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From 81d6949acdad70ecfb130d3286eeab1b3a51937f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
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Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 19:25:24 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] cli_credentials_parse_string: fix parsing of principals
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When parsing a principal-like name, user name was left with full
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principal instead of taking only the left part before '@' sign.
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>>> from samba import credentials
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>>> t = credentials.Credentials()
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>>> t.parse_string('admin@realm.test', credentials.SPECIFIED)
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>>> t.get_username()
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'admin@realm.test'
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The issue is that cli_credentials_set_username() does a talloc_strdup()
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of the argument, so we need to change order of assignment to allow
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talloc_strdup() to copy the right part of the string.
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Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
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---
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auth/credentials/credentials.c | 5 ++---
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
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index 77c35dd104b..06ac79058f9 100644
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--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
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+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
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@@ -840,11 +840,10 @@ _PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_parse_string(struct cli_credentials *credentials,
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* in order to undo the effect of
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* cli_credentials_guess().
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*/
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- cli_credentials_set_username(credentials, uname, obtained);
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- cli_credentials_set_domain(credentials, "", obtained);
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-
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cli_credentials_set_principal(credentials, uname, obtained);
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*p = 0;
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+ cli_credentials_set_username(credentials, uname, obtained);
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+ cli_credentials_set_domain(credentials, "", obtained);
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cli_credentials_set_realm(credentials, p+1, obtained);
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return;
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} else if ((p = strchr_m(uname,'\\'))
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--
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2.28.0
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From fa38bebb993011428612d51819530218d8358f5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 16:04:20 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] lookup_name: allow lookup for own realm
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When using security tab in Windows Explorer, a lookup over a trusted
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forest might come as realm\name instead of NetBIOS domain name:
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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[2020/01/13 11:12:39.859134, 1, pid=33253, effective(1732401004, 1732401004), real(1732401004, 0), class=rpc_parse] ../../librpc/ndr/ndr.c:471(ndr_print_function_debug)
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lsa_LookupNames3: struct lsa_LookupNames3
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in: struct lsa_LookupNames3
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handle : *
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handle: struct policy_handle
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handle_type : 0x00000000 (0)
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uuid : 0000000e-0000-0000-1c5e-a750e5810000
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num_names : 0x00000001 (1)
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names: ARRAY(1)
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names: struct lsa_String
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length : 0x001e (30)
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size : 0x0020 (32)
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string : *
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string : 'ipa.test\admins'
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sids : *
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sids: struct lsa_TransSidArray3
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count : 0x00000000 (0)
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sids : NULL
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level : LSA_LOOKUP_NAMES_UPLEVEL_TRUSTS_ONLY2 (6)
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count : *
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count : 0x00000000 (0)
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lookup_options : LSA_LOOKUP_OPTION_SEARCH_ISOLATED_NAMES (0)
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client_revision : LSA_CLIENT_REVISION_2 (2)
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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Allow this lookup using realm to be done against primary domain.
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Refactor user name parsing code to reuse cli_credentials_* API to be
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consistent with other places. cli_credentials_parse_string() handles
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both domain and realm-based user name variants.
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Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
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---
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source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
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1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c b/source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c
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index 82c47b3145b..39d599fed27 100644
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--- a/source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c
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+++ b/source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c
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@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
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#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
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#include "lib/winbind_util.h"
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#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/idmap.h"
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+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
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static bool lookup_unix_user_name(const char *name, struct dom_sid *sid)
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{
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@@ -78,52 +79,82 @@ bool lookup_name(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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const char **ret_domain, const char **ret_name,
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struct dom_sid *ret_sid, enum lsa_SidType *ret_type)
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{
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- char *p;
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const char *tmp;
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const char *domain = NULL;
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const char *name = NULL;
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+ const char *realm = NULL;
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uint32_t rid;
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struct dom_sid sid;
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enum lsa_SidType type;
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TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
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+ struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
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if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
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DEBUG(0, ("talloc_new failed\n"));
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return false;
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}
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- p = strchr_m(full_name, '\\');
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-
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- if (p != NULL) {
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- domain = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx, full_name,
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- PTR_DIFF(p, full_name));
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- name = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, p+1);
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- } else {
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- domain = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, "");
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- name = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, full_name);
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+ creds = cli_credentials_init(tmp_ctx);
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+ if (creds == NULL) {
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+ DEBUG(0, ("cli_credentials_init failed\n"));
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+ return false;
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}
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- if ((domain == NULL) || (name == NULL)) {
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- DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n"));
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- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
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+ cli_credentials_parse_string(creds, full_name, CRED_SPECIFIED);
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+ name = cli_credentials_get_username(creds);
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+ domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(creds);
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+ realm = cli_credentials_get_realm(creds);
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+
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+ /* At this point we have:
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+ * - name -- normal name or empty string
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+ * - domain -- either NULL or domain name
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+ * - realm -- either NULL or realm name
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+ *
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+ * domain and realm are exclusive to each other
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+ * the code below in lookup_name assumes domain
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+ * to be at least empty string, not NULL
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+ */
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+
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+ if ((name == NULL) || (name[0] == '\0')) {
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+ DEBUG(0, ("lookup_name with empty name, exit\n"));
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return false;
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}
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+ if ((domain == NULL) && (realm == NULL)) {
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+ domain = talloc_strdup(creds, "");
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+ }
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+
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DEBUG(10,("lookup_name: %s => domain=[%s], name=[%s]\n",
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full_name, domain, name));
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DEBUG(10, ("lookup_name: flags = 0x0%x\n", flags));
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- if (((flags & LOOKUP_NAME_DOMAIN) || (flags == 0)) &&
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- strequal(domain, get_global_sam_name()))
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- {
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+ /* Windows clients may send a LookupNames request with both NetBIOS
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+ * domain name- and realm-qualified user names. Thus, we need to check
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+ * both against both of the SAM domain name and realm, if set. Since
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+ * domain name and realm in the request are exclusive, test the one
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+ * that is specified. cli_credentials_parse_string() will either set
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+ * realm or wouldn't so we can use it to detect if realm was specified.
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+ */
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+ if ((flags & LOOKUP_NAME_DOMAIN) || (flags == 0)) {
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+ const char *domain_name = realm ? realm : domain;
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+ bool check_global_sam = false;
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+
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+ if (domain_name[0] != '\0') {
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+ check_global_sam = strequal(domain_name, get_global_sam_name());
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+ if (!check_global_sam && lp_realm() != NULL) {
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+ check_global_sam = strequal(domain_name, lp_realm());
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+ }
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+ }
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- /* It's our own domain, lookup the name in passdb */
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- if (lookup_global_sam_name(name, flags, &rid, &type)) {
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- sid_compose(&sid, get_global_sam_sid(), rid);
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- goto ok;
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+ if (check_global_sam) {
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+ /* It's our own domain, lookup the name in passdb */
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+ if (lookup_global_sam_name(name, flags, &rid, &type)) {
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+ sid_compose(&sid, get_global_sam_sid(), rid);
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+ goto ok;
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+ }
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+ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
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+ return false;
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}
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- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
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- return false;
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}
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if ((flags & LOOKUP_NAME_BUILTIN) &&
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--
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2.28.0
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