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From fc4f4cdb8bf9981904e652abf69b892a45bddacf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 22:32:21 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix protocol downgrade bug in case of fragmented packets
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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CVE-2014-3511
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
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---
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ssl/s23_srvr.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
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1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
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index 4877849..2901a6b 100644
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--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
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+++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
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@@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
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* to read more records to find out.
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* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
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- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
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- * attacks. */
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+ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
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+ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
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if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
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{
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-#if 0
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
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goto err;
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-#else
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- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
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-#endif
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}
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/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
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* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
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* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
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* this....
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*/
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- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
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+ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
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v[1]=0xff;
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else
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v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
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@@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
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v[1] = p[4];
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+ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
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+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
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+ * record. It's format is:
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+ * Byte Content
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+ * 0-1 msg_length
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+ * 2 msg_type
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+ * 3-4 version
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+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
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+ * 7-8 session_id_length
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+ * 9-10 challenge_length
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+ * ... ...
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+ */
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n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
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if (n > (1024*4))
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
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goto err;
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}
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+ if (n < 9)
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+ {
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+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
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+ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
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+ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
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+ * packet bytes. */
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if (j <= 0) return(j);
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ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
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--
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1.8.3.1
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