buf every window transfer */
++	int     hpn_disabled;    /* Switch to disable HPN buffer management */
++	int     hpn_buffer_size; /* User definable size for HPN buffer window */
+ 	int	ip_qos_interactive;	/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
+ 	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
+ 	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
+@@ -126,7 +130,12 @@
+ 
+ 	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
+ 	int64_t rekey_limit;
++	int     none_switch;    /* Use none cipher */
++	int     none_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */
++	int     nonemac_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */	
++	int     disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/
+ 	int	rekey_interval;
++
+ 	int	no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+ 	int	identities_only;
+ 	int	server_alive_interval;
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/regress/integrity.sh openssh-8.7p1/regress/integrity.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/regress/integrity.sh	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/integrity.sh	2021-10-24 07:56:04.860030025 +0200
+@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@
+ cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
+ 
+ for m in $macs; do
++	# the none mac is now valid but tests against it will succeed when we expect it to
++	# fail. so we need to explicity remove it from the list of macs returned.
++	if [ "$m" = "none" ]; then
++		continue
++	fi
++
+ 	trace "test $tid: mac $m"
+ 	elen=0
+ 	epad=0
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c openssh-8.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.842834139 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.861030027 +0200
+@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@
+ #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getpeername /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpeername),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
+ #endif
+@@ -318,6 +321,9 @@
+ #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socketcall
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_socketcall),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_time
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
+ #endif
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/scp.c openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/scp.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.854834166 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.861030027 +0200
+@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@
+ 	off_t size, statbytes;
+ 	unsigned long long ull;
+ 	int setimes, targisdir, wrerr;
+-	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
++	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[16384], visbuf[16384];
+ 	char **patterns = NULL;
+ 	size_t n, npatterns = 0;
+ 	struct timeval tv[2];
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.871834204 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.863030032 +0200
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
+@@ -200,6 +201,12 @@
+ 	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+ 	options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
+ 	options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
++	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
++	options->hpn_disabled = -1;
++	options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
++	options->none_enabled = -1;
++	options->nonemac_enabled = -1;
++	options->disable_multithreaded = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
+@@ -290,6 +297,10 @@
+ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ {
+ 	u_int i;
++	/* needed for hpn socket tests */
++	int sock;
++	int socksize;
++	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
+ 
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+@@ -461,6 +472,51 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+ 		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
++	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
++		options->none_enabled = 0;
++	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
++		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
++	if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && options->none_enabled == 0) {
++		debug ("Attempted to enabled None MAC without setting None Enabled to true. None MAC disabled.");
++		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
++	}
++	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
++		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
++	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
++		options->hpn_disabled = 0;
++
++	if (options->hpn_buffer_size == -1) {
++		/* option not explicitly set. Now we have to figure out */
++		/* what value to use */
++		if (options->hpn_disabled == 1) {
++			options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++		} else {
++			/* get the current RCV size and set it to that */
++			/*create a socket but don't connect it */
++			/* we use that the get the rcv socket size */
++			sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++			getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++				   &socksize, &socksizelen);
++			close(sock);
++			options->hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++			debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
++		}
++	} else {
++		/* we have to do this in case the user sets both values in a contradictory */
++		/* manner. hpn_disabled overrrides hpn_buffer_size*/
++		if (options->hpn_disabled <= 0) {
++			if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
++				options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
++			/* limit the maximum buffer to SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
++			if (options->hpn_buffer_size > (SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 1024)) {
++				options->hpn_buffer_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
++			} else {
++				options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
++			}
++		} else
++			options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++	}
++
+ 	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+ 		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
+ 	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+@@ -533,6 +589,9 @@
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
++	sNoneEnabled, sNoneMacEnabled,
++	sDisableMTAES,
++	sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+@@ -733,6 +792,12 @@
+ 	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "hpnbuffersize", sHPNBufferSize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "disableMTAES", sDisableMTAES, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "nonemacenabled", sNoneMacEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -791,6 +856,7 @@
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+ 		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
++			debug("Config token is %s", keywords[i].name);
+ 			*flags = keywords[i].flags;
+ 			return keywords[i].opcode;
+ 		}
+@@ -1568,12 +1634,36 @@
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
++	case sTcpRcvBufPoll:
++		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sHPNDisabled:
++		intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sHPNBufferSize:
++		intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
+ 		intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
+  parse_flag:
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
++	case sNoneEnabled:
++		intptr = &options->none_enabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sNoneMacEnabled:
++		intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sDisableMTAES:
++		intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sHostbasedAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.871834204 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.864030034 +0200
+@@ -214,6 +214,13 @@
+ 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
+ 	int	permit_pam_user_change;	/* Allow PAM to change user name */
+ 
++	int     tcp_rcv_buf_poll;       /* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/
++	int	hpn_disabled;		/* disable hpn functionality. false by default */
++	int	hpn_buffer_size;	/* set the hpn buffer size - default 3MB */
++	int	none_enabled;		/* Enable NONE cipher switch */
++	int     disable_multithreaded;  /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr cipher */
++	int     nonemac_enabled;        /* Enable NONE MAC switch */
++
+ 	int	permit_tun;
+ 
+ 	char   **permitted_opens;	/* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/serverloop.c openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/serverloop.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.855834168 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.865030036 +0200
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@
+ process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in)
+ {
+ 	int r, len;
+-	char buf[16384];
++	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
+ 
+ 	/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
+ 	if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@
+ 		/* Buffer any received data. */
+ 		if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "ssh_packet_process_incoming");
++		ssh->fdout_bytes += len;
+ 	}
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -340,6 +341,7 @@
+ 	sigset_t bsigset, osigset;
+ 
+ 	debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
++	ssh->start_time = monotime_double();
+ 
+ 	if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 || sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGCHLD) == -1)
+ 		error_f("bsigset setup: %s", strerror(errno));
+@@ -388,6 +390,7 @@
+ 
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
+ 			logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
++			sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
+ 			cleanup_exit(255);
+ 		}
+@@ -409,6 +412,9 @@
+ 	/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
+ 	channel_free_all(ssh);
+ 
++	/* final entry must come after channels close -cjr */
++	sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
++
+ 	/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
+ 	session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -559,7 +565,8 @@
+ 	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
+ 
+ 	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+-	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
++	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
++	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ 	c->datagram = 1;
+ #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+ 	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
+@@ -610,6 +617,8 @@
+ 	c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
+ 	    -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 	    0, "server-session", 1);
++	if ((options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll) && (!options.hpn_disabled))
++		c->dynamic_window = 1;
+ 	if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
+ 		debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
+ 		channel_free(ssh, c);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/session.c openssh-8.7p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/session.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.855834168 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/session.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.866030038 +0200
+@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@
+ 		goto authsock_err;
+ 
+ 	/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
++	/* this shouldn't matter if its hpn or not - cjr */
+ 	nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket",
+ 	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
+ 	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+@@ -2363,7 +2364,8 @@
+ 	channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
+ 	    fdout, fdin, fderr,
+ 	    ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
+-	    1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
++	    1, is_tty,
++	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sftp.1 openssh-8.7p1/sftp.1
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sftp.1	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp.1	2021-10-24 07:56:04.867030041 +0200
+@@ -295,7 +295,8 @@
+ Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+ Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
+ but will increase memory usage.
+-The default is 64 outstanding requests.
++The default is 256 outstanding requests providing for 8MB
++of outstanding data with a 32KB buffer.
+ .It Fl r
+ Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
+ Note that
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sftp-client.c openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sftp-client.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.868030043 +0200
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
+ #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN	32768
+ 
+ /* Default number of concurrent outstanding requests */
+-#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	64
++#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	256
+ 
+ /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
+ #define MIN_READ_SIZE	512
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_api.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh_api.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_api.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_api.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.869030045 +0200
+@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@
+ 	char *cp;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0)
++	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_RELEASE)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshbuf.h openssh-8.7p1/sshbuf.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshbuf.h	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshbuf.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.870030047 +0200
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 
+-#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0x8000000	/* Hard maximum size */
++#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0xF000000	/* Hard maximum size 256MB */
+ #define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX		0x100000	/* Max child buffers */
+ #define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM	(16384 / 8)	/* Max bignum *bytes* */
+ #define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT	((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.872834206 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.871030049 +0200
+@@ -1056,6 +1056,10 @@
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'T':
+ 			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
++			/* ensure that the user doesn't try to backdoor a */
++			/* null cipher switch on an interactive session */
++			/* so explicitly disable it no matter what */
++			options.none_switch=0;
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'o':
+ 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
+@@ -1784,6 +1788,8 @@
+ 	setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
+ }
+ 
++extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
++
+ /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
+ static void
+ fork_postauth(void)
+@@ -2101,6 +2107,79 @@
+ 	    NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++hpn_options_init(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	/*
++	 * We need to check to see if what they want to do about buffer
++	 * sizes here. In a hpn to nonhpn connection we want to limit
++	 * the window size to something reasonable in case the far side
++	 * has the large window bug. In hpn to hpn connection we want to
++	 * use the max window size but allow the user to override it
++	 * lastly if they disabled hpn then use the ssh std window size.
++	 *
++	 * So why don't we just do a getsockopt() here and set the
++	 * ssh window to that? In the case of a autotuning receive
++	 * window the window would get stuck at the initial buffer
++	 * size generally less than 96k. Therefore we need to set the
++	 * maximum ssh window size to the maximum hpn buffer size
++	 * unless the user has specifically set the tcprcvbufpoll
++	 * to no. In which case we *can* just set the window to the
++	 * minimum of the hpn buffer size and tcp receive buffer size.
++	 */
++
++	if (tty_flag)
++		options.hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++	else
++		options.hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
++
++	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW) {
++		debug("HPN to Non-HPN connection");
++	} else {
++		debug("HPN to HPN connection");
++		int sock, socksize;
++		socklen_t socksizelen;
++		if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll <= 0) {
++			sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++			socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++			getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++				   &socksize, &socksizelen);
++			close(sock);
++			debug("socksize %d", socksize);
++			options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++			debug("HPNBufferSize set to TCP RWIN: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++		} else {
++			if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0) {
++				/*
++				 * Create a socket but don't connect it:
++				 * we use that the get the rcv socket size
++				 */
++				sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++				/*
++				 * If they are using the tcp_rcv_buf option,
++				 * attempt to set the buffer size to that.
++				 */
++				if (options.tcp_rcv_buf) {
++					socksizelen = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf);
++					setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++						   &options.tcp_rcv_buf, socksizelen);
++				}
++				socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++				getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++					   &socksize, &socksizelen);
++				close(sock);
++				debug("socksize %d", socksize);
++				options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++				debug("HPNBufferSize set to user TCPRcvBuf: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++			}
++		}
++	}
++
++	debug("Final hpn_buffer_size = %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++
++	channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
++}
++
+ /* open new channel for a session */
+ static int
+ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2119,9 +2198,11 @@
+ 	if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
+ 		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
+ 
+-	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++	window = options.hpn_buffer_size;
++
+ 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ 	if (tty_flag) {
++		window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+ 		window >>= 1;
+ 		packetmax >>= 1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2132,6 +2213,11 @@
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self);
+ 
++	if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll > 0 && !options.hpn_disabled) {
++		c->dynamic_window = 1;
++		debug("Enabled Dynamic Window Scaling");
++	}
++
+ 	channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
+ 	if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+ 		channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self,
+@@ -2146,6 +2232,13 @@
+ 	int r, id = -1;
+ 	char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * We need to initialize this early because the forwarding logic below
++	 * might open channels that use the hpn buffer sizes.  We can't send a
++	 * window of -1 (the default) to the server as it breaks things.
++	 */
++	hpn_options_init(ssh);
++
+ 	/* XXX should be pre-session */
+ 	if (!options.control_persist)
+ 		ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.873834208 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-10-24 08:06:47.586411958 +0200
+@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+ /*
++ * tty_flag is set in ssh.c. Use this in ssh_userauth2:
++ * if it is set, then prevent the switch to the null cipher.
++ */
++
++extern int tty_flag;
++
++/*
+  * SSH2 key exchange
+  */
+ 
+@@ -212,6 +219,8 @@
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
++static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
++static const char *myproposal_default[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ void
+ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+@@ -225,6 +234,10 @@
+ 	char *gss_host = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
++	memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
++
++	memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
++
+ 	xxx_host = host;
+ 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
+@@ -569,6 +582,53 @@
+ 
+ 	if (!authctxt.success)
+ 		fatal("Authentication failed.");
++
++	/*
++	 * If the user wants to use the none cipher and/or none mac, do it post authentication
++	 * and only if the right conditions are met -- both of the NONE commands
++	 * must be true and there must be no tty allocated.
++	 */
++	if (options.none_switch == 1 && options.none_enabled == 1) {
++		if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */
++			debug("Requesting none rekeying...");
++			memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
++			myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
++			myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
++			fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER!!!\n");
++			/* NONEMAC can only be used in context of the NONE CIPHER */
++			if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
++				myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
++				myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
++				fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE MAC\n");
++			}
++			kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal);
++			packet_request_rekeying();
++		} else {
++			/* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */
++			debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated");
++			fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
++		}
++	}
++
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
++		/* if we are using aes-ctr there can be issues in either a fork or sandbox
++		 * so the initial aes-ctr is defined to point to the original single process
++		 * evp. After authentication we'll be past the fork and the sandboxed privsep
++		 * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we
++		 * then force a rekey
++		 */
++		const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh);
++
++		/* only do this for the ctr cipher. otherwise gcm mode breaks. Don't know why though */
++		if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) {
++			debug("Single to Multithread CTR cipher swap - client request");
++			cipher_reset_multithreaded();
++			packet_request_rekeying();
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+ 		verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.794834032 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.873030054 +0200
+@@ -345,6 +345,30 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
++ * Set TCP receive buffer if requested.
++ * Note: tuning needs to happen after the socket is
++ * created but before the connection happens
++ * so winscale is negotiated properly -cjr
++ */
++static void
++ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(int sock)
++{
++	void *buf = (void *)&options.tcp_rcv_buf;
++	int sz = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf);
++	int socksize;
++	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
++
++	debug("setsockopt Attempting to set SO_RCVBUF to %d", options.tcp_rcv_buf);
++	if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, buf, sz) >= 0) {
++		getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &socksize, &socksizelen);
++		debug("setsockopt SO_RCVBUF: %.100s %d", strerror(errno), socksize);
++	}
++	else
++		error("Couldn't set socket receive buffer to %d: %.100s",
++		    options.tcp_rcv_buf, strerror(errno));
++}
++
++/*
+  * Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection.
+  */
+ static int
+@@ -366,6 +390,9 @@
+ 	}
+ 	fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ 
++	if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0)
++		ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(sock);
++
+ 	/* Use interactive QOS (if specified) until authentication completed */
+ 	if (options.ip_qos_interactive != INT_MAX)
+ 		set_sock_tos(sock, options.ip_qos_interactive);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.874834211 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2021-10-24 08:00:18.185586742 +0200
+@@ -1110,6 +1110,8 @@
+ 	int ret, listen_sock;
+ 	struct addrinfo *ai;
+ 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
++	int socksize;
++	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
+ 
+ 	for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ 		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+@@ -1155,6 +1157,11 @@
+ 
+ 		debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+ 
++		getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++		    &socksize, &socksizelen);
++		debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize);
++		debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++
+ 		/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+ 		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+@@ -1854,6 +1861,19 @@
+ 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ 
++	if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
++		char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers;
++		xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers);
++		free(old_ciphers);
++
++		/* only enable the none MAC in context of the none cipher -cjr */
++		if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
++			char *old_macs = options.macs;
++			xasprintf(&options.macs, "%s,none", old_macs);
++			free(old_macs);
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	/* Check that options are sensible */
+ 	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
+ 	    (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
+@@ -2301,6 +2321,9 @@
+ 	    rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
+ 	free(laddr);
+ 
++	/* set the HPN options for the child */
++	channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ 	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2413,6 +2436,25 @@
+ 	/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
+ 	notify_hostkeys(ssh);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
++		/* if we are using aes-ctr there can be issues in either a fork or sandbox
++		 * so the initial aes-ctr is defined to point ot the original single process
++		 * evp. After authentication we'll be past the fork and the sandboxed privsep
++		 * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we
++		 * then force a rekey
++		 */
++		const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(the_active_state);
++
++		/* only rekey if necessary. If we don't do this gcm mode cipher breaks */
++		if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) {
++			debug("Single to Multithreaded CTR cipher swap - server request");
++			cipher_reset_multithreaded();
++			packet_request_rekeying();
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Start session. */
+ 	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
+ 
+@@ -2486,6 +2528,11 @@
+ 	struct kex *kex;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	if (options.none_enabled == 1)
++		debug("WARNING: None cipher enabled");
++	if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1)
++		debug("WARNING: None MAC enabled");
++
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config	2021-10-24 07:54:36.874834211 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config	2021-10-24 07:56:04.875030058 +0200
+@@ -127,6 +127,28 @@
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 
++# the following are HPN related configuration options
++# tcp receive buffer polling. disable in non autotuning kernels
++#TcpRcvBufPoll yes
++
++# disable hpn performance boosts
++#HPNDisabled no
++
++# buffer size for hpn to non-hpn connections
++#HPNBufferSize 2048
++
++# allow the use of the none cipher
++#NoneEnabled no
++
++# allow the use of the none MAC
++#NoneMacEnabled no
++
++# Disable MT-AES-CTR cipher on server
++# * needed for GSI-OpenSSH 7.4p1 because it's broken on the server side there
++# * useful for modern processors with AES-NI instructions making the stock
++#   AES-CTR cipher faster than the MT-AES-CTR cipher
++DisableMTAES yes
++
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+ #	X11Forwarding no
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h openssh-8.7p1/version.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.876834215 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/version.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.876030061 +0200
+@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+ #define GSI_PORTABLE	"c-GSI"
++#define SSH_HPN		"-hpn15v2"
+ #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \
+-			GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION
++			GSI_VERSION SSH_HPN KRB5_VERSION
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bca544
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.169 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.170 2021/09/26 14:01:03 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+  * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+ # include <paths.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+ #include <net/if.h>
+@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 		}
+ 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ 
++		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
++		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
++			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
++			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
+ 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+ 			    strerror(errno));
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index cbbba40..d393884 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz) = 9854eda0b773c64c9f1f74844ce466b2b42ee8845f58ad062b73141d617af944fa4ebafdf72069f400106d2c2bd0a69c92fe805ec1fc26d4f0faadf06c3fbbe6
-SHA512 (openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc) = ea75d7fe350fd1761ee5490b222249e9b8915b2a02a1d41979195f15d239def387e4c6467362ab9515d517087750fa66bc368f5baa15c325502f725172631967
+SHA512 (openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz) = 08c81024d9e1248abfda6cc874886ff5ae916669b93cd6aff640e0614ee8cbcbc3fe87a9ce47136b6443ddbb1168b114367c74e117551905994e1a7e3fa2c0c2
+SHA512 (openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc) = 08b4bda855ca3ef202c271f1c0e3486082b93d1009a794d020e7ba223978bc87bf34b1fbccaae3379a47639bd849935fdaaf63bdb781d0a44625066ccf00fbfc
 SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21