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From d21d36e84354c04638b60a739a5f7c3d9f8adaf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:43:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 23/23] libxc: Better range check in xc_dom_alloc_segment

If seg->pfn is too large, the arithmetic in the range check might
overflow, defeating the range check.

This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
 tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c |    3 ++-
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
index f8d1b08..e79e38d 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ int xc_dom_alloc_segment(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
     seg->vstart = start;
     seg->pfn = (seg->vstart - dom->parms.virt_base) / page_size;
 
-    if ( pages > dom->total_pages || /* double test avoids overflow probs */
+    if ( pages > dom->total_pages || /* multiple test avoids overflow probs */
+         seg->pfn > dom->total_pages ||
          pages > dom->total_pages - seg->pfn)
     {
         xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
-- 
1.7.2.5