From a1905af412163cf971107f51a33dff8b416ab690 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>

Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 15:21:46 +0200

Subject: [PATCH] Instrument SHA-1 signatures with USDT probes

In order to discover remaining uses of SHA-1 in signatures without

forcefully breaking the code paths, add USDT probes that can be queried

with systemtap at runtime.

This should allow identifying components that still use SHA-1 signatures

in production so that they can be transitioned to more modern hash

algorithms.

---

crypto/evp/m_sigver.c                    | 13 +++++++++----

crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c                   | 13 +++++++++----

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c                   |  6 +++++-

providers/common/securitycheck.c         | 22 +++++++++++++++-------

providers/common/securitycheck_default.c | 13 +++++++++++--

ssl/t1_lib.c                             |  8 +++++++-

6 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c

index 8da2183ce0..c17cdfa5d5 100644

--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c

+++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@

 #include "internal/numbers.h"   /* includes SIZE_MAX */

 #include "evp_local.h"

+#include <sys/sdt.h>

+

 typedef struct ossl_legacy_digest_signatures_st {

     int allowed;

 } OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES;

@@ -336,10 +338,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,

             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)

             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {

         int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(ctx->reqdigest);

-        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(locpctx->libctx, 0)

-                && (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)) {

-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);

-            goto err;

+        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1) {

+            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(locpctx->libctx, 0)) {

+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);

+                goto err;

+            } else {

+                DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_do_sigver_init_1, mdnid);

+            }

         }

     }

diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c

index 3c5a1e6f5d..589a352974 100644

--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c

+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@

 #include "internal/sslconf.h"

 #include "evp_local.h"

+#include <sys/sdt.h>

+

 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE

 static int evp_pkey_ctx_store_cached_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,

@@ -954,10 +956,13 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,

             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)

             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {

         int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);

-        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)

-                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0)) {

-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);

-            return -1;

+        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1) {

+            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0)) {

+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);

+                return -1;

+            } else {

+                DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_evp_pkey_ctx_set_md_1, mdnid);

+            }

         }

     }

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

index 60aa26f552..d054acd5a7 100644

--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@

 #include "crypto/x509.h"

 #include "x509_local.h"

+#include <sys/sdt.h>

+

 /* CRL score values */

 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */

@@ -3462,10 +3464,12 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)

     if (nid == NID_sha1

             && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)

-            && ctx->param->auth_level < 2)

+            && ctx->param->auth_level < 2) {

+        DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_check_sig_level_1, nid);

         /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,

          * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */

         return 1;

+    }

     return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];

 }

diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c

index e534ad0a5f..bf496450cf 100644

--- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c

+++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@

 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"

 #include "internal/sslconf.h"

+#include <sys/sdt.h>

+

 /*

  * FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or

  * signing), and for legacy purposes 80 bits (for decryption or verifying).

@@ -238,11 +240,14 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,

 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */

 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE

-    if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))

-        /* SHA1 is globally disabled, check whether we want to locally allow

-         * it. */

-        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 && !sha1_allowed)

+    if (mdnid == NID_sha1 && !sha1_allowed) {

+        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))

+            /* SHA1 is globally disabled, check whether we want to locally allow

+             * it. */

             mdnid = -1;

+        else

+            DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1_1, mdnid);

+    }

 #endif

     return mdnid;

@@ -258,9 +263,12 @@ int ossl_digest_is_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)

 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE

     {

         int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);

-        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)

-                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))

-            return 0;

+        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1) {

+            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))

+                return 0;

+            else

+                DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_ossl_digest_is_allowed_1, mdnid);

+        }

     }

 #endif

diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c

index ce54a94fbc..ecb3a9d4b6 100644

--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c

+++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@

 #include "internal/nelem.h"

 #include "internal/sslconf.h"

+#include <sys/sdt.h>

+

 /* Disable the security checks in the default provider */

 int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)

 {

@@ -40,9 +42,16 @@ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,

     ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0);

     mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, sha1_allowed || ldsigs_allowed);

+    if (mdnid == NID_sha1)

+        /* This will only happen if SHA1 is allowed, otherwise mdnid is -1. */

+        DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid_1, mdnid);

     if (mdnid == NID_undef)

         mdnid = ossl_digest_md_to_nid(md, name_to_nid, OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid));

-    if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1 && !ldsigs_allowed)

-        mdnid = -1;

+    if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1) {

+        if (ldsigs_allowed)

+            DTRACE_PROBE1(libcrypto, fedora_ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid_2, mdnid);

+        else

+            mdnid = -1;

+    }

     return mdnid;

 }

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c

index e47ddf56f1..a4b9ff749e 100644

--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c

+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@

 #include "ssl_local.h"

 #include <openssl/ct.h>

+#include <sys/sdt.h>

+

 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);

 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);

@@ -1568,6 +1570,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)

             && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2) {

         /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,

          * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */

+        DTRACE_PROBE1(libssl, fedora_tls12_check_peer_sigalg_1, lu->hash);

     } else {

         /*

          * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical

@@ -2120,6 +2123,7 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)

             && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2) {

         /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,

          * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */

+        DTRACE_PROBE1(libssl, fedora_tls12_sigalg_allowed_1, lu->hash);

         return 1;

     }

@@ -3018,10 +3022,12 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)

             && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)

             && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2)

                 || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 2)

-            ))

+            )) {

         /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,

          * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */

+        DTRACE_PROBE1(libssl, fedora_ssl_security_cert_sig_1, nid);

         return 1;

+    }

     if (s)

         return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);

--

2.35.1