From a0a1977d9a5dc28e6c1998d8d5cb712305bd0b50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lennart Poettering Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 17:51:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: more comprehensive protection against libseccomp's __NR_xyz namespace invasion A follow-up for 59b657296a2fe104f112b91bbf9301724067cc81, adding the same conditioning for all cases of our __NR_xyz use. Fixes: #14031 (cherry picked from commit 4df8fe8415eaf4abd5b93c3447452547c6ea9e5f) --- src/basic/missing_syscall.h | 10 +++++----- src/test/test-seccomp.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/basic/missing_syscall.h b/src/basic/missing_syscall.h index 6d9b12544d..1255d8b197 100644 --- a/src/basic/missing_syscall.h +++ b/src/basic/missing_syscall.h @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static inline int missing_renameat2(int oldfd, const char *oldname, int newfd, c #if !HAVE_KCMP static inline int missing_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2) { -# ifdef __NR_kcmp +# if defined __NR_kcmp && __NR_kcmp > 0 return syscall(__NR_kcmp, pid1, pid2, type, idx1, idx2); # else errno = ENOSYS; @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static inline int missing_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, unsigned long i #if !HAVE_KEYCTL static inline long missing_keyctl(int cmd, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { -# ifdef __NR_keyctl +# if defined __NR_keyctl && __NR_keyctl > 0 return syscall(__NR_keyctl, cmd, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); # else errno = ENOSYS; @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static inline long missing_keyctl(int cmd, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg } static inline key_serial_t missing_add_key(const char *type, const char *description, const void *payload, size_t plen, key_serial_t ringid) { -# ifdef __NR_add_key +# if defined __NR_add_key && __NR_add_key > 0 return syscall(__NR_add_key, type, description, payload, plen, ringid); # else errno = ENOSYS; @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static inline key_serial_t missing_add_key(const char *type, const char *descrip } static inline key_serial_t missing_request_key(const char *type, const char *description, const char * callout_info, key_serial_t destringid) { -# ifdef __NR_request_key +# if defined __NR_request_key && __NR_request_key > 0 return syscall(__NR_request_key, type, description, callout_info, destringid); # else errno = ENOSYS; @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ enum { static inline long missing_set_mempolicy(int mode, const unsigned long *nodemask, unsigned long maxnode) { long i; -# ifdef __NR_set_mempolicy +# if defined __NR_set_mempolicy && __NR_set_mempolicy > 0 i = syscall(__NR_set_mempolicy, mode, nodemask, maxnode); # else errno = ENOSYS; diff --git a/src/test/test-seccomp.c b/src/test/test-seccomp.c index a906070f9a..6dd98672b8 100644 --- a/src/test/test-seccomp.c +++ b/src/test/test-seccomp.c @@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ #include "tmpfile-util.h" #include "virt.h" -#if SCMP_SYS(socket) < 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__) +/* __NR_socket may be invalid due to libseccomp */ +#if !defined(__NR_socket) || __NR_socket <= 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__) /* On these archs, socket() is implemented via the socketcall() syscall multiplexer, * and we can't restrict it hence via seccomp. */ # define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 1 @@ -304,14 +305,14 @@ static void test_protect_sysctl(void) { assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { -#if __NR__sysctl > 0 +#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl > 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, NULL) < 0); assert_se(errno == EFAULT); #endif assert_se(seccomp_protect_sysctl() >= 0); -#if __NR__sysctl > 0 +#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl > 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, 0, 0, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EPERM); #endif @@ -640,7 +641,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) { assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); -#if SCMP_SYS(access) >= 0 +#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access > 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); #else assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); @@ -656,7 +657,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) { s = hashmap_free(s); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); -#if SCMP_SYS(access) >= 0 +#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access > 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #else assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); @@ -672,7 +673,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) { s = hashmap_free(s); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); -#if SCMP_SYS(poll) >= 0 +#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll > 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); #else assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); @@ -689,7 +690,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) { s = hashmap_free(s); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); -#if SCMP_SYS(poll) >= 0 +#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll > 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #else assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); @@ -767,8 +768,8 @@ static int real_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) { * testing purposes that calls the real syscall, on architectures where SYS_open is defined. On * other architectures, let's just fall back to the glibc call. */ -#ifdef SYS_open - return (int) syscall(SYS_open, path, flags, mode); +#if defined __NR_open && __NR_open > 0 + return (int) syscall(__NR_open, path, flags, mode); #else return open(path, flags, mode); #endif