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diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod.rsa-ephemeral	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod	2015-01-13 11:15:25.096957795 +0100
@@ -151,15 +151,7 @@ temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are us
 
 =item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
 
-Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations
-(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>).
-According to the specifications this is only done, when a RSA key
-can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers
-with restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral
-RSA keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the
-SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with
-clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH (ephemeral
-Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead.
+This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op.
 
 =item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
 
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod.rsa-ephemeral	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod	2015-01-13 11:15:25.096957795 +0100
@@ -74,21 +74,14 @@ exchange and use EDH (Ephemeral Diffie-H
 in order to achieve forward secrecy (see
 L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
 
-On OpenSSL servers ephemeral RSA key exchange is therefore disabled by default
-and must be explicitly enabled  using the SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA option of
-L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, violating the TLS/SSL
-standard. When ephemeral RSA key exchange is required for export ciphers,
-it will automatically be used without this option!
-
-An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via
-a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the
-callback may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the
-generation of a RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant
-delay in the handshake procedure.  Another advantage of the callback function
-is that it can supply keys of different size (e.g. for SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
-usage) while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for key size of
-512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give away key length
-if a longer key would be allowed.
+An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via a
+callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the callback
+may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the generation of a
+RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant delay in the handshake
+procedure.  Another advantage of the callback function is that it can supply
+keys of different size while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for
+key size of 512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give
+away key length if a longer key would be allowed.
 
 The B<tmp_rsa_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
 the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/CHANGES.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/CHANGES
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c.rsa-ephemeral	2015-01-12 17:49:04.912808002 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c	2015-01-13 11:15:25.096957795 +0100
@@ -450,24 +450,15 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-				)
-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
-				 * be able to handle this) */
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+			/*
+			 * clear this, it may get reset by
+			 * send_server_key_exchange
+			 */
+			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
 			/* only send if a DH key exchange or
 			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+			if (0
 			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
 			 * hint if provided */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.rsa-ephemeral	2015-01-12 17:49:04.936808545 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h	2015-01-13 11:15:25.098957840 +0100
@@ -587,9 +587,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE				0x00080000L
 /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
 #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE				0x00100000L
-/* Set to always use the tmp_rsa key when doing RSA operations,
- * even when this violates protocol specs */
-#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x00200000L
+/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
+#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x0
 /* Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's
  * preferences */
 #define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE			0x00400000L
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.rsa-ephemeral	2015-01-12 17:49:04.946808771 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-01-13 11:15:25.097957817 +0100
@@ -1492,6 +1492,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
 		{
+		/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
+		if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.rsa-ephemeral openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.rsa-ephemeral	2015-01-12 17:51:32.044135496 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2015-01-13 11:15:25.098957840 +0100
@@ -441,20 +441,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-				)
-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
-				 * be able to handle this) */
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+			/*
+			 * clear this, it may get reset by
+			 * send_server_key_exchange
+			 */
+			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
 
 			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
@@ -468,7 +459,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			 * server certificate contains the server's
 			 * public key for key exchange.
 			 */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+			if (0
 			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
 			 * hint if provided */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK