From be18992d0630149403bfae5882601cf01a7d4eea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2010 14:16:00 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit
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Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds
checking on the passed-in iocb array:

       if (unlikely(nr < 0))
               return -EINVAL;

       if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp)))))
               return -EFAULT;                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the
number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in
the long.  This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as
returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a
return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in.

Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 fs/aio.c |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 02a2c93..b84a769 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -1639,6 +1639,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(io_submit, aio_context_t, ctx_id, long, nr,
 	if (unlikely(nr < 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
+		nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
+
 	if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-- 
1.7.2.3