xen: list interfaces subject to the security process exception in XSA-77

List all the sub ops of:
  __HYPERVISOR_domctl
  __HYPERVISOR_sysctl
  __HYPERVISOR_memory_op
  __HYPERVISOR_tmem_op
which are subject to the policy given in
http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-77.html

It is expected that these lists will be whittled away as each interface is
audited for safety.

New interfaces should be expected to be safe when introduced (IOW the list
should never be expanded).

This is XSA-77.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>

diff --git a/docs/misc/xsm-flask.txt b/docs/misc/xsm-flask.txt
index ff81b01..ddd5831 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xsm-flask.txt
+++ b/docs/misc/xsm-flask.txt
@@ -17,6 +17,189 @@ Some examples of what FLASK can do:
 Some of these examples require dom0 disaggregation to be useful, since the
 domain build process requires the ability to write to the new domain's memory.
 
+Security Status of dom0 disaggregation
+--------------------------------------
+
+Xen supports disaggregation of various support and management
+functions into their own domains, via the XSM mechanisms described in
+this document.
+
+However the implementations of these support and management interfaces
+were originally written to be used only by the totally-privileged
+dom0, and have not been reviewed for security when exposed to
+supposedly-only-semi-privileged disaggregated management domains.  But
+such management domains are (in such a design) to be seen as
+potentially hostile, e.g. due to privilege escalation following
+exploitation of a bug in the management domain.
+
+Until the interfaces have been properly reviewed for security against
+hostile callers, the Xen.org security team intends (subject of course
+to the permission of anyone disclosing to us) to handle these and
+future vulnerabilities in these interfaces in public, as if they were
+normal non-security-related bugs.
+
+This applies only to bugs which do no more than reduce the security of
+a radically disaggregated system to the security of a
+non-disaggregated one.  Here a "radically disaggregated system" is one
+which uses the XSM mechanism to delegate the affected interfaces to
+other-than-fully-trusted domains.
+
+This policy does not apply to bugs which affect stub device models,
+driver domains, or stub xenstored - even if those bugs do no worse
+than reduce the security of such a system to one whose device models,
+backend drivers, or xenstore, run in dom0.
+
+For more information see http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-77.html.
+
+The following interfaces are covered by this statement.  Interfaces
+not listed here are considered safe for disaggregation, security
+issues found in interfaces not listed here will be handled according
+to the normal security problem response policy
+http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html.
+
+__HYPERVISOR_domctl (xen/include/public/domctl.h)
+
+ The following subops are covered by this statement. subops not listed
+ here are considered safe for disaggregation.
+
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_pausedomain
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_unpausedomain
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getmemlist
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo2
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_setvcpuaffinity
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_max_mem
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_setvcpucontext
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpucontext
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuinfo
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_setdomainhandle
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_setdebugging
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_hypercall_init
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_arch_setup
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuaffinity
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_real_mode_area
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_resumedomain
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_sendtrigger
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_gethvmcontext
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_sethvmcontext
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_address_size
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_get_address_size
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_pin_mem_cacheattr
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_ext_vcpucontext
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_get_ext_vcpucontext
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_opt_feature
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_target
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpuid
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_machine_address_size
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_get_machine_address_size
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_gethvmcontext_partial
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_mem_event_op
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_settscinfo
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_setvcpuextstate
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuextstate
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_audit_p2m
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_broken_page_p2m
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_setnodeaffinity
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_getnodeaffinity
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_set_max_evtchn
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_domstatus
+
+__HYPERVISOR_sysctl (xen/include/public/sysctl.h)
+
+ The following subops are covered by this statement. subops not listed
+ here are considered safe for disaggregation.
+
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_readconsole
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_tbuf_op
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_physinfo
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_sched_id
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_perfc_op
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_getdomaininfolist
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_debug_keys
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_getcpuinfo
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_availheap
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_get_pmstat
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_hotplug
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_pm_op
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_page_offline_op
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_lockprof_op
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_topologyinfo
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_numainfo
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_cpupool_op
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_scheduler_op
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_coverage_op
+
+__HYPERVISOR_memory_op (xen/include/public/memory.h)
+
+ The following subops are covered by this statement. subops not listed
+ here are considered safe for disaggregation.
+
+ * XENMEM_set_pod_target
+ * XENMEM_get_pod_target
+ * XENMEM_claim_pages
+
+__HYPERVISOR_tmem_op (xen/include/public/tmem.h)
+
+ The following tmem control ops, that is the sub-subops of
+ TMEM_CONTROL, are covered by this statement. 
+
+ Note that TMEM is also subject to a similar policy arising from
+ XSA-15 http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-announce/2012-09/msg00006.html.
+ Due to this existing policy all TMEM Ops are already subject to
+ reduced security support.
+
+ * TMEMC_THAW
+ * TMEMC_FREEZE
+ * TMEMC_FLUSH
+ * TMEMC_DESTROY
+ * TMEMC_LIST
+ * TMEMC_SET_WEIGHT
+ * TMEMC_SET_CAP
+ * TMEMC_SET_COMPRESS
+ * TMEMC_QUERY_FREEABLE_MB
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_BEGIN
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_VERSION
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_MAXPOOLS
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_CLIENT_WEIGHT
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_CLIENT_CAP
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_CLIENT_FLAGS
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_POOL_FLAGS
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_POOL_NPAGES
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_POOL_UUID
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_NEXT_PAGE
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_GET_NEXT_INV
+ * TMEMC_SAVE_END
+ * TMEMC_RESTORE_BEGIN
+ * TMEMC_RESTORE_PUT_PAGE
+ * TMEMC_RESTORE_FLUSH_PAGE
+
+
 
 Setting up FLASK
 ----------------