diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/verify.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/verify.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/verify.pod.manfix 2010-02-23 15:09:22.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/verify.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:15.277264650 +0100
@@ -54,35 +54,37 @@ in PEM format concatenated together.
=item B<-untrusted file>
A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
+in PEM format concatenated together.
=item B<-purpose purpose>
-the intended use for the certificate. Without this option no chain verification
-will be done. Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>,
-B<nssslserver>, B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION>
-section for more information.
+The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
+B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
+Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
+B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
+information.
=item B<-help>
-prints out a usage message.
+Print out a usage message.
=item B<-verbose>
-print extra information about the operations being performed.
+Print extra information about the operations being performed.
=item B<-issuer_checks>
-print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate
-of the current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer
-certificate was rejected. However the presence of rejection messages
-does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal
-verify process several rejections may take place.
+Print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate of the
+current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer certificate was
+rejected. The presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that
+anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several
+rejections may take place.
=item B<-policy arg>
-Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set
-(see RFC3280 et al). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric
-form. This argument can appear more than once.
+Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
+RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
+This argument can appear more than once.
=item B<-policy_check>
@@ -90,41 +92,40 @@ Enables certificate policy processing.
=item B<-explicit_policy>
-Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC3280 et al).
+Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
=item B<-inhibit_any>
-Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC3280 et al).
+Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
=item B<-inhibit_map>
-Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC3280 et al).
+Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
=item B<-policy_print>
-Print out diagnostics, related to policy checking
+Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
=item B<-crl_check>
-Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to lookup a valid CRL.
+Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
=item B<-crl_check_all>
Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
-to lookup valid CRLs.
+to look up valid CRLs.
=item B<-ignore_critical>
Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
-supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by
-RFC3280 et al). If this option is set critical extensions are
-ignored.
+supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
+If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
=item B<-x509_strict>
-Disable workarounds for broken certificates which have to be disabled
-for strict X.509 compliance.
+For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
+certificates.
=item B<-extended_crl>
@@ -142,16 +143,15 @@ because it doesn't add any security.
=item B<->
-marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
+Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
with a B<->.
=item B<certificates>
-one or more certificates to verify. If no certificate filenames are included
-then an attempt is made to read a certificate from standard input. They should
-all be in PEM format.
-
+One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given, B<verify>
+will attempt to read a certificate from standard input. Certificates must be
+in PEM format.
=back
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/x509.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/x509.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/x509.pod.manfix 2013-01-10 10:26:11.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/apps/x509.pod 2013-01-30 17:35:38.952458133 +0100
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<x509>
[B<-purpose>]
[B<-dates>]
[B<-modulus>]
+[B<-pubkey>]
[B<-fingerprint>]
[B<-alias>]
[B<-noout>]
@@ -136,6 +137,10 @@ section for more information.
this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
+=item B<-pubkey>
+
+outputs the the certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo block in PEM format.
+
=item B<-modulus>
this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.manfix 2009-10-01 01:40:47.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.381045128 +0100
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3
L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)|EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)>
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod.manfix 2009-10-01 01:40:48.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.381045128 +0100
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3
L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod.manfix 2009-10-01 01:40:48.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.381045128 +0100
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3
L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
=head1 HISTORY
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod.manfix 2009-10-01 01:40:48.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.382045143 +0100
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3
L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod.manfix 2009-10-01 01:40:48.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.382045143 +0100
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ public key algorithm.
L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
=head1 HISTORY
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod.manfix 2009-10-01 01:40:49.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.382045143 +0100
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3
L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod.manfix 2009-10-01 01:40:50.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.383045149 +0100
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3
L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod.manfix 2010-12-02 14:45:25.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.383045149 +0100
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3
L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod.manfix 2013-01-30 17:36:05.383045149 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod 2013-01-30 17:36:05.383045149 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover - recover signature using a public key algorithm
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+context using key B<pkey> for a verify recover operation.
+
+The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() function recovers signed data
+using B<ctx>. The signature is specified using the B<sig> and
+B<siglen> parameters. If B<rout> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
+buffer is written to the B<routlen> parameter. If B<rout> is not B<NULL> then
+before the call the B<routlen> parameter should contain the length of the
+B<rout> buffer, if the call is successful recovered data is written to
+B<rout> and the amount of data written to B<routlen>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Normally an application is only interested in whether a signature verification
+operation is successful in those cases the EVP_verify() function should be
+used.
+
+Sometimes however it is useful to obtain the data originally signed using a
+signing operation. Only certain public key algorithms can recover a signature
+in this way (for example RSA in PKCS padding mode).
+
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() algorithm specific control
+operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
+operation.
+
+The function EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() can be called more than once on the same
+context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() and EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() return 1 for success
+and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ unsigned char *rout, *sig;
+ size_t routlen, siglen;
+ EVP_PKEY *verify_key;
+ /* NB: assumes verify_key, sig and siglen are already set up
+ * and that verify_key is an RSA public key
+ */
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key);
+ if (!ctx)
+ /* Error occurred */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx) <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+
+ /* Determine buffer length */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+
+ rout = OPENSSL_malloc(routlen);
+
+ if (!rout)
+ /* malloc failure */
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ /* Error */
+
+ /* Recovered data is routlen bytes written to buffer rout */
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=cut
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod.manfix openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod.manfix 2009-10-18 17:28:59.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod 2013-01-30 17:34:16.315630759 +0100
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabl
an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
set by an application.
+=back
+
=head1 NOTES
The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields
diff -up openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod /dev/null
--- openssl-1.0.1c/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init, EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover - recover signature using a public key algorithm
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- int EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
- int EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
- const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
-context using key B<pkey> for a verify recover operation.
-
-The EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() function recovers signed data
-using B<ctx>. The signature is specified using the B<sig> and
-B<siglen> parameters. If B<rout> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
-buffer is written to the B<routlen> parameter. If B<rout> is not B<NULL> then
-before the call the B<routlen> parameter should contain the length of the
-B<rout> buffer, if the call is successful recovered data is written to
-B<rout> and the amount of data written to B<routlen>.
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-Normally an application is only interested in whether a signature verification
-operation is successful in those cases the EVP_verify() function should be
-used.
-
-Sometimes however it is useful to obtain the data originally signed using a
-signing operation. Only certain public key algorithms can recover a signature
-in this way (for example RSA in PKCS padding mode).
-
-After the call to EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() algorithm specific control
-operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
-operation.
-
-The function EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() can be called more than once on the same
-context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() and EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() return 1 for success
-and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
-indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
-
-=head1 EXAMPLE
-
-Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
-
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
- unsigned char *rout, *sig;
- size_t routlen, siglen;
- EVP_PKEY *verify_key;
- /* NB: assumes verify_key, sig and siglen are already set up
- * and that verify_key is an RSA public key
- */
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key);
- if (!ctx)
- /* Error occurred */
- if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init(ctx) <= 0)
- /* Error */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
- /* Error */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0)
- /* Error */
-
- /* Determine buffer length */
- if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
- /* Error */
-
- rout = OPENSSL_malloc(routlen);
-
- if (!rout)
- /* malloc failure */
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
- /* Error */
-
- /* Recovered data is routlen bytes written to buffer rout */
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
-
-=cut
--