From 216317b0de0392dfdd2a547fb66348dfb0c7d322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Bolle Date: Mar 11 2019 17:30:38 +0000 Subject: Drop six orphaned patches Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle --- diff --git a/0001-Correct-warning-with-gcc9.patch b/0001-Correct-warning-with-gcc9.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9a5e942..0000000 --- a/0001-Correct-warning-with-gcc9.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -From 0de1315ee843713bafb9a59bc040a024f688c62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Laura Abbott -Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:56:47 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Correct warning with gcc9 - -Suggested from Arnd - -Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott ---- - include/linux/module.h | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h -index 8fa38d3e7538..f2a24b59cca4 100644 ---- a/include/linux/module.h -+++ b/include/linux/module.h -@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ extern void cleanup_module(void); - #define module_init(initfn) \ - static inline initcall_t __maybe_unused __inittest(void) \ - { return initfn; } \ -- int init_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#initfn))); -+ int init_module(void) __attribute__((cold, alias(#initfn))); - - /* This is only required if you want to be unloadable. */ - #define module_exit(exitfn) \ - static inline exitcall_t __maybe_unused __exittest(void) \ - { return exitfn; } \ -- void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#exitfn))); -+ void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((cold, alias(#exitfn))); - - #endif - --- -2.20.1 - diff --git a/Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch b/Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ebabac6..0000000 --- a/Add-option-to-automatically-enforce-module-signature.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,217 +0,0 @@ -From 6b6203b92cfb457a0669a9c87a29b360405bffc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthew Garrett -Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 10/20] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures - when in Secure Boot mode - -UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will -only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also -require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option -that enforces this automatically when enabled. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett ---- - Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++ - arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 ++++++ - arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 +- - arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++ - include/linux/module.h | 6 ++++ - kernel/module.c | 7 ++++ - 7 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt -index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644 ---- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt -+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt -@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning - 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) - 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer - (below) -+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled -+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware - 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders - 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures - 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table -diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig -index bada636d1065..d666ef8b616c 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig -@@ -1786,6 +1786,17 @@ config EFI_MIXED - - If unsure, say N. - -+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE -+ def_bool n -+ depends on EFI -+ prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled" -+ ---help--- -+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the -+ firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain -+ use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed. -+ Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement -+ when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. -+ - config SECCOMP - def_bool y - prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" -diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -index cc69e37548db..ebc85c1eefd6 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include "../string.h" - #include "eboot.h" -@@ -537,6 +538,67 @@ static void setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params) - efi_call_early(free_pool, pci_handle); - } - -+static int get_secure_boot(void) -+{ -+ u8 sb, setup; -+ unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb); -+ efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; -+ efi_status_t status; -+ -+ status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable, -+ L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb); -+ -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (sb == 0) -+ return 0; -+ -+ -+ status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable, -+ L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, -+ &setup); -+ -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (setup == 1) -+ return 0; -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+ -+/* -+ * See if we have Graphics Output Protocol -+ */ -+static efi_status_t setup_gop(struct screen_info *si, efi_guid_t *proto, -+ unsigned long size) -+{ -+ efi_status_t status; -+ void **gop_handle = NULL; -+ -+ status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, -+ size, (void **)&gop_handle); -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) -+ return status; -+ -+ status = efi_call_early(locate_handle, -+ EFI_LOCATE_BY_PROTOCOL, -+ proto, NULL, &size, gop_handle); -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) -+ goto free_handle; -+ -+ if (efi_early->is64) -+ status = setup_gop64(si, proto, size, gop_handle); -+ else -+ status = setup_gop32(si, proto, size, gop_handle); -+ -+free_handle: -+ efi_call_early(free_pool, gop_handle); -+ return status; -+} -+ - static efi_status_t - setup_uga32(void **uga_handle, unsigned long size, u32 *width, u32 *height) - { -@@ -1094,6 +1156,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c, - else - setup_boot_services32(efi_early); - -+ sanitize_boot_params(boot_params); -+ -+ boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(); -+ - setup_graphics(boot_params); - - setup_efi_pci(boot_params); -diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h -index c18ce67495fa..2b3e5427097b 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h -@@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ struct boot_params { - __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */ - __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */ - __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */ -- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */ -+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */ -+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */ - /* - * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S. - * -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -index bbfbca5fea0c..d40e961753c9 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -@@ -1160,6 +1160,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) - - io_delay_init(); - -+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE -+ if (boot_params.secure_boot) { -+ enforce_signed_modules(); -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* - * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration. - */ -diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h -index 05bd6c989a0c..32327704e18d 100644 ---- a/include/linux/module.h -+++ b/include/linux/module.h -@@ -260,6 +260,12 @@ extern const typeof(name) __mod_##type##__##name##_device_table \ - - struct notifier_block; - -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -+extern void enforce_signed_modules(void); -+#else -+static inline void enforce_signed_modules(void) {}; -+#endif -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES - - extern int modules_disabled; /* for sysctl */ -diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c -index cb864505d020..cb1f1da69bf4 100644 ---- a/kernel/module.c -+++ b/kernel/module.c -@@ -4285,6 +4285,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod, - EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout); - #endif - -+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -+void enforce_signed_modules(void) -+{ -+ sig_enforce = true; -+} -+#endif -+ - bool secure_modules(void) - { - #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG --- -2.9.3 - diff --git a/efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch b/efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c440103..0000000 --- a/efi-Add-EFI_SECURE_BOOT-bit.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From a8883aff32f1e15b65e210462804aa2a9ab9a0b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer -Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400 -Subject: [PATCH 13/20] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit - -UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit -for use with efi_enabled. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer ---- - arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ - include/linux/efi.h | 1 + - 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -index d40e961753c9..b93183336674 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c -@@ -1162,7 +1162,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) - - #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE - if (boot_params.secure_boot) { -+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags); - enforce_signed_modules(); -+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); - } - #endif - -diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h -index ce943d5accfd..5af91b58afae 100644 ---- a/include/linux/efi.h -+++ b/include/linux/efi.h -@@ -1046,6 +1046,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *); - #define EFI_ARCH_1 7 /* First arch-specific bit */ - #define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */ - #define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */ -+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 10 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_EFI - /* --- -2.9.3 - diff --git a/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch b/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 761a66f..0000000 --- a/efi-Disable-secure-boot-if-shim-is-in-insecure-mode.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -From d687d79620ea20511b2dbf77e74fdcf4d94981f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Josh Boyer -Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 12/20] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode - -A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of -images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called -MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the -user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable -secure boot mode if that variable is set. - -Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer ---- - arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -index ebc85c1eefd6..50e027f388d8 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c -@@ -540,8 +540,9 @@ static void setup_efi_pci(struct boot_params *params) - - static int get_secure_boot(void) - { -- u8 sb, setup; -+ u8 sb, setup, moksbstate; - unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb); -+ u32 attr; - efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; - efi_status_t status; - -@@ -565,6 +566,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(void) - if (setup == 1) - return 0; - -+ /* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode. If so, and the variable -+ * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that. -+ */ -+ var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; -+ status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable, -+ L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize, -+ &moksbstate); -+ -+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ -+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) -+ return 1; -+ -+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) { -+ if (moksbstate == 1) -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - return 1; - } - --- -2.9.3 - diff --git a/include-linux-module.h-mark-init-cleanup_module-aliases-as-__cold.patch b/include-linux-module.h-mark-init-cleanup_module-aliases-as-__cold.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f350e6f..0000000 --- a/include-linux-module.h-mark-init-cleanup_module-aliases-as-__cold.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,149 +0,0 @@ -From patchwork Wed Jan 23 17:37:07 2019 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -X-Patchwork-Submitter: Miguel Ojeda -X-Patchwork-Id: 1034989 -Return-Path: -Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) - by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A7D50C282C0 - for ; Wed, 23 Jan 2019 17:38:31 +0000 (UTC) -Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) - by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CE1F20870 - for ; Wed, 23 Jan 2019 17:38:31 +0000 (UTC) -Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; - dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com - header.b="qdRA7oPl" -Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand - id S1726152AbfAWRi3 (ORCPT - ); - Wed, 23 Jan 2019 12:38:29 -0500 -Received: from mail-wm1-f67.google.com ([209.85.128.67]:52719 "EHLO - mail-wm1-f67.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org - with ESMTP id S1725896AbfAWRi3 (ORCPT - ); - Wed, 23 Jan 2019 12:38:29 -0500 -Received: by mail-wm1-f67.google.com with SMTP id m1so242485wml.2 - for ; - Wed, 23 Jan 2019 09:38:27 -0800 (PST) -DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; - d=gmail.com; s=20161025; - h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version:content-disposition - :user-agent; - bh=1joVTuHcQFv5PhIFvZBlpu1jeKwRQi2Ty1HKsqzNx+0=; - b=qdRA7oPloipduZyiYE/EECaW/vCZup5EXmE5a1XgE9mc55H+TTPNNRTt44QJbQgbnn - wTNksIkBx8Gs0k3pJI9QIDO2J5AipLN8OOoxkPiDIJtAC8buHzQrdTxFG/4Uxw7tRf8X - A6PNyuUGr+02itkYIlALzEuDHvZna8yZx0zCeCDXF2IrGt0NBHZVTzz1XfX8LeQlCh9L - hleyVdDQnDvwxA7dXqrA4UugXUlEqT8HnIAUdg8+/xubsXOSz9T/22+zc9pZ9uSHm2uq - DpO/hgx1e5DONDN8T+sjjKCO0LnJ8Z9ZS0Huf+8W2XH1uxo48jSgXUOsygPQ36+8R/7t - ng6Q== -X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; - d=1e100.net; s=20161025; - h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version - :content-disposition:user-agent; - bh=1joVTuHcQFv5PhIFvZBlpu1jeKwRQi2Ty1HKsqzNx+0=; - b=ZQrXdTIYsCSUGNJS1C0dn+gibvoSHb2o+kcUMGTbH6G2tag3Zy4vnfIcBT0xhmvPLq - 5pU8jskcufXp0qQ0sivNsBpJYJCbsqqiChoivTs9WC4rxoM5G62Wi0pAZL59fGGDnmyV - xjSTkSoxe8CiB+26BDzg52zkynkWC2v0OHgaM7/1lTeTqNxdYIvQ+hC4LXdy40bAP64/ - JIC1nET+KwewpPHJQc2u87ah4xp6nEjzO/4wTP3CUi4zbZPTU17oH007IAXhObL7JO0r - XkRBJAgpcTKexfAJB7HnAUc4KLSv5L5Uz+Z14TusskTuK6njE11PE9GSJ7Z7lqufqJNZ - Z4GQ== -X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukdaW+EjUkHLIrpaLWRYCoF9XYWdpSiPfNnJgu3VB9CW8t9xYlZJ - NDU6hJ2AXvnDR+awfdjm6IU= -X-Google-Smtp-Source: - ALg8bN59XklA0HTVEDaLFI+8dguNdipIQWTlgIi23N78PjaLBzniLMXowf2nCpIra7boIidjtFvfYg== -X-Received: by 2002:a1c:7c05:: with SMTP id x5mr3525198wmc.54.1548265106544; - Wed, 23 Jan 2019 09:38:26 -0800 (PST) -Received: from gmail.com (79.108.96.12.dyn.user.ono.com. [79.108.96.12]) - by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id - r77sm74200791wmd.22.2019.01.23.09.38.25 - (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); - Wed, 23 Jan 2019 09:38:25 -0800 (PST) -Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 18:37:07 +0100 -From: Miguel Ojeda -To: Jessica Yu -Cc: Laura Abbott , - Martin Sebor , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org -Subject: [PATCH] include/linux/module.h: mark init/cleanup_module aliases as - __cold -Message-ID: <20190123173707.GA16603@gmail.com> -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii -Content-Disposition: inline -User-Agent: elm/2 -Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org -Precedence: bulk -List-ID: -X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org - -The upcoming GCC 9 release adds the -Wmissing-attributes warnings -(enabled by -Wall), which trigger for all the init/cleanup_module -aliases in the kernel (defined by the module_init/exit macros), -ending up being very noisy. - -These aliases point to the __init/__exit functions of a module, -which are defined as __cold (among other attributes). However, -the aliases themselves do not have the __cold attribute. - -Since the compiler behaves differently when compiling a __cold -function as well as when compiling paths leading to calls -to __cold functions, the warning is trying to point out -the possibly-forgotten attribute in the alias. - -In order to keep the warning enabled, we choose to silence -the warning by marking the aliases as __cold. This is possible -marking either the extern declaration, the definition, or both. -In order to avoid changing the behavior of callers, we do it -only in the definition of the aliases (since those are not -seen by any other TU). - -Suggested-by: Martin Sebor -Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda ---- -Note that an alternative is using the new copy attribute -introduced by GCC 9 (Martin told me about it, as well as the -new warning). - -What I am concerned about using __copy is that I am not sure -we should be copying all the attributes (even if some are -blacklisted by the copy itself), since: - - We have unknown-to-GCC attributes (e.g. from plugins). - - We wouldn't enjoy the fix for older compilers - (e.g. if the fix had an actual impact). - -So here I took the conservative approach for the moment, -and we can discuss/apply whether another solution is best. - -Jessica: please review what I explain in the commit message. -Do we actually want the __cold attribute in the declaration -as well? If yes, AFAIK, GCC would assume paths that end up -calling the __init/__exit functions are not meant to be taken -(but when we are asked to load modules, that is the expected -path, no?). - -I will put this in the compiler-attributes tree and get -some time in linux-next, unless you want to pick it up! - - include/linux/module.h | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h -index 8fa38d3e7538..c4e805e87628 100644 ---- a/include/linux/module.h -+++ b/include/linux/module.h -@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ extern void cleanup_module(void); - #define module_init(initfn) \ - static inline initcall_t __maybe_unused __inittest(void) \ - { return initfn; } \ -- int init_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#initfn))); -+ int init_module(void) __cold __attribute__((alias(#initfn))); - - /* This is only required if you want to be unloadable. */ - #define module_exit(exitfn) \ - static inline exitcall_t __maybe_unused __exittest(void) \ - { return exitfn; } \ -- void cleanup_module(void) __attribute__((alias(#exitfn))); -+ void cleanup_module(void) __cold __attribute__((alias(#exitfn))); - - #endif - diff --git a/lib-crc32.c-mark-crc32_le_base-__crc32c_le_base-aliases-as-__pure.patch b/lib-crc32.c-mark-crc32_le_base-__crc32c_le_base-aliases-as-__pure.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2010603..0000000 --- a/lib-crc32.c-mark-crc32_le_base-__crc32c_le_base-aliases-as-__pure.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,124 +0,0 @@ -From patchwork Thu Jan 24 15:44:20 2019 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -X-Patchwork-Submitter: Miguel Ojeda -X-Patchwork-Id: 1035252 -Return-Path: -Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) - by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95925C282C3 - for ; Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:44:28 +0000 (UTC) -Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) - by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6368521872 - for ; Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:44:28 +0000 (UTC) -Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; - dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com - header.b="DEOxuN9k" -Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand - id S1728590AbfAXPo1 (ORCPT - ); - Thu, 24 Jan 2019 10:44:27 -0500 -Received: from mail-wm1-f68.google.com ([209.85.128.68]:37788 "EHLO - mail-wm1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org - with ESMTP id S1727649AbfAXPo0 (ORCPT - ); - Thu, 24 Jan 2019 10:44:26 -0500 -Received: by mail-wm1-f68.google.com with SMTP id g67so3548002wmd.2 - for ; - Thu, 24 Jan 2019 07:44:25 -0800 (PST) -DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; - d=gmail.com; s=20161025; - h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version:content-disposition - :user-agent; - bh=JeyLhzrsCRzzO/4nbb0LJSQxILVpgC++VcQqugacalc=; - b=DEOxuN9kV3A3qQ3ere0UjnfgT3DE1Gc4z/52Qty46F/mbpPja2OkXvtPJ15RK9/h4Z - AG1fdkKf/GjCRaBidO9BLWwcoq0uiTV69J0KR0rF67QR9zxgGVEl8fu6s/ZmtKnnIdF4 - AysPfOHY+/MwlcB6UOzADtS69SDUYTsxDxOfHBj/FjnS7WmNetq8ae17VvRdpd/JEWtE - M58OhgBYmckFYuVXQTEEhpm8w6TIefPA5S3r3KeUuXclMeqJ07pU1vJWK7tdTp7sIeAv - xYgGq49/NBPkUl4l+LdwVBwp+o6pvUfh2w9zBQW67xZu6rn/j500BV8xdubxQqHTauSM - oQPw== -X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; - d=1e100.net; s=20161025; - h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version - :content-disposition:user-agent; - bh=JeyLhzrsCRzzO/4nbb0LJSQxILVpgC++VcQqugacalc=; - b=twekOdboep908h8e5de5qIQIgDuUrOYeS/p8s5bh3AYpMD9r3CIJtanHSCWnFCsPIw - /hesYDvbpVSiQTI1afBap2tw2ugq2aL2Sur2/9BhWE5So2HlVMlN5M6S8ccs6IK6Ldzh - +wxWJnq7dnvwbpMLcT3mASpdlEUPTaVTA7AazIssYrIDY9ucJA4vfYUemvvTtKn2tovO - lJjVDsOwv7/3P9XphLneTUXTI1ZD9soUX/qpt1m4n4BAme1tHfmbAL4cceRfMf7eFKhh - t3iRpkh/6ZHMGw0moeXPkTB+WTDhA7MgsmQA/X6tmPfjfMQsEo+OKRUBtFuuVDY5wzSf - eX7Q== -X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukcM8ZahlKLufK0H1V2XtT0GIN899FyU1V2PJM0+/GfK3XvzMW2n - o0kPoin07YrKIK/Zh71qAxI= -X-Google-Smtp-Source: - ALg8bN7upuyKWCD/cTB9FAkdcEyU6dlTStUcg49cEAv640NugO83fRipoQ9X2YGpIogSFxA7BbHmeQ== -X-Received: by 2002:a1c:bbd6:: with SMTP id l205mr2979576wmf.97.1548344665032; - Thu, 24 Jan 2019 07:44:25 -0800 (PST) -Received: from gmail.com (79.108.96.12.dyn.user.ono.com. [79.108.96.12]) - by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id - k128sm80898610wmd.37.2019.01.24.07.44.23 - (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); - Thu, 24 Jan 2019 07:44:24 -0800 (PST) -Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 16:44:20 +0100 -From: Miguel Ojeda -To: Krzysztof Kozlowski -Cc: Laura Abbott , - Herbert Xu , - Ard Biesheuvel , - Catalin Marinas , - Martin Sebor , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org -Subject: [PATCH] lib/crc32.c: mark crc32_le_base/__crc32c_le_base aliases as - __pure -Message-ID: <20190124154420.GA11471@gmail.com> -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii -Content-Disposition: inline -User-Agent: elm/2 -Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org -Precedence: bulk -List-ID: -X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org - -The upcoming GCC 9 release extends the -Wmissing-attributes warnings -(enabled by -Wall) to C and aliases: it warns when particular function -attributes are missing in the aliases but not in their target. - -In particular, it triggers here because crc32_le_base/__crc32c_le_base -aren't __pure while their target crc32_le/__crc32c_le are. - -These aliases are used by architectures as a fallback in accelerated -versions of CRC32. See commit 9784d82db3eb ("lib/crc32: make core crc32() -routines weak so they can be overridden"). - -Therefore, being fallbacks, it is likely that even if the aliases -were called from C, there wouldn't be any optimizations possible. -Currently, the only user is arm64, which calls this from asm. - -Still, marking the aliases as __pure makes sense and is a good idea -for documentation purposes and possible future optimizations, -which also silences the warning. - -Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda ---- -I am picking this up through the compiler-attributes tree -and putting it into -next along with the other cleanup -for -Wmissing-attributes (unless some other maintainer wants it). - - lib/crc32.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/crc32.c b/lib/crc32.c -index 45b1d67a1767..4a20455d1f61 100644 ---- a/lib/crc32.c -+++ b/lib/crc32.c -@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ u32 __pure __weak __crc32c_le(u32 crc, unsigned char const *p, size_t len) - EXPORT_SYMBOL(crc32_le); - EXPORT_SYMBOL(__crc32c_le); - --u32 crc32_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(crc32_le); --u32 __crc32c_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(__crc32c_le); -+u32 __pure crc32_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(crc32_le); -+u32 __pure __crc32c_le_base(u32, unsigned char const *, size_t) __alias(__crc32c_le); - - /* - * This multiplies the polynomials x and y modulo the given modulus.