diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec index c4e53f9..209dab9 100644 --- a/kernel.spec +++ b/kernel.spec @@ -776,6 +776,9 @@ Patch26140: ext4-ignore-journal-checksum-on-remount-don-t-fail.patch #rhbz 1190947 Patch26141: Bluetooth-ath3k-Add-support-Atheros-AR5B195-combo-Mi.patch +#CVE-2015-1421 rhbz 1196581 1196595 +Patch26142: net-sctp-fix-slab-corruption-from-use-after-free-on-.patch + # END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS %endif @@ -1515,6 +1518,9 @@ ApplyPatch ext4-ignore-journal-checksum-on-remount-don-t-fail.patch #rhbz 1190947 ApplyPatch Bluetooth-ath3k-Add-support-Atheros-AR5B195-combo-Mi.patch +#CVE-2015-1421 rhbz 1196581 1196595 +ApplyPatch net-sctp-fix-slab-corruption-from-use-after-free-on-.patch + %if 0%{?aarch64patches} ApplyPatch kernel-arm64.patch %ifnarch aarch64 # this is stupid, but i want to notice before secondary koji does. @@ -2333,6 +2339,9 @@ fi # ||----w | # || || %changelog +* Thu Feb 26 2015 Josh Boyer +- CVE-2015-1421 sctp: slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions (rhbz 1196581 1196595) + * Wed Feb 25 2015 Josh Boyer - Add support for AR5B195 devices from Alexander Ploumistos (rhbz 1190947) diff --git a/net-sctp-fix-slab-corruption-from-use-after-free-on-.patch b/net-sctp-fix-slab-corruption-from-use-after-free-on-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65796db --- /dev/null +++ b/net-sctp-fix-slab-corruption-from-use-after-free-on-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 18:26:54 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT + collisions + +When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as +already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit +auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally +still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to +have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ... + +[ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff +[ 533.913657] IP: [] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230 +[ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0 +[ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP +[ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...] +[ 534.939704] Call Trace: +[ 534.951833] [] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 +[ 534.984213] [] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 +[ 535.015025] [] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170 +[ 535.045661] [] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0 +[ 535.074593] [] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50 +[ 535.105239] [] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp] +[ 535.138606] [] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0 +[ 535.166848] [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b + +... or depending on the the application, for example this one: + +[ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff +[ 1370.026506] IP: [] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0 +[ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0 +[ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP +[ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...] +[ 1370.963431] Call Trace: +[ 1370.974632] [] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 +[ 1371.000863] [] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 +[ 1371.027154] [] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170 +[ 1371.054679] [] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 +[ 1371.080183] [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b + +With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten: + +[ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten +[ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b +[ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494 +[ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566 +[ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310 +[ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] +[ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp] +[ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp] +[ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...] +[ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494 +[ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8 +[ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230 +[ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40 +[ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp] +[ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp] +[ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp] + +Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at +heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice +when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again +from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on +the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation +of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected +at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation). + +Reference counting of auth keys revisited: + +Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations +in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being +added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached +and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds +a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which +keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc +or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and +the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped. + +User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct +sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or +adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes +with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old +sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt() +on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either +endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places) +sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(). + +sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's +and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key +directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops +the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we +eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with +intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in +sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to +set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). + +To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret +material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track +of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76 +("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of +this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures +being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly +on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are +being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount +of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is +to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics. + +Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich +Acked-by: Neil Horman +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +--- + net/sctp/associola.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c +index f791edd64d6c..26d06dbcc1c8 100644 +--- a/net/sctp/associola.c ++++ b/net/sctp/associola.c +@@ -1182,7 +1182,6 @@ void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc, + asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = new->peer.peer_hmacs; + new->peer.peer_hmacs = NULL; + +- sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key); + sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC); + } + +-- +2.1.0 +