policy_module(kernel,1.0)
# assertion related attributes
attribute can_load_policy;
attribute can_setenforce;
attribute can_setsecparam;
attribute can_load_kernmodule;
attribute can_receive_kernel_messages;
# constraint related attributes
attribute can_change_process_identity;
attribute can_change_process_role;
attribute can_change_object_identity;
#
# kernel_t is the domain of kernel threads.
# It is also the target type when checking permissions in the system class.
#
type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule, can_load_policy;
role system_r types kernel_t;
domain_make_domain(kernel_t)
sid kernel context_template(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,s0 - s9:c0.c127)
#
# unlabeled_t is the type of unlabeled objects.
# Objects that have no known labeling information or that
# have labels that are no longer valid are treated as having this type.
#
type unlabeled_t;
sid unlabeled context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
# These initial sids are no longer used, and can be removed:
sid any_socket context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid file_labels context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid icmp_socket context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid igmp_packet context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid init context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid kmod context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid netmsg context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid policy context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid scmp_packet context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_modprobe context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_fs context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_kernel context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_net context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_net_unix context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_vm context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_dev context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid tcp_socket context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
#
# security_t is the target type when checking
# the permissions in the security class. It is also
# applied to selinuxfs inodes.
#
type security_t;
fs_make_fs(security_t)
sid security context_template(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0)
genfscon selinuxfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0)
#
# sysfs_t is the type for /sys
#
type sysfs_t;
files_make_mountpoint(sysfs_t)
fs_make_fs(sysfs_t)
genfscon sysfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:sysfs_t,s0)
#
# usbfs_t is the type for /proc/bus/usb
#
type usbfs_t alias usbdevfs_t;
files_make_mountpoint(usbfs_t)
fs_make_fs(usbfs_t)
genfscon usbfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:usbfs_t,s0)
genfscon usbdevfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:usbfs_t,s0)
#
# Procfs types
#
type proc_t;
files_make_mountpoint(proc_t)
fs_make_fs(proc_t)
genfscon proc / context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sysvipc context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)
# kernel message interface
type proc_kmsg_t;
genfscon proc /kmsg context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_kmsg_t,s0)
neverallow ~can_receive_kernel_messages proc_kmsg_t:file ~getattr;
# /proc kcore: inaccessible
type proc_kcore_t;
neverallow * proc_kcore_t:file ~getattr;
genfscon proc /kcore context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_kcore_t,s0)
type proc_mdstat_t;
genfscon proc /mdstat context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_mdstat_t,s0)
type proc_net_t;
genfscon proc /net context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_net_t,s0)
#
# Sysctl types
#
# /proc/irq directory and files
type sysctl_irq_t;
genfscon proc /irq context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_irq_t,s0)
# /proc/net/rpc directory and files
type sysctl_rpc_t;
genfscon proc /net/rpc context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_rpc_t,s0)
# /proc/sys directory, base directory of sysctls
type sysctl_t;
files_make_mountpoint(sysctl_t)
sid sysctl context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/fs directory and files
type sysctl_fs_t;
files_make_mountpoint(sysctl_fs_t)
genfscon proc /sys/fs context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/kernel directory and files
type sysctl_kernel_t;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file
type sysctl_modprobe_t;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug file
type sysctl_hotplug_t;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_hotplug_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/net directory and files
type sysctl_net_t;
genfscon proc /sys/net context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/net/unix directory and files
type sysctl_net_unix_t;
genfscon proc /sys/net/unix context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_unix_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/vm directory and files
type sysctl_vm_t;
genfscon proc /sys/vm context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/dev directory and files
type sysctl_dev_t;
genfscon proc /sys/dev context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0)
########################################
#
# kernel local policy
#
# Use capabilities. need to investigate which capabilities are actually used
allow kernel_t self:capability *;
# Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files
allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton;
# old general_domain_access()
allow kernel_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow kernel_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow kernel_t self:msg { send receive };
allow kernel_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow kernel_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow kernel_t self:fd use;
# old general_proc_read_access():
allow kernel_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_t:{ lnk_file file } r_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_net_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_net_t:file r_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_mdstat_t:file r_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_kcore_t:file getattr;
allow kernel_t proc_kmsg_t:file getattr;
allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file r_file_perms;
# old base_file_read_access():
files_list_home_directories(kernel_t)
files_read_general_application_resources(kernel_t)
selinux_read_config(kernel_t)
selinux_read_binary_policy(kernel_t)
allow kernel_t security_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;
auditallow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;
libraries_use_dynamic_loader(kernel_t)
libraries_use_shared_libraries(kernel_t)
corecommands_execute_shell(kernel_t)
terminal_use_console(kernel_t)
domain_signal_all_domains(kernel_t)
# Mount root file system. Used when loading a policy
# from initrd, then mounting the root filesystem
fs_mount_all_fs(kernel_t)
# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe is set to /bin/true if not using modules.
corecommands_execute_general_programs(kernel_t)
logging_send_system_log_message(kernel_t)
# Kernel-generated traffic, e.g. ICMP replies.
corenetwork_sendrecv_raw_on_all_interfaces(kernel_t)
corenetwork_sendrecv_raw_on_all_nodes(kernel_t)
# Kernel-generated traffic, e.g. TCP resets.
corenetwork_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_interfaces(kernel_t)
corenetwork_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_nodes(kernel_t)
neverallow ~can_load_policy security_t:security load_policy;
neverallow ~can_setenforce security_t:security setenforce;
neverallow ~can_setsecparam security_t:security setsecparam;
# enabling dyntransition breaks process tranquility. If you dont
# know what this means or dont understand the implications of a
# dynamic transition, you shouldnt be using it!!!
neverallow * *:process { setcurrent dyntransition };
neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule *:capability sys_module;