diff --git a/KEYS-Fix-ASN.1-indefinite-length-object-parsing.patch b/KEYS-Fix-ASN.1-indefinite-length-object-parsing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..957de09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/KEYS-Fix-ASN.1-indefinite-length-object-parsing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+From 23c8a812dc3c621009e4f0e5342aa4e2ede1ceaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 11:03:12 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsing
+
+This fixes CVE-2016-0758.
+
+In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted,
+it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added
+to the cursor.  With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check:
+
+	datalen - dp < 2
+
+may then fail due to integer overflow.
+
+Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining
+data in both places a definite length is determined.
+
+Whilst we're at it, make the following changes:
+
+ (1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity
+     of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that
+     variable is assumed to be (size_t).
+
+ (2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the
+     integer 0.
+
+ (3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of:
+
+	for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
+
+     since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n.
+
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
+Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/asn1_decoder.c | 16 +++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+index 2b3f46c049d4..554522934c44 100644
+--- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c
++++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ next_tag:
+ 
+ 	/* Extract a tag from the data */
+ 	tag = data[dp++];
+-	if (tag == 0) {
++	if (tag == ASN1_EOC) {
+ 		/* It appears to be an EOC. */
+ 		if (data[dp++] != 0)
+ 			goto invalid_eoc;
+@@ -96,10 +96,8 @@ next_tag:
+ 
+ 	/* Extract the length */
+ 	len = data[dp++];
+-	if (len <= 0x7f) {
+-		dp += len;
+-		goto next_tag;
+-	}
++	if (len <= 0x7f)
++		goto check_length;
+ 
+ 	if (unlikely(len == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
+ 		/* Indefinite length */
+@@ -110,14 +108,18 @@ next_tag:
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	n = len - 0x80;
+-	if (unlikely(n > sizeof(size_t) - 1))
++	if (unlikely(n > sizeof(len) - 1))
+ 		goto length_too_long;
+ 	if (unlikely(n > datalen - dp))
+ 		goto data_overrun_error;
+-	for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
++	len = 0;
++	for (; n > 0; n--) {
+ 		len <<= 8;
+ 		len |= data[dp++];
+ 	}
++check_length:
++	if (len > datalen - dp)
++		goto data_overrun_error;
+ 	dp += len;
+ 	goto next_tag;
+ 
+-- 
+2.5.5
+
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 2b6df4d..8710f87 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -663,6 +663,9 @@ Patch714: ALSA-timer-Fix-leak-in-SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS.patch
 Patch715: ALSA-timer-Fix-leak-in-events-via-snd_timer_user_cca.patch
 Patch716: ALSA-timer-Fix-leak-in-events-via-snd_timer_user_tin.patch
 
+#CVE-2016-0758 rhbz 1300257 1335386
+Patch717: KEYS-Fix-ASN.1-indefinite-length-object-parsing.patch
+
 # END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
 
 %endif
@@ -2184,6 +2187,9 @@ fi
 #
 # 
 %changelog
+* Fri May 13 2016 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+- CVE-2016-0758 pointer corruption in asn1 decoder (rhbz 1300257 1335386)
+
 * Wed May 11 2016 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> - 4.5.4-200
 - Linux v4.5.4