From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Subject: x86/amd: Mitigations for Zenbleed

Zenbleed is a malfunction on AMD Zen2 uarch parts which results in corruption

of the vector registers.  An attacker can trigger this bug deliberately in

order to access stale data in the physical vector register file.  This can

include data from sibling threads, or a higher-privilege context.

Microcode is the preferred mitigation but in the case that's not available use

the chickenbit as instructed by AMD.  Re-evaluate the mitigation on late

microcode load too.

This is XSA-433 / CVE-2023-20593.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c

index b6a20d375ad1..8d23a5be0c5f 100644

--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c

+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@

 #include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>

 #include <asm/acpi.h>

 #include <asm/apic.h>

+#include <asm/microcode.h>

 #include "cpu.h"

@@ -878,6 +879,72 @@ void __init detect_zen2_null_seg_behaviour(void)

 }

+void amd_check_zenbleed(void)

+{

+	const struct cpu_signature *sig = &this_cpu(cpu_sig);

+	unsigned int good_rev, chickenbit = (1 << 9);

+	uint64_t val, old_val;

+

+	/*

+	 * If we're virtualised, we can't do family/model checks safely, and

+	 * we likely wouldn't have access to DE_CFG even if we could see a

+	 * microcode revision.

+	 *

+	 * A hypervisor may hide AVX as a stopgap mitigation.  We're not in a

+	 * position to care either way.  An admin doesn't want to be disabling

+	 * AVX as a mitigation on any build of Xen with this logic present.

+	 */

+	if (cpu_has_hypervisor || boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17)

+		return;

+

+	switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {

+	case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107a; break;

+	case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010b; break;

+	case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608105; break;

+	case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701032; break;

+	case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00008; break;

+	default:

+		/*

+		 * With the Fam17h check above, parts getting here are Zen1.

+		 * They're not affected.

+		 */

+		return;

+	}

+

+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val);

+	old_val = val;

+

+	/*

+	 * Microcode is the preferred mitigation, in terms of performance.

+	 * However, without microcode, this chickenbit (specific to the Zen2

+	 * uarch) disables Floating Point Mov-Elimination to mitigate the

+	 * issue.

+	 */

+	val &= ~chickenbit;

+	if (sig->rev < good_rev)

+		val |= chickenbit;

+

+	if (val == old_val)

+		/* Nothing to change. */

+		return;

+

+	/*

+	 * DE_CFG is a Core-scoped MSR, and this write is racy during late

+	 * microcode load.  However, both threads calculate the new value from

+	 * state which is shared, and unrelated to the old value, so the

+	 * result should be consistent.

+	 */

+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val);

+

+	/*

+	 * Inform the admin that we changed something, but don't spam,

+	 * especially during a late microcode load.

+	 */

+	if (smp_processor_id() == 0)

+		printk(XENLOG_INFO "Zenbleed mitigation - using %s\n",

+		       val & chickenbit ? "chickenbit" : "microcode");

+}

+

 static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)

 {

 	u32 l, h;

@@ -1150,6 +1217,8 @@ static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)

 	if ((smp_processor_id() == 1) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ITSC))

 		disable_c1_ramping();

+	amd_check_zenbleed();

+

 	check_syscfg_dram_mod_en();

 	amd_log_freq(c);

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c

index ded8fe90e650..c6d13f3fb35f 100644

--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c

+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c

@@ -262,6 +262,8 @@ static int cf_check apply_microcode(const struct microcode_patch *patch)

            "microcode: CPU%u updated from revision %#x to %#x, date = %04x-%02x-%02x\n",

            cpu, old_rev, rev, patch->year, patch->month, patch->day);

+    amd_check_zenbleed();

+

     return 0;

 }

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h

index 8e2816fae9b9..66611df6efc1 100644

--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h

+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h

@@ -637,6 +637,8 @@ enum ap_boot_method {

 };

 extern enum ap_boot_method ap_boot_method;

+void amd_check_zenbleed(void);

+

 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */

 #endif /* __ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */