Blob Blame Raw
From: David Howells <>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2010 08:59:51 +0000 (+0100)
Subject: KEYS: Fix bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() if parent has no session keyring

KEYS: Fix bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() if parent has no session keyring

Fix a bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() whereby it tries to check the ownership
of the parent process's session keyring whether or not the parent has a session
keyring [CVE-2010-2960].

This results in the following oops:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0
  IP: [<ffffffff811ae4dd>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x251/0x443
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff811ae2f3>] ? keyctl_session_to_parent+0x67/0x443
   [<ffffffff8109d286>] ? __do_fault+0x24b/0x3d0
   [<ffffffff811af98c>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb8
   [<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

if the parent process has no session keyring.

If the system is using pam_keyinit then it mostly protected against this as all
processes derived from a login will have inherited the session keyring created
by pam_keyinit during the log in procedure.

To test this, pam_keyinit calls need to be commented out in /etc/pam.d/.

Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <>
Acked-by: Tavis Ormandy <>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <>

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 3868c67..60924f6 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1305,7 +1305,8 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 		goto not_permitted;
 	/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
-	if (pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
+	if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
+	     pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) ||
 	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
 		goto not_permitted;