diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in --- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.065883826 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-20 13:41:15.100883769 +0100 @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \ - kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o + kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o auditstub.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/audit-bsm.c --- openssh-6.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/audit-bsm.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.092883782 +0100 @@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, #endif } -void +int audit_run_command(const char *command) { /* not implemented */ + return 0; +} + +void +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + /* not necessary */ } void @@ -393,6 +406,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) /* not implemented */ } +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { @@ -454,4 +473,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); } } + +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} #endif /* BSM */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/audit-linux.c --- openssh-6.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/audit-linux.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 @@ -35,13 +35,25 @@ #include "log.h" #include "audit.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ +#include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256 + +extern ServerOptions options; +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +extern u_int utmp_len; const char* audit_username(void); -int -linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, - const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) +static void +linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) { int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; @@ -49,11 +61,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, if (audit_fd < 0) { if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) - return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ else - return 0; /* Must prevent login */ + goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ } - rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); saved_errno = errno; @@ -65,35 +77,154 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) rc = 0; errno = saved_errno; - return (rc >= 0); + if (rc < 0) { +fatal_report: + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + } } +static void +linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) +{ + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + static const char *event_name[] = { + "maxtries exceeded", + "root denied", + "success", + "none", + "password", + "challenge-response", + "pubkey", + "hostbased", + "gssapi", + "invalid user", + "nologin", + "connection closed", + "connection abandoned", + "unknown" + }; + + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ + } + + if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) + event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; + + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, + NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", + username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; + close(audit_fd); + /* + * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non + * root user. + */ + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) + rc = 0; + errno = saved_errno; + if (rc < 0) { +fatal_report: + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + } +} + +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + return 0; /* Must prevent login */ + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port()); + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, + buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); + if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + goto out; + /* is the fingerprint_prefix() still needed? + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d", + type, bits, sshkey_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port()); + */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d", + type, bits, fp, get_remote_port()); + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, + buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); +out: + saved_errno = errno; + audit_close(audit_fd); + errno = saved_errno; + /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); +} + +static int user_login_count = 0; + /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ void audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) { -} /* not implemented */ +} -void +int audit_run_command(const char *command) { - /* not implemented */ + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + return 0; +} + +void +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); +} + +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + user_login_count++; } void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) { - if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, - NULL, li->line, 1) == 0) - fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); } void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) { - /* not implemented */ + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); } void @@ -101,21 +232,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { switch(event) { case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: - case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event); + break; + case SSH_NOLOGIN: - case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); break; + case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); + break; + + case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + if (user_login_count) { + while (user_login_count--) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } + break; + + case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: case SSH_INVALID_USER: - linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, - get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); break; default: @@ -123,4 +276,135 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) } } +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; + char *s; + int audit_fd; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), + get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) + /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ + return; + audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0); + audit_close(audit_fd); +#endif +} + +const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; + +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + const Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); + char *s; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs, + (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, + get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ +#endif +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + char *s; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, + get_remote_port(), + (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), + get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", + fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, + listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(), + NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} + +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/audit.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/audit.c --- openssh-6.8p1/audit.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/audit.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include +#include #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS @@ -36,6 +37,11 @@ #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" /* * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when @@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. */ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +extern ServerOptions options; /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ ssh_audit_event_t @@ -71,13 +78,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) const char * audit_username(void) { - static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; - static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; + static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; - if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) + if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) return (unknownuser); - if (!the_authctxt->valid) - return (invaliduser); return (the_authctxt->user); } @@ -111,6 +115,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) return(event_lookup[i].name); } +void +audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key) +{ + char *fp; + const char *crypto_name; + + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) + crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1"; + else + crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key); + if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0) + *rv = 0; + free(fp); +} + +void +audit_unsupported(int what) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what)); +} + +void +audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid())); +} + +void +audit_session_key_free(int ctos) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); +} + # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* * Null implementations of audit functions. @@ -140,6 +178,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) } /* + * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, + * audit_session_open. + */ +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), + audit_username()); +} + +/* * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. * @@ -174,13 +223,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) /* * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows - * multiple sessions within a single connection. + * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for + * audit_end_command. */ -void +int audit_run_command(const char *command) { debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), audit_username(), command); + return 0; +} + +/* + * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows + * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from + * the corresponding audit_run_command. + */ +void +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), + audit_username(), command); +} + +/* + * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. + * + * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. + */ +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", + host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits, + sshkey_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv); +} + +/* + * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. + */ +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); +} + +/* + * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. + */ +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, + (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on succesfull session key discard + */ +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key + */ +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", + geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key + */ +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *) +{ + debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp); } # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/audit.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/audit.h --- openssh-6.8p1/audit.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/audit.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ # define _SSH_AUDIT_H #include "loginrec.h" +#include "key.h" enum ssh_audit_event_type { SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, @@ -47,11 +48,25 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { }; typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; +int listening_for_clients(void); + void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); +void audit_count_session_open(void); void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); -void audit_run_command(const char *); +int audit_run_command(const char *); +void audit_end_command(int, const char *); ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); +int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int); +void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *); +void audit_unsupported(int); +void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *); +void audit_unsupported_body(int); +void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); +void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *); #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auditstub.c --- openssh-6.8p1/auditstub.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/auditstub.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima + */ + +#include + +void +audit_unsupported(int n) +{ +} + +void +audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) +{ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free(int ctos) +{ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ +} diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth-rsa.c --- openssh-6.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/auth-rsa.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 @@ -95,7 +95,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) { u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; - int len; + int len, rv; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + char *fp; +#endif /* don't allow short keys */ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { @@ -119,12 +122,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) ssh_digest_free(md); /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ - if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { - /* Wrong answer. */ - return (0); + rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0; + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) { + debug("unsuccessful audit"); + rv = 0; } - /* Correct answer. */ - return (1); + free(fp); +#endif + + return rv; } /* diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth.c --- openssh-6.8p1/auth.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/auth.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 @@ -644,9 +644,6 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) record_failed_login(user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); #endif -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); -#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ return (NULL); } if (!allowed_user(pw)) diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth.h --- openssh-6.8p1/auth.h.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.002883927 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/auth.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); +int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); @@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struc int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); +int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c --- openssh-6.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.002883927 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && - PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) authenticated = 1; @@ -164,6 +164,18 @@ done: return authenticated; } +int +hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + int rv; + + rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_key(0, &rv, key); +#endif + return rv; +} + /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c --- openssh-6.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.013883910 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && - PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) { authenticated = 1; /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */ @@ -250,6 +250,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con free(extra); } +int +user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + int rv; + + rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_key(1, &rv, key); +#endif + return rv; +} + static int match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth2.c --- openssh-6.8p1/auth2.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.044883860 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/auth2.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 @@ -249,9 +249,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 } else { logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); -#endif } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) diff -up openssh-6.8p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/cipher.c --- openssh-6.8p1/cipher.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/cipher.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.101883767 +0100 @@ -57,26 +59,6 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(v extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); #endif -struct sshcipher { - char *name; - int number; /* for ssh1 only */ - u_int block_size; - u_int key_len; - u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ - u_int auth_len; - u_int discard_len; - u_int flags; -#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) -#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) -#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) -#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); -#else - void *ignored; -#endif -}; - static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, diff -up openssh-6.8p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/cipher.h --- openssh-6.8p1/cipher.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/cipher.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 @@ -62,7 +62,26 @@ #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 -struct sshcipher; +struct sshcipher { + char *name; + int number; /* for ssh1 only */ + u_int block_size; + u_int key_len; + u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ + u_int auth_len; + u_int discard_len; + u_int flags; +#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) +#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) +#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) +#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); +#else + void *ignored; +#endif +}; + struct sshcipher_ctx { int plaintext; int encrypt; diff -up openssh-6.8p1/kex.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/kex.c --- openssh-6.8p1/kex.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.046883856 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/kex.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.101883767 +0100 @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "audit.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" @@ -484,8 +508,12 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *cli { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(0); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; + } if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; enc->name = name; @@ -503,8 +531,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(1); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; + } if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* truncate the key */ @@ -521,8 +553,12 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char * { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(2); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; + } if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { @@ -672,6 +708,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); + debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); +#endif } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; @@ -847,3 +887,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); } #endif + +static void +enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc) +{ + if (enc == NULL) + return; + + if (enc->key) { + memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); + free(enc->key); + } + + if (enc->iv) { + memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size); + free(enc->iv); + } + + memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); +} + +void +newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + + enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); + mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); + memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); +} + diff -up openssh-6.8p1/kex.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/kex.h --- openssh-6.8p1/kex.h.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.046883856 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/kex.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.095883777 +0100 @@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); #endif +void newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys); + int kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); diff -up openssh-6.8p1/key.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/key.h --- openssh-6.8p1/key.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/key.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.095883777 +0100 @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key; #define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid #define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert +#define key_is_private sshkey_is_private #define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain #define key_cert_is_legacy sshkey_cert_is_legacy #define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid diff -up openssh-6.8p1/mac.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/mac.c --- openssh-6.8p1/mac.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/mac.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.102883766 +0100 @@ -226,6 +246,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } +void +mac_destroy(struct sshmac *mac) +{ + if (mac == NULL) + return; + + if (mac->key) { + memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); + free(mac->key); + } + + memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); +} + /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ #define MAC_SEP "," int diff -up openssh-6.8p1/mac.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/mac.h --- openssh-6.8p1/mac.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/mac.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.095883777 +0100 @@ -47,5 +47,6 @@ int mac_init(struct sshmac *); int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int, u_char *, size_t); void mac_clear(struct sshmac *); +void mac_destroy(struct sshmac *); #endif /* SSHMAC_H */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/monitor.c --- openssh-6.8p1/monitor.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.072883814 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/monitor.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.107883758 +0100 @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ #include "ssh2.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "authfd.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" @@ -117,6 +118,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug; extern int auth_debug_init; extern Buffer loginmsg; +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); + /* State exported from the child */ static struct sshbuf *child_state; @@ -167,6 +170,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffe #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *); #endif static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); @@ -226,6 +234,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, @@ -264,6 +276,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; @@ -296,6 +313,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} @@ -309,6 +330,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} @@ -1466,9 +1493,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) Key *key; u_char *signature, *data, *blob; u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; + int type = 0; int verified = 0; int valid_data = 0; + type = buffer_get_int(m); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); @@ -1476,6 +1505,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); + if (type != key_blobtype) + fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if (key == NULL) @@ -1496,7 +1527,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) if (!valid_data) fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); - verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + switch (key_blobtype) { + case MM_USERKEY: + verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + break; + case MM_HOSTKEY: + verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + break; + default: + verified = 0; + break; + } debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); @@ -1554,6 +1595,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s) debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL) { + debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle); + session_end_command2(s); + } +#endif session_unused(s->self); } @@ -1836,6 +1883,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif + destroy_sensitive_data(0); + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); @@ -1878,11 +1927,43 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff { u_int len; char *cmd; + Session *s; debug3("%s entering", __func__); cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + /* sanity check command, if so how? */ - audit_run_command(cmd); + s = session_new(); + if (s == NULL) + fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__); + s->command = cmd; + s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, s->self); + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + int handle; + u_int len; + char *cmd; + Session *s; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + handle = buffer_get_int(m); + cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + + s = session_by_id(handle); + if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || + strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) + fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__); + mm_session_close(s); free(cmd); return (0); } @@ -1936,6 +2017,7 @@ void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { + Buffer m; debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) @@ -1946,6 +2027,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, child_state); debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (compat20) { + buffer_init(&m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); + buffer_free(&m); + } +#endif + + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ + while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) + ; + } @@ -2212,3 +2308,87 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Bu #endif /* GSSAPI */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +int +mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int what; + + what = buffer_get_int(m); + + audit_unsupported_body(what); + + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int ctos, len; + char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + ctos = buffer_get_int(m); + cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pfs = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); + + free(cipher); + free(mac); + free(compress); + free(pfs); + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int ctos; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + ctos = buffer_get_int(m); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); + + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int len; + char *fp; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); + + free(fp); + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); + return 0; +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/monitor.h --- openssh-6.8p1/monitor.h.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.072883814 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/monitor.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.096883775 +0100 @@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, - MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 125 }; diff -up openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.c --- openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.047883855 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.108883756 +0100 @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha */ int -mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; @@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i return (0); buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, type); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); @@ -492,6 +493,18 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i return (verified); } +int +mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); +} + +int +mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); +} + void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) { @@ -1005,10 +1018,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) buffer_free(&m); } -void +int mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) { Buffer m; + int handle; debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); @@ -1016,6 +1030,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); + + handle = buffer_get_int(&m); + buffer_free(&m); + + return (handle); +} + +void +mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + Buffer m; + + debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, handle); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ @@ -1151,3 +1185,72 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc #endif /* GSSAPI */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void +mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, what); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, + &m); + + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "")); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, fps); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, + &m); + + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, + &m); + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, + &m); + buffer_free(&m); +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.h --- openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.048883853 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.096883775 +0100 @@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); -int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); +int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); +int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); @@ -79,7 +80,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); -void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); +int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); +void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); +void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); +void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); +void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); #endif struct Session; diff -up openssh-6.8p1/packet.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/packet.c --- openssh-6.8p1/packet.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:14.990883947 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/packet.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ #include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */ #include "xmalloc.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "crc32.h" #include "deattack.h" #include "compat.h" @@ -448,6 +449,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh return ssh->state->connection_out; } +static int +packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) +{ + return state != NULL && + (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); +} + /* * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. @@ -478,13 +486,6 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) if (!state->initialized) return; state->initialized = 0; - if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { - shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); - close(state->connection_out); - } else { - close(state->connection_in); - close(state->connection_out); - } sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); @@ -516,14 +517,24 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) inflateEnd(stream); } } - if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0) - error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0) - error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (packet_state_has_keys(state)) { + if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0) + error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0) + error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + audit_session_key_free(2); + } if (ssh->remote_ipaddr) { free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; } + if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { + shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); + close(state->connection_out); + } else { + close(state->connection_in); + close(state->connection_out); + } free(ssh->state); ssh->state = NULL; } @@ -941,6 +952,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod } if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); + audit_session_key_free(mode); if ((r = cipher_cleanup(cc)) != 0) return r; enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; @@ -2263,6 +2275,75 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) return (void *)ssh->state->output; } +static void +newkeys_destroy_and_free(struct newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + + free(newkeys->enc.name); + + if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { + mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); + free(newkeys->mac.name); + } + + free(newkeys->comp.name); + + newkeys_destroy(newkeys); + free(newkeys); +} + +static void +packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) +{ + if (state == NULL) + return; + + cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context); + cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context); + + buffer_free(state->input); + state->input = NULL; + buffer_free(state->output); + state->output = NULL; + buffer_free(state->outgoing_packet); + state->outgoing_packet = NULL; + buffer_free(state->incoming_packet); + state->incoming_packet = NULL; + if( state->compression_buffer ) { + buffer_free(state->compression_buffer); + state->compression_buffer = NULL; + } + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); + state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); + state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; + mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); +// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; +// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); +} + +void +packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) +{ + if (audit_it) + audit_it = (active_state != NULL && packet_state_has_keys(active_state->state)) + || (backup_state != NULL && packet_state_has_keys(backup_state->state)); + if (active_state != NULL) + packet_destroy_state(active_state->state); + if (backup_state != NULL) + packet_destroy_state(backup_state->state); + if (audit_it) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (privsep) + audit_session_key_free(2); + else + audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); +#endif + } +} + /* XXX TODO update roaming to new API (does not work anyway) */ /* * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when @@ -2272,18 +2373,12 @@ void ssh_packet_backup_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct ssh *backup_state) { - struct ssh *tmp; - close(ssh->state->connection_in); ssh->state->connection_in = -1; close(ssh->state->connection_out); ssh->state->connection_out = -1; - if (backup_state) - tmp = backup_state; - else - tmp = ssh_alloc_session_state(); backup_state = ssh; - ssh = tmp; + ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state(); } /* XXX FIXME FIXME FIXME */ @@ -2302,9 +2397,7 @@ ssh_packet_restore_state(struct ssh *ssh backup_state = ssh; ssh = tmp; ssh->state->connection_in = backup_state->state->connection_in; - backup_state->state->connection_in = -1; ssh->state->connection_out = backup_state->state->connection_out; - backup_state->state->connection_out = -1; len = sshbuf_len(backup_state->state->input); if (len > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->input, @@ -2313,6 +2406,11 @@ ssh_packet_restore_state(struct ssh *ssh sshbuf_reset(backup_state->state->input); add_recv_bytes(len); } + backup_state->state->connection_in = -1; + backup_state->state->connection_out = -1; + packet_destroy_state(backup_state->state); + free(backup_state); + backup_state = NULL; } /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/packet.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/packet.h --- openssh-6.8p1/packet.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/packet.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh); const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp); /* OLD API */ -extern struct ssh *active_state; +extern struct ssh *active_state, *backup_state; #include "opacket.h" #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) @@ -203,4 +203,5 @@ extern struct ssh *active_state; # undef EC_POINT #endif +void packet_destroy_all(int, int); #endif /* PACKET_H */ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/session.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/session.c --- openssh-6.8p1/session.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.073883813 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/session.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ extern int log_stderr; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); extern Buffer loginmsg; /* original command from peer. */ @@ -731,6 +731,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); +#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA + /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, + compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely + ugly. */ + if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) + audit_count_session_open(); +#endif + /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; packet_set_interactive(1, @@ -853,15 +861,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) get_remote_port()); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) + fatal("do_exec: command already set"); if (command != NULL) - PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); + s->command = xstrdup(command); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; - PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); + s->command = xstrdup(shell); } + if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1) + s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); @@ -1704,7 +1716,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command int r = 0; /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(1); + /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the + monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ + packet_destroy_all(0, 1); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { @@ -1934,6 +1949,7 @@ session_unused(int id) sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; + sessions[id].command_handle = -1; sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } @@ -2016,6 +2032,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha } Session * +session_by_id(int id) +{ + if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { + Session *s = &sessions[id]; + if (s->used) + return s; + } + debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { int i; @@ -2532,6 +2561,32 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta chan_write_failed(c); } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void +session_end_command2(Session *s) +{ + if (s->command != NULL) { + if (s->command_handle != -1) + audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command); + free(s->command); + s->command = NULL; + s->command_handle = -1; + } +} + +static void +session_end_command(Session *s) +{ + if (s->command != NULL) { + if (s->command_handle != -1) + PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command)); + free(s->command); + s->command = NULL; + s->command_handle = -1; + } +} +#endif + void session_close(Session *s) { @@ -2540,6 +2593,10 @@ session_close(Session *s) debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command) + session_end_command(s); +#endif free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); @@ -2754,6 +2811,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) server_loop2(authctxt); } +static void +do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s) +{ + session_pty_cleanup2(s); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + session_end_command2(s); +#endif +} + void do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { @@ -2802,5 +2868,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) - session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); + session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session); } diff -up openssh-6.8p1/session.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/session.h --- openssh-6.8p1/session.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/session.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session { char *name; char *val; } *env; + + /* exec */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + int command_handle; + char *command; +#endif }; void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); @@ -73,8 +79,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *)); void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); +void session_end_command2(Session *); Session *session_new(void); +Session *session_by_id(int); Session *session_by_tty(char *); void session_close(Session *); void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); diff -up openssh-6.8p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/sshd.c --- openssh-6.8p1/sshd.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.083883796 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/sshd.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.110883753 +0100 @@ -121,6 +124,7 @@ #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "roaming.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" @@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg; struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ -void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +void destroy_sensitive_data(int); void demote_sensitive_data(void); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 @@ -281,6 +285,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) num_listen_socks = -1; } +/* + * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific + * client connection?) + */ +int listening_for_clients(void) +{ + return num_listen_socks > 0; +} + static void close_startup_pipes(void) { @@ -560,22 +573,45 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in } } -/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ +/* + * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, + * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. + */ void -destroy_sensitive_data(void) +destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep) { int i; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; } + pid = getpid(); + uid = getuid(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + char *fp; + + if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + else + fp = NULL; key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + if (fp != NULL) { + if (privsep) + PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, + pid, uid)); + else + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, + pid, uid); + free(fp); + } } - if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + if (sensitive_data.host_certificates + && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } @@ -589,6 +625,8 @@ void demote_sensitive_data(void) { Key *tmp; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { @@ -597,13 +635,25 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; } + pid = getpid(); + uid = getuid(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + char *fp; + + if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + else + fp = NULL; tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; + if (fp != NULL) { + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); + free(fp); + } } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } @@ -675,7 +725,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); - pid = fork(); + pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { @@ -759,6 +811,12 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); + if (*pmonitor->m_pkex != NULL ){ + newkeys_destroy((*pmonitor->m_pkex)->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); + newkeys_destroy((*pmonitor->m_pkex)->newkeys[MODE_IN]); + audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); + packet_destroy_all(0, 0); + } monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ @@ -1286,6 +1341,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so if (received_sigterm) { logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); + destroy_sensitive_data(0); close_listen_socks(); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); @@ -2242,6 +2321,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); + packet_destroy_all(1, 1); exit(0); } @@ -2287,7 +2367,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) privsep_postauth(authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ if (!compat20) - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(0); } packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, @@ -2301,6 +2381,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ + packet_destroy_all(1, 1); + destroy_sensitive_data(1); + packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); @@ -2461,6 +2544,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none", "none"); +#endif + debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); /* Get the encrypted integer. */ @@ -2520,7 +2607,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) } /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(1); if (use_privsep) mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); @@ -2703,6 +2802,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) void cleanup_exit(int i) { + static int in_cleanup = 0; + int is_privsep_child; + + /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep + wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse + indefinitely. */ + if (in_cleanup) + _exit(i); + in_cleanup = 1; + if (the_authctxt) { do_cleanup(the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && @@ -2714,9 +2823,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); } } + is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; + if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL) + destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child); + packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ - if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) + if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && + (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); diff -up openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.c --- openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.111883751 +0100 @@ -317,6 +319,33 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) } int +sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + return k->rsa->d != NULL; + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; +#endif + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519: + return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); + default: + /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ + return 0; + } +} + +int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) diff -up openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.h --- openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.098883772 +0100 @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); +int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); int sshkey_type_plain(int); diff -up openssh-6.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c --- openssh-6.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.088883788 +0100 +++ openssh-6.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 @@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ #ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */ SC_ALLOW(time), #endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + SC_ALLOW(getuid), +#ifdef __NR_getuid32 /* not defined on x86_64 */ + SC_ALLOW(getuid32), +#endif +#endif SC_ALLOW(read), SC_ALLOW(write), SC_ALLOW(close),